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ABSTRACT 
“Children of the Silent Majority: Nixon, New Politics, and the Youth Vote, 1968-
1972” investigates the emergence of young Americans as a major force in national 
politics, arguing that the 1968 generation constrained the conservative realignment that 
Richard Nixon envisioned but also revitalized the Republican Party after the voting age 
fell to eighteen. Despite the widespread assumption that the vast cadre of young voters 
casting ballots for the first time in 1972 would tilt the electorate to the Democratic Party, 
this dissertation reveals that the Nixon administration targeted and mobilized young 
Americans not aligned with the left—people Nixon’s staff called the “sons and daughters 
of the silent majority.” 
Nixon cultivated his own youth cadre, Young Voters for the President (YVP). 
Carefully targeting non-students and campus conservatives to join this 400,000 member 
organization, YVP leaders employed both grassroots organization and modern Madison 
Avenue advertising techniques to pry increasingly independent young voters from 
previous Democratic strongholds such as urban, ethnic enclaves and the Sunbelt. In 
 
 
v 
 
addition, when the politics of youth--the ways Americans, young and old, thought about 
young people and youth issues--presented a barrier to Nixon’s law-and-order 
conservative policies on problems such as marijuana and campus disorders, Nixon 
acquiesced on issues such as the draft and environmental protection. This youth-friendly 
approach allowed his administration to attract and recruit young voters.  
This study also explores how youth politics fueled the development of image 
politics during the1970s, compelling campaigns to embrace new techniques that 
emphasized targeted polling, television and candidates’ personal characteristics over 
party loyalty.  Attracting young voters necessitated a more image savvy campaign, giving 
Nixon’s in-house advertising agency of high-powered executives, the November Group, a 
central role in campaign strategy.  Young voters also supplied the campaign with public 
relations opportunities to counter Nixon’s detractors in the media who relished his “youth 
problem.” 
This study contributes to the scholarship on the Nixon presidency and the political 
history of the Republican “New Majority” in the 1960s and 1970s by uncovering the 
decisive role of young voters and youth issues in those pivotal years. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 In 1968, the Republican Party followed traditional protocol when it nominated 
Richard Nixon as its presidential candidate.  Predictably, Nixon’s crucial supporters 
received the honor of seconding his nomination at the Republican National Convention in 
Miami.  These positions had historically been reserved for party leaders and political 
elites in thanks for their efforts or to unify the party behind a candidacy.  1968 was no 
exception, as Governor John Volpe of Massachusetts, Senator Howard Baker of 
Tennessee, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon and Illinois gubernatorial candidate Richard 
Ogilvie addressed the hall on Nixon’s behalf.1 
Four years later, when Nixon’s campaign managers planned the seconding 
speeches for the 1972 Republican National Convention, they assembled a more varied 
and “diligently balanced panel” including the nation’s youngest state representative and a 
nineteen-year-old mayor.
2
 This change encapsulated the emergence of young Americans 
in politics during this period. In 1971, the ratification of the 26
th
 Amendment guaranteed 
eleven million Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty the right to vote, 
contributing to an unprecedented explosion of young voters.  This development caused 
concern in Nixon’s administration when experts identified the youth vote as anti-war and 
left-leaning, arguing that the voting booth offered “a fresh sense of power and identity to 
                                                          
1
 Associated Press, “Volpe to Give Initial Seconding Speech as Nixon is Proposed for Candidate,” Lewiston 
Evening Journal, Lewiston-Auburn, ME, August 7, 1968, p.21. 
2
 Convention Schedule, August 3, 1972.  PJM Box 15, Folder: Subject Files, Alphabetical (JSM) 
Convention [1 of 10].  Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA. See also: Max Frankel, “Nixon is Renominated by 
1,347 to 1 Vote; Liberals Lose Fight over Rules for 1976”, New York Times, August, 23, 1972, p.1.  
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a generation that until now could test its muscles only in the politics of street protest.” 
One LIFE magazine article claimed “the margin of new Democrats over Republicans is 
roughly 5-2, even in GOP strongholds.”3 The youth vote threatened the mandate 
President Richard Nixon desired for his re-election in 1972. 
Observers explained the Democrats’ predicted success with young voters as a 
result of the 1960s’ youth revolt or Nixon’s tough stance on the Vietnam War. 
Furthermore, Nixon’s advisors feared that his “law and order” image personified the gap 
between the generations and fueled young voters’ reluctance to support the President. 
After all, in a time when young Americans warned each other never to trust anyone over 
thirty, one of Nixon’s critics mused that he “seems the kind of kid who [must have] 
always carried a bookbag.  Who was 42 years old the day he was born.”4  Pictures of 
Nixon dodging the surf while wearing a suit and wingtips further cemented his square 
reputation.  In 1971, before Nixon’s campaign managers knew their opponent, pundits, 
political scientists and even Nixon’s personal pollster, Robert Teeter, predicted potent 
youth support for the Democratic challenger.
5
 
His sights set on a landslide victory, however, Nixon proclaimed that “there can 
be no generation gap in America,” and resolved to fold young people into his 
constituency.
6
 After the nation ratified the 26
th
 Amendment in record time, the 
                                                          
3Dale Wittner, “Young Voters Surge to Enroll in the System,” LIFE, October 15, 1971, p.28. 
4R.W. Apple, Jr., “Youth Vote Likely to Aid Democrats,” New York Times Magazine, May 10, 1971, p.18. 
5
 William F. Buckley, Jr.,“A Way Out On Voting Age Pledge,” Washington Star, February 17, 1970, p. 17.  
Jeb Magruder claims Teeter recommended the CRP leaders “halt all activity among young people” after his 
first wave of polls in 1970.  Jeb Magruder, An American Life(New York: Atheneum, 1974), p.171.       
6
 Richard Nixon,Remarks to a Student-Faculty Convocation at the University of Nebraska, PPP,The 
American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, CA: University of 
California,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2955.  Accessed October, 12, 2012. 
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Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP) promptly established Young Voters for the 
President (YVP), which included over 400,000 members and received unequaled funding 
and autonomy within the Nixon campaign. Surprisingly, Nixon split the youth vote as 
one Gallup poll taken in August, 1972, even showed fifty-seven percent of the voters 
under thirty years-old found the President “more sincere and believable” than his anti-war 
opponent, Senator George McGovern (D-SD).
7
 
As the GOP sought to recruit voter segments that had supported Democrats since 
the New Deal, these new conditions offered Republicans an opportunity to build their 
ranks. The YVP established a constituency and leadership cohort for the party’s future 
while it opened the Republican Party to new methods that facilitated the GOP’s shift 
away from its “country club-big business image” to win over urban ethnic enclaves and 
Sunbelt conservatives.  Young voters played a central role in this election but also began 
lasting changes that brought politics out of the “smoke filled rooms.” 
Young Americans’ influence on politics during this period fell into three 
categories; the politics of youth, youth politics and the politics of image.  First, the 
politics of youth developed into a national debate over young people’s roles, attitudes, 
and issues-- the voting age, ending the draft, lowering the age of majority, college 
financial aid and the environment.  When Nixon took office in 1969, however, he viewed 
young Americans only through the prism of his more likely constituency of older 
supporters.  Invoking law-and-order to confront the threat of rebellious youth, Nixon 
                                                          
7
 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 
2008), p. 565. 
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appealed to Middle America, or the forty-seven-year old, white woman from Ohio as 
described in Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg’s  influential study, The Real 
Majority.
8
  Scammon and Wattenberg noted that cultural issues had dethroned the 
economy’s primacy among the concerns of ordinary voters, defining the dominant source 
of American anxiety as the "social issue” of “crime, violence, drugs, disruption, riot, out-
of-wedlock birth, promiscuity, that whole panoply of issues."
9
  Through television, many 
Americans imagined young people as the embodiment of these social issues.  One 
editorial claimed: “Semantically the word student has come to mean violence, long hair, 
LSD, dirt, and sexual freedom to many adults whose major contact with youth has come 
through mass media.”10 As the politics of youth emphasized these social issues that 
targeted how voters felt more than any political loyalty, emotional and image conscious 
appeals to anxious voters became more effective than the “bread and butter” issues.11 
While Scammon, a Democratic advisor, meant for this to prescribe a shift in 
Democratic Party politics, Richard Nixon established his command of social issues as he 
attacked elements of the youth problem—student protest and marijuana use--and carved 
out a Republican majority by embracing social conservatives and religious voters.
12
 Still, 
                                                          
8
 Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg,  The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the 
American Electorate (New York:  Coward-McCann, 1970). 
9
 Bernard Shaw, “20th century brings changes to the American voter,” December 28, 
1999http://archives.cnn.com/1999/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/28/millenium.voter/index.html, accessed, 
October, 20, 2012. 
10
 Guest Column: National Education Association, “Student NEA Beefs up Political Image,” Florence 
Times Daily, August 29, 1970, p.4. 
11
 Dennis D. Loo, Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, “Polls, Politics and Crime: The ‘Law and Order’ Issues of the 
1960s,” Western Criminology Review,5(1), http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v5n1/manuscripts/Loo.pdf, 50-67 
(2004). Michael Flamm, Law and Order Street Crime, Civil Unrest and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 
1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p.128. 
12
 Bruce Schulman, The Seventies:  The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (Cambridge, 
MA: Da Capo Press, 2002); Perlstein, Nixonland. 
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Nixon realized that many young people made up “the sons and daughters of the silent 
majority” and softened his attack on young people.  In addition, while the image of 
troubled youth served Nixon’s appeal to law and order in 1968 it hurt his presidency’s 
ability to claim success in calming America’s tumult during his first term. The President 
moderated his tough stance on marijuana, choosing only to punish the pushers. After the 
Ohio National Guard killed four students during an antiwar demonstration at Kent State, 
Nixon looked for ways to turn the youth problem into an asset. Cultivating a conservative 
student culture through speeches on campuses such as the University of Nebraska and the 
University of Tennessee, Nixon separated the hippies he blamed for the generation gap 
from those young Americans who shared his “square” sensibility. As the generation gap 
became a cause for even greater concern, Nixon’s administration pushed him to consider 
a more youth-friendly approach.  Especially as the eighteen-year old vote became likely, 
the White House defensively took actions that sought to defuse this ticking time bomb 
before Election Day.  To soothe these tensions, Nixon publicly supported youth friendly 
measures that ended the draft, increased student aid and lowered the voting age.  
As Nixon looked for a way to get past the youth problem, he found a group of 
New Republicans who had utilized youthful campaigns to expand the party’s appeal 
beyond traditional Republicans.  Bill Brock (R-TN), for example, had become the first 
Republican Congressman in his district since 1920 at the age of thirty-two, and he 
utilized a powerful Youth for Brock Senate campaign in 1970 to defeat the long-time 
incumbent, Senator Albert Gore Sr. (D-TN). While Gore harbored anti-war sentiments 
that the experts felt would win over student voters, Brock’s campaign projected a 
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telegenic, youthful campaign that won that election’s youth vote with a strong 
organization that included non-students.  Nixon’s administration took note, as they 
pursued a path for young Americans to become adults. While they lowered the age of 
majority, his administration began an “open door” approach to staffing young people and 
holding youth conferences.  This effort sought creative ways to carve out a youth 
constituency rather than fear its electoral impact.  The politics of youth, during this 
election, included youth politics as young people now had influence as voters.  
In 1971, Nixon hired Brock and his campaign manager, Ken Rietz, to organize the 
Young Voters for the President.  The YVP’s volunteers fulfilled a central role in building 
Nixon’s image.  CRP director Jeb Magruder recalled that Nixon felt the youth vote 
mattered “not so much for its substance--voters registered, volunteers enlisted--as for its 
PR benefits.”13Although the YVP served these new image-focused ends, Children of the 
Silent Majority shows that Nixon’s youth campaign also became a signature moment in 
the founding of the conservative movement, creating an infrastructure and a leadership 
cadre that would exert lasting influence.  
This outreach to young voters signaled the underappreciated history of youth 
politics. Between 1968 and 1972, both the Nixon administration and Democrats 
mobilized youth as a political force, revealing its central role in the larger transformations 
of both parties in the early 1970s.  This dissertation explains that the press, pundits, 
Democrats, student radicals and even some Republicans were wrong about the youth 
vote.  YVP members built their organization with traditional grassroots means as they 
                                                          
13
Magruder, An American Life, p.173. 
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targeted a constituency of working youth, campus conservatives and young independent 
voters to take forty-nine percent of the youth vote.  When asked to characterize the 
YVP’s inspiration, New York’s YVP State Director Cathy Bertini described it as a 
“movement,” “almost countercultural.” As Bertini recalled, “we were a little bit more 
establishment and they [McGovern’s young supporters] were more Woodstock.”  The 
radical image that McGovern’s youth elicited, whether deserved or not, provoked a 
criticism that his campaign stood for “Acid, Amnesty, and Abortion.” In addition to 
McGovern’s “three A’s” motivation for square young Americans, the YVP also attracted 
ambitious young men and women who saw Nixon’s campaign as an opportunity. As YVP 
College Director George Gorton recalled, “We had speakers, money and possible future 
jobs.”  
The YVP leadership first recruited volunteers from youth organizations filled with 
reliably loyal, Republican and conservative young Americans. For example, the College 
Republicans at the University of Maryland staffed their own YVP headquarters and saw 
membership jump from 200 to 800.
14
 To be sure, Nixon’s victory did not produce a 
traditional realignment -- the GOP secured neither the White House nor a congressional 
majority after Nixon resigned. Still, his presidency did carve out a future GOP 
constituency. First time voters’ surprising decisions at the polls offers a revealing 
measurement of the overlooked and underestimated young Americans who believed in 
the establishment during the 1960s and 1970s and supported Richard Nixon’s initiatives 
such as ending the draft, passing environmental laws, and ending the Vietnam War “with 
                                                          
14
Student Organization Application for Space. Papers of UMDCR Box 1 Folder 14, Presidential Papers, 
Alan Virta 1972-1973. University of Maryland, College Park, MD. 
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honor.” 
YVP leaders did not only target well-coordinated and loyal young devotees, they 
also courted the increasing number of young people who ignored political parties and 
declared themselves as independents.  One young stewardess declared her party 
affiliation as “Gemini,” claiming that “an independent is more willing to say what he 
feels, than what the party thinks is right.”15 Thirty-two percent of twenty-one to twenty-
four year old voters registered as independent in 1964; fifty-two percent did so in 1972.
16
 
In an odd twist, the process of declaring themselves as independent linked young voters 
to a larger, shared political sensibility. Young Americans did not agree on politics, but 
the majority wanted to decide on their candidates free of party influence.  Explanations 
for this rising independence attributed it to educated young Americans who developed 
their own political views, as high school graduate rates rose from sixty-three to over 
eighty percent during the 1960s and college enrollment doubled.
17
  In addition, as the 
political scientist Louis M. Seagull claimed in 1971, party identification and party 
machines lost the “glue-giving function” due to “mass media and communication.”  This 
generation, raised under the television’s glow, frequently dismissed the political loyalties 
that had determined older Americans’ votes.18 
                                                          
15Steven V. Roberts, “Role of ‘Invisible Youths’ in 1972 Politics Reviewed,” Nashua Telegraph, March 22, 
1972, p.24. 
16Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller “Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 American 
Presidential Election,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/193436,  pp. 393-434. 
17
 Louis M. Seagull,  “The Youth Vote and Change in American Politics” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 397, Seven Polarizing Issues in America Today (Sep., 1971), pp. 88-
96, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1039021,  p.91. 
18Seagull, “The Youth Vote and Change in American Politics,” p.91. 
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This dissertation also explains that the youth vote helped open the political system 
to the politics of image-- advertising, the emphasis on candidates’ character and new 
public relations techniques. Youth politics synergized with this focus on image as 
independent-minded young voters paid less attention to party machines and more 
attention to social issues and the candidate’s character or style.  As a result, the politics of 
image became crucial to deal with the “youth problem” and blurred the line between 
public relations and policy. In addition, young supporters had developed as an 
increasingly important component of any political image. Starting with Dwight 
Eisenhower’s campaign and intensifying after John F. Kennedy’s campaign in 1960, 
presidential candidates valued young voters as important assets. “Nowadays we press 
youth out of the young as quickly as possible,” complained journalist Russell Baker. 
“With the national genius for packaging, [we] merchandise youth to the aging as 
something that can be put on like a plastic wrapper.” Critics of this youthful, image-
focused politics feared that elections had been handed over to slick admen who espoused 
a superficial youth appeal, as Baker suggested: “Packaging is not good enough…Let’s 
bring back old age. And dignity. And Grace.”19 
This complaint marked only the beginning of the new political environment that 
“preferred the beautified candidate to the grizzled.”20 Recent studies of Nixon’s image 
have focused on the debate over perception and the conflicting, symbolic efforts to define 
                                                          
19
 Russell Baker, “Observer: The Newest Wrinkle in the Youth Game,” New York Times, May 21, 1964; 
p.34. 
20
 Baker, “Observer: The Newest Wrinkle in the Youth Game,” p. 34. 
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his legacy.
21
 Focusing on the YVP, Children of the Silent Majority shows, however, that 
image-makers and political actors negotiated their relationship and produced a nuanced 
political strategy that merged organization, issues and media to target new voters and 
convince older voters that Nixon could calm the nation’s divisions.  
Recruiting young voters meant overcoming the stigma or “peer group pressure” 
that tamped down youth’s enthusiasm for the president.  This required a well-structured, 
carefully-managed youth campaign to recruit YVP members on an individual level.  It 
also meant showcasing them.
22
Nixon did not trust the media, his enemy, with this task.  
Thus, Nixon turned to a reliable and loyal group of advertising executives, the November 
Group, who volunteered for Nixon’s CRP.  In combination, the politics of youth, youth 
politics and the politics of image created a new relationship between policy, organization 
and modern campaign strategies. While image and media had assumed an increasingly 
important role in modern politics, especially since the spread of television, early efforts in 
short “spots” such as Eisenhower’s “I Like Ike” ads avoided issues and left that for the 
more traditional, half-hour speeches or dry “man on the street” questions that only 
tackled issues.  Nixon’s youth campaign in 1972 merged issues and image in its spot ads 
that featured YVP members. Demanding thirty-second television advertisements over the 
traditionally longer spots, the November group’s creative editor Bill Taylor asked, “How 
long does it take to say to young people, 'Richard Nixon gave you the vote, stopped the 
                                                          
21
 See: David Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image (2003); Daniel Frick, Reinventing 
Richard Nixon: A Cultural History of an American Obsession (2008), Mark Feeney, Feeney, Mark.  Nixon 
at the Movies: A Book about Belief (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,2004). 
22
George Gorton interview. 
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draft, and is winding down the war?'"
23
  Young voters forced Nixon’s campaign to build 
creative, forward looking tactics that the GOP used to tackle the image-conscious 
political environment. 
This organization’s precedent-setting youth campaign remains obscured for two 
reasons. First, Watergate tarnished the YVP leaders’ standing in politics. After YVP 
director Ken Rietz testified during the Watergate hearings, admitting that he paid a 
student to infiltrate a peace vigil, Nixon’s downfall stigmatized the YVP.  Journalist Jack 
Anderson called the YVP “a network of young spies and dirty tricksters who came to be 
called the ‘Kiddie Corps.’”24 While Nixon’s demise stunted the career of many YVP 
leaders, Watergate also distracted political observers from the YVP’s strategic 
innovations. 
Second, the standard narrative exaggerates this generation’s rebellious reputation 
and dismisses the YVP as a contrived oddity.
25
   For contemporary observers, the youth 
vote meant young liberals—long hairs. Because McGovern’s young supporters did not 
vote as expected, (only fifty percent turned out), young voters’ apathy defined the first 
                                                          
23
 Edwin Diamond, and Stephen Bates, The Spot: The Rise of Political Advertising on Television 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), p. 191. 
24
 Jack Anderson “The Washington Merry-Go –Round: Former Nixon Spy Now with Reagan,” Wilmington 
Morning Star, Dec. 19, 1975, p.2. 
25
 On history of youth politics during this era, see: John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics 
and Society, 1961-1974 (1991), David Frum, How We Got Here: The 70’s, the Decade that Brought You 
Modern Life (For Better or Worse) (2000); David Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image 
(2003); Walter L Hixson, The Vietnam Antiwar Movement.(2000); Mark Hamilton Lytle, America’s Uncivil 
Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon (2006); Bruce Miroff, The Liberal’s 
Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party (2007); Rick Perlstein, 
Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (2008); Doug Rossinow, The Politics of 
Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity and the New Left in America (1998); Alan Sica and Stephen Turner, 
ed. The Disobedient Generation: Social Theorists in the Sixties (2005); Melvin Small, Covering Dissent: 
The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement, (1994); Theodore Windt, Presidents and Protesters: 
Political Rhetoric in the 1960s (1990); Jules Witcover, Very Strange Bed Fellows: The Short and Unhappy 
Marriage of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew (2007).  
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youth vote’s legacy.  After the 1972 presidential election, Hunter S. Thompson 
interpreted the youth vote through his gonzo writing style and jaded perspective. 
Thompson saw McGovern’s youth-focused and activist campaign as a lost opportunity to 
realize “what a fantastic monument to the best instincts of the human race this country 
might have been.”26 This conception of 1972 as a “moment” and a lost opportunity for 
liberal youth has lingered along with Thompson’s influential account of the campaign.27 
In this interpretation, the YVP lacked authenticity. After all, during the 1960s, 
youth on the left demanded that political actors words and image matched their actions.
28
 
For Thompson, Nixon’s youthful supporters functioned simply as window dressing: 
“waterheads” and “cheerleaders.” Thompson dismissed the President’s surprising 
popularity with young voters as a symptom of political decline along with American 
voters’ susceptibility to superficial marketing techniques. “This may be the year when we 
finally come face to face with ourselves,” Thompson complained about the President’s 
young voters, and “finally just lay back and say it--that we are really just a nation of 220 
million used car salesmen…”29 Unable to imagine conservative youth, Nixon’s square 
version of young voters provoked Thompson to blame the new political sensibility that 
relied on slick, distrustful admen.  Thompson’s analysis, however, overlooked the 
important ways the politics of youth and the rise of youth politics merged to create the 
opportunity for Nixon’s campaign to make the politics of image a central component his 
                                                          
26
 Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing: On the Campaign Trail,’72  (New York: Warner Books, 
1973), p.120.  
27
 Bruce Miroff’s book, The Liberals’ Moment, and the recent documentary, One Bright Shining Moment 
look at the campaign’s limits and the youth vote’s shortcomings. 
28
 Doug Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity and the New Left in America (New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 1998), p.235. 
29
Thompson, Fear and Loathing: On the Campaign Trail,’72, p.389.  
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reelection. Dismissing the YVP for either its Watergate connections or its seeming 
contrivance, the standard interpretations have ignored the ways political elites adapted to 
young voters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The imperatives of youth politics 
entrenched the relationship between campaigns and new media techniques. 
Chapter one examines the way Nixon’s initial, law and order approach to the 
politics of youth alienated the increasingly potent youth politics during 1968--as 
Democratic candidates such as Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy had mobilized 
young voters. Agreeing with the political consultants who defined “middle-America” as 
“un-black, the un-poor and the un-young,” Nixon called this constituency the “silent 
majority” and rallied social conservatives in urban ethnic enclaves and Sunbelt suburbs 
against young people who carried a rebellious reputation and permissive image. One 
nationally (and internationally) reprinted editorial from a Minnesota weekly captured this 
fear of the youth generation as an internal threat to American traditions. In his article 
entitled “I am a Tired American,” a conservative pundit named Alan McIntosh became a 
national figure when he complained, “I am a tired American…fed up with mobs of long-
haired youths who claim they represent the ‘new wave’ of America and sneer at the old-
fashioned virtues of honesty, integrity and morality.”30 As Vietnam, the counterculture 
and campus protest brought young people into the political fray, Nixon distanced himself 
from the youth generation to win the presidency in 1968.  
                                                          
30
 As quoted by Robert Fitch in Christian Century, February,1,1967, p.139. See also: James Gilbert, Cycle 
of Outrage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)for the role juvenile delinquency played in politics 
during the 1950s and early 1960s.  Fears about young people and media’s influence on their morality took 
many forms, and subsided during the 1960s as Americans became enamored with youth culture.  This did 
not signal the end of this fear, as see in this quote, and the concerns returned with fervor in the late 1960s in 
response to mass media and the counterculture. 
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Chapter two examines the ways Nixon implemented and adapted his hard 
approach to the politics of youth after winning the White House. Nixon’s tough stance on 
controversial youth issues such as marijuana use and campus unrest underlined his 
constituency’s antagonistic relationship with the generation gap.  Even from within his 
administration, however, this stance soon came under scrutiny as the youth vote became a 
reality. While law and order had become a powerful weapon for conservatives in the 
1960s who blamed liberal leaders for the rise in street crime, drug use and campus unrest, 
it soon lost the political appeal it had held for conservative presidential politicians. “They 
discovered,” as Michael Flamm argues, “that controlling crime was more difficult than 
they had led the American people to believe.”31 A tough law and order position on 
marijuana and campus unrest suited Nixon as a campaigner, but this approach proved 
more difficult to maintain as president. 
The potential of a robust young voter segment made Nixon more cautious about 
fighting against “youth problems” such as drugs and student protests. As Nixon’s Chief 
of Staff H.R. Haldeman characterized a polling report, “Harris believes that all kids tend 
to identify with each other, they stick together. More than any other generation, they 
resent being talked down to by their elders” and “it is almost impossible to attack one 
without attacking all.”32 Despite tough talk and actions against “bad kids,” marijuana use 
continued to spread and campus unrest became a national crisis.   
The youth revolt motivated Nixon’s law and order when he ran for president in 
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1968, but also provided a structural barrier in his project to usher in a conservative era. 
Chapter three shows that during Nixon’s first term and especially after the tragedy at 
Kent State in 1970, the administration had to find new ways to appear youth friendly.  
This effort became more important when the voting age dropped to eighteen. Youth 
issues—the voting age, the environment and the draft—pushed Nixon to react 
defensively due to his concerns over young Americans’ building agency and the wider 
public relations problem this created. The President, though reluctantly, supported 
policies that one former YVP organizer called “counterintuitive” to soften the “old 
Nixon” law and order reputation to bring young people back into the system.33  Still, the 
politics of youth developed as a considerable problem for Nixon’s administration as it 
attempted to build a New Majority.  Hardly the “evil genius” that many called Nixon, his 
position on these issues revealed a confused president. 
Chapter four describes Nixon’s shift to an offensive, creative reach outreach 
young voters. This effort followed the trail blazed by New Republicans who expanded 
the GOP beyond its traditional constituency and sought new voter groups including youth 
in the Sunbelt suburbs and urban ethnic enclaves. Searching for a way to reach young 
voters in 1972, Nixon found one successful New Republican, Bill Brock (R-TN), who 
rejected the GOP’s reputation as the same old party of the “tired and dreary.” Several 
young Republicans joined Brock; as one journalist noted, “Until 1966…Democrats 
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seemed to have a monopoly of political sex appeal.”34 In 1970, Brock’s successful 
campaign to unseat Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) proved the perfect model as he 
established a Youth for Brock campaign that attracted more young voters than the liberal, 
anti-war incumbent. In addition to his conservative base, Brock attracted moderates with 
television and media based strategies to circumvent the existing party structure that 
favored Democrats. While Nixon’s Southern Strategy to end the Democratic Party’s 
dominance below the Mason-Dixon line failed (at least in 1970), he eagerly eyed Brock’s 
neatly packaged, youth-focused campaign—and Brock’s campaign manager, former 
public relations executive Kenneth Rietz.  In 1971, Nixon hired Brock and Rietz to 
organize the autonomous, heavily funded youth campaign for his own re-election. In 
addition, Nixon held a conference on youth that included thousands of delegates between 
seventeen and twenty-four. While going to China proved one of the most popular moves 
of this sort, lowering the age of majority also boosted Nixon’s shift on the politics of 
youth.  
Chapter five shows that youth voters offered a tantalizing yet problematic 
segment for liberal candidates. Challenging President Nixon in 1972, Senator George 
McGovern encouraged Democratic Party reforms that expanded the influence of youth 
and tied his electoral hopes to young voters. Widely regarded as a prairie populist, a 
principled history professor and a side-burned antiwar stalwart, McGovern’s image 
seemed a natural fit for the Woodstock Generation’s righteous politics. Liberal literature, 
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such as Charles Reich’s Greening of America, evaluated young people’s individualism as 
a rejection of the traditional social and economic systems that encouraged conformity.  
According to Reich and others, this could supply Democrats with a much needed 
constituency.
35
 However, as McGovern’s attempt to ride a youth organization branded his 
campaign, he could not shed his “Acid, Amnesty and Abortion” image.  His attempt after 
the convention to shift back to traditional Democratic voters lacked the necessary 
organization. The results proved disastrous, as Nixon only lost Massachusetts and the 
District of Columbia in the general election. Despite its liberal reputation, the youth vote 
also represented an opportunity for New Republicans. A moderate Republican just 
needed to utilize the growing popularity of youth culture while stigmatizing the 
Democratic Party as an embodiment of the youth revolt’s most sinister, permissive 
aspects. Ironically then, McGovern’s youth campaign actually enhanced the YVP’s 
significance. 
Chapter six explores the formation, structure and inspiration behind the YVP as 
well as its long term influence on GOP political strategy that mobilized new voter 
segments and fueled its developing majority.  This chapter recovers the lost history of 
youth politics during this period. By the beginning of the 1970s, the superficial need to 
appear young required complex and concrete organization and policy. A focus on youth 
politics from 1968 to 1972 explains that even though the electoral realignment Nixon 
desired fell short, the Republican Party cultivated a youth cohort that strengthened the 
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GOP for decades.
36
 YVP’s leaders united conservatives on campuses, brought young 
southern independents into the GOP and fortified training networks for young 
Republicans to fine-tune their ability to “Get Out the Vote.”    
The YVP succeeded beyond its leaders’ expectations. Nixon’s youth campaign 
utilized modern political methods and adapted to the structural changes that refocused 
organization around candidates, not the party.  Calling Nixon’s campaign a “science-
fiction preview of future politics,” Theodore White marveled at the CRP organizers’ 
innovation in polling, communication, advertising and voting bloc categorization into 
ethnicity, race and even occupation. In addition, Nixon’s youth campaign tested the 
GOP’s new methods and strategies to develop a carefully structured, though autonomous 
branch of the CRP to build the YVP.   
Chapter seven explores that the politics of youth and youth politics integrated the 
politics of image into campaigns, organization and policy. Young voters’ independence 
privileged image over party loyalty, encouraging politicians to appeal directly to voters 
through media.  Nixon’s youth campaign in 1972 focused his campaign’s appeal to the 
rising role of image politics. “The new era,” Theodore White explained, “is one where 
emotions and ideas are manipulated by the mass media.” As a result, “television 
commentators will be more influential…than Mayor Daley.”37  Tom Wicker of the New 
York Times agreed, as he pointed out that television “allows candidates to go over the 
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heads of organizations and delegates” and “focuses on personality rather than record of 
party service.”38  During the 1960s, media became the central tool for candidates to reach 
voters. Federal Communications Commission figures showed that political spending for 
television and radio quadrupled between 1956 and 1968, far beyond the increased prices 
and inflation during this period.
39
 As Nixon admitted in his memoirs, “since the advent of 
television as our primary means of communication modern presidents must have 
specialized talents at once more superficial and more complicated than those of their 
predecessors.”40  Nixon campaigned from the White House, even refusing to debate his 
challenger.
41
 This “non-campaign” strategy avoided Nixon’s personal image problems 
but also entrusted his campaign managers with freedom to create Nixon’s image.  As 
YVP’s College Director George Gorton explained, YVP’s members played a crucial role 
in the CRP’s ability to make voting for Nixon “cool.”42 
While young voters required an image conscious campaign, they had also become 
shrewd consumers and demanded authenticity. As Aniko Bodroghkozy asserted in 
Groove Tube: Sixties Television and Youth Rebellion: “Baby Boomers would not only 
have their huge numbers in common; they would also have their shared rearing with the 
television set to knit them together.”  In addition, baby boom historian Landon Jones 
argued that this was the first generation to receive such intense marketing attention: 
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“From cradle, the baby boomers had been surrounded by products created especially for 
them, from Silly Putty to Slinkys to skateboards.”43 During the 1960s, on Madison 
Avenue, selling with youth became a necessary way to sell to youth.   In addition, older 
American consumers saw youth as a stand in for hip, new and non-conformist.
44
  As 
media and marketing efforts defined the way young and old viewed Americans between 
eighteen and thirty, the youth generation carried this emphasis on image into the political 
system.
45
 
Nixon saw this shift to a youth and image focus as problematic. After all, his 
efforts to counteract a generally hostile media environment with Madison Avenue style 
campaigning in 1968 evoked even more criticism. Joe McGinnis’ The Selling of the 
Presidency 1968: The Classic Account of the Packaging of a Candidate ridiculed the 
growing role of public relations experts in shaping Nixon’s contrived image. Thus, 
Nixon’s CRP leaders decided to insource the public relations campaign to limit expenses, 
control outside access to the operation and assure its advertising team’s loyalty to the 
president as Jeb Magruder admitted: “So many of the creative people in advertising are 
liberal Democrats.” Creating Nixon’s own agency, the CRP leaders controlled “hiring, 
salaries and loyalties.”46 As the lines between campaign strategy and governance blurred, 
the high-powered advertising executives who volunteered for Nixon’s in-house PR team, 
the November Group, featured the YVP to create a tighter relationship between issues 
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and image to promote Nixon.  Whether during the convention, at rallies or on television 
commercials, Nixon’s YVP always had a presence in the campaign. At the Republican 
National Convention, YVP lined the audiences’ perimeter in the hall while thousands 
congregated to greet the President and Sammy Davis Jr. during a youth concert. The YVP 
umbrella also included the Celebrities for the President, the well-kept and uniformed 
Nixonettes and the Nixonaires, a national cohort of young airline stewardesses who 
attended Nixon rallies in their fashionable work attire. This effort sharpened the targeted 
and sophisticated campaign methods that would enable the GOP to continue to build a 
new Republican majority while the Democrats struggled to take command of image 
focused environment of politics after 1972. While the media--print and television-- 
proved a challenging terrain for Nixon’s youth effort, he found a more effective ways to 
soften his image through his connections with Madison Avenue and his young supporters 
who joined the YVP.  
Recently, the Nixon Presidential Library released papers belonging to central 
figures in the Committee to Re-elect the President.  While these political actors are 
known for the sinister and illegal actions that came to light during the Watergate 
hearings, these new sources allow reconsideration of the CRP’s contributions to modern 
political strategy.  As a “campaign within a campaign,” YVP offered a microcosmic 
model for future politicians who hoped to incorporate such image-focused organization.  
Youth politics and the politics of image converged to elevate Nixon’s attention to the 
politics of youth in his policy and campaign strategy. Thus, this dissertation balances its 
archival research on political elites such as Nixon, Brock and McGovern with various 
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College Republican collections, college newspapers, underground press, and interviews 
that include the young people behind the story.   
Recent scholarship on this generation has explored an international cohort that 
shared a lasting and influential radical political sensibility.
47
    While the historiography 
on the American 1968-generation looks almost exclusively at radicals and long hairs as 
part of a trans-national movement, most young people did not fit that mold. Examining 
the ‘sons and daughters of the silent majority’ offers an alternative, more microscopic 
lens that complicates the narrative describing this generation’s politics and reevaluates its 
legacy and influence.  The 1968-generation in America, however, had unique 
characteristics that shaped the country’s political direction away from liberal policies that 
continued in other “western” nations. The baby boom in America shaped the political 
environment, as did the television explosion that created baby boomers’ relationship with 
the media. I argue this generation did share a sensibility that emphasized its attention to 
image and the importance of independence.  This allowed the GOP an opportunity to 
hone the targeted political strategy it followed to develop the new majority Nixon 
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Chapter One 
The New Nixon and the Politics of Youth 
 
Running for president in 1968, Richard Nixon had offered a flattering view of the 
nation’s youth, those Americans born during or after World War II. “They are more 
socially conscious, more politically aware, and much better educated than their parents 
were at age 18,” he gushed in an eighteen minute, October, 1968 speech on NBC radio, 
“Youth today is just not as young as it used to be.”1 Highlighting young people’s 
individual voices, and playing to their unusual confidence that they could influence 
American society, Nixon encouraged a mature, independent young cohort to participate 
in the political process.   
Still, even as the candidate painted a sanguine portrait of young Americans and 
downplayed their challenge to authority, his campaign denounced the hippies and 
protesters to co-opt his conservative competitors’ promise to restore ‘law and order.’ 
During the general election, George C. Wallace of the right wing American Independent 
Party offered a tough stance against campus protesters and street violence that had 
attracted voters from the previously reliable Democratic constituencies in the South and 
in ethnic urban enclaves. While Nixon allowed for “socially conscious,” “politically 
aware” and “better educated” young people to participate, he laid down the law with the 
protest culture. “When they engage in conduct which, in effect, denies to others their 
rights to listen…and occupy buildings and insist on their demands with illegal means,” 
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Nixon warned, “then out…They should be out of the universities and colleges.”2 Nixon 
emphasized his own version of ‘law and order,’ explaining it as a reaction against the 
anti-war, permissive and extremist image many associated with youth. After all, concerns 
about the home front no longer revolved around the traditional bread-and-butter issues 
that favored Democrats while the New Deal coalition reigned. As one union member 
claimed, “the problem in the streets is more important.”3 Thus, young radicals became a 
convenient foil for Nixon to prove his conservative credibility.
4
 
 In contrast, liberal Democratic candidates such as senators Eugene McCarthy and 
Robert Kennedy harnessed 1960s politics of the street and young Americans’ rebellious 
search for influence through “New Politics.” This political approach, both a style and 
strategy, combined young people’s idealistic, grassroots energy with an appreciation for 
media’s increasing significance amongst the 1968-generation.  Certainly, young activists 
who entered the political system to support anti-war candidates during this tumultuous 
year understood their image in American politics. McCarthy’s young male supporters, 
hoping to attract the “middle-of-the-road” students that made up the bulk of the young 
population, made a spectacle of their refined appearance when they publicly shaved their 
hair to shed the hippie stigma and went “Clean for Gene.”5 In this youth-focused 
environment, Nixon introduced himself as a “cooler” more image savvy “New Nixon” 
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who journalists described as a “milder and wiser” presidential candidate than he had been 
in his unsuccessful 1960 run for the White House. As Nixon’s campaign manager, former 
ad man H. R Haldeman suggested, “The time has come for political campaigning--its 
techniques and strategies--to move out of the dark ages and into the brave new world of 
the omnipresent eye.”6 
This meant Nixon would have to build a more visible connection with youth, the 
necessary accoutrement for any campaign’s attempt to add vitality and charisma. Nixon’s 
lack of will and the significant political difficulties that youth politics presented in 1968, 
however, limited his youth campaign’s effectiveness. Studies in presidential elections and 
image explain that Richard Nixon deftly shifted his 1968 bid to a slick advertising 
approach after learning his lesson in 1960 when he could not match John F. Kennedy’s 
vigor and telegenic media presence.
7
  Certainly, Nixon spent more money and time on his 
image. I argue, however, that 1968 campaign presented a similar version of Nixon and 
that his transformation has been exaggerated. 
In 1968, this previously superficial reach out to young supporters took on new 
complexities as the politics of youth made Nixon’s effort to cultivate his own young 
voters problematic.  In 1968, Nixon cultivated a youth campaign that bolstered both his 
law and order platform and his New Nixon image. Nixon also espoused policies to gain 
young supporters as he vowed to end the draft and lower the voting age if elected 
president.  While Nixon could not risk pandering to youth and losing his own socially 
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conservative base, he found the world of conservative youth politics a necessary but 
unpredictable element of his campaign. Beneath this veneer, Nixon‘s administration 
learned tough and important lessons about organizing young people.  
New Politics 
In the 1968 election, youth became a new force in American electoral politics. 
Young people contributed to the Democrats’ confidence that the party could realign with 
a new approach, New Politics, which built a constituency on young voters, women and 
minorities. The New Left’s emphasis on transparency and young people’s efforts to end 
the war and racism inspired New Politics’ practitioners. Cementing this influence, a 
group of activist gathered to form the National Conference for New Politics in 1966 
seeking a 1968 presidential candidate “committed to peace in Vietnam.” Led by civil 
rights activist Julian Bond, the meeting at the luxurious Berkshire Hotel on New York’s 
Madison Avenue assembled fifty people who represented leadership from the civil rights 
and anti-war movement.  The conference set out to raise a $500,000 fund to support like-
minded candidates. Although they could not settle on one for the presidential race, many 
claimed that Senator Robert Kennedy’s interests ran “parallel” to their own.8   Riding the 
growing wave of anti-war sentiment, these leaders of American grass-roots movements 
envisioned New Politics as a vehicle for entry into the conventional political system.  
Two years later, opportunistic anti-war liberal politicians heralded the 1968-
generation’s character and impact based on the assumption that more youth meant more 
votes.  For example, Congressman Allard Lowenstein, a New York Democrat, led a 
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powerful “Dump Johnson,” anti-war youth movement in January, 1968. As youth 
increasingly opposed President Lyndon B. Johnson, Lowenstein searched for an 
alternative they would find acceptable for the 1968 presidential race.  Senator Robert 
Kennedy (D-NY) became Lowenstein’s first choice, as he could convince the party 
bosses to win delegates in states that did not have primaries.  After Kennedy originally 
turned Lowenstein down, Eugene McCarthy agreed to carry the mantle of New Politics, 
claiming that “young people could effect change by working within the 
system.”9McCarthy stood far down on Lowenstein’s list of potential anti-Johnson 
candidates as he lacked an experienced staff and the campaign funds necessary to oppose 
the President.
10
  Still, McCarthy gave students a willing and committed peace candidate. 
For Eugene McCarthy, the anti-war Senator from Minnesota, this development 
offered an unprecedented opportunity to change American politics and include young 
people’s voices.   One amused critic claimed that McCarthy sold himself as “the biggest 
thing that has happened to American youth since marijuana.”11 With Lowenstein’s help, 
McCarthy mobilized students from campuses across the nation around his anti-war 
campaign.  Working out of their own storefront headquarters, McCarthy’s youth cadre of 
mostly graduate students began to organize six weeks before the first primary in New 
Hampshire. This effort relied on carefully planned canvassing efforts and mass mailings, 
but ran on sheer enthusiasm and numbers.  Days before the New Hampshire primary, 
despite the campaign’s attempt to cancel eighteen buses of students from across the 
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eastern seaboard, over 1,000 young volunteers arrived to help the Senator’s challenge to 
LBJ for the Democratic nomination. One Republican family that took in two student 
McCarthyites from New Jersey marveled at their devotion: “They get out at 8 o’clock in 
the morning and don’t get home from their headquarters until 2 or 3 in the morning. I 
don’t know where they get the strength.”12 Though they could vote only in the GOP 
primary, the adoptive parents found McCarthy’s volunteers persuasive and pledged to 
write his name on their Republican ballots.  While McCarthy did not win in New 
Hampshire, he nearly won forty-percent of the Democratic Party’s support.  This made 
LBJ’s victory pyrrhic and vindicated New Politics.   
Speaking to Purdue University students following his surprising success in New 
Hampshire, McCarthy defined New Politics as “the art of the impossible.”  Citing his 
strong showing in the presidential election’s first primary, McCarthy claimed that New 
Politics “was put to the test in New Hampshire…based on the simple idea that individual 
citizens matter.”  First, this claim rested on the growing faith in participation politics over 
organization politics, as primaries no longer could be dismissed as the “eyewash” Harry 
Truman called them.  Suddenly, individual voters mattered as the parties’ control of the 
process slipped away. McCarthy compared his political brand against “old politics,” 
which allowed that “honest dissent may…be branded as treason.” While his campaign 
demanded an immediate end to the war, he also embraced the youthful critique of the 
process where the “actual political decisions are made by an elite who communicate with 
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each other in closed rooms and with people by way of slogans.”13  New Politics’ 
practitioners sought an image of transparency to counter the cynical environment. 
Observing young Americans’ rising alienation, the Senator fulfilled the central 
tenet of New Politics: include the youth.
14
  McCarthy showed an intense faith in young 
people’s power of persuasion, as he later asked a group of high school students that day 
“to go home and ‘influence’ their parents and other adults to vote for him.”15  Celebrating 
this cause, the Americans for Democratic Action’s National Chairman, John Kenneth 
Galbraith, applauded the progressive group’s ability to end LBJ’s campaign, claiming 
that “Once opposition was brought out of the streets and into the political arena, public 
support [for Vietnam] evaporated.”16 Bringing “street” politics into the system required 
some finesse, as the more strident, less compliant volunteers found themselves working 
behind the curtain as one McCarthy organizer joked, “In the last weekend, we had some 
large telephone banks and if the newspapers had ever gotten pictures of the telephone 
banks ‘the clean for Gene’ myth would have gone right out the window.”17 Despite 
McCarthy’s effort to make New Politics respectable, many anti-war voters worried that 
he could not win the nomination over the party favorite, Hubert Humphrey. It would take 
a Kennedy to do that.   
Senator Robert Kennedy offered a more viable candidacy for young voters who 
challenged the party leaders.  Before announcing his candidacy in March, 1968, Kennedy 
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proclaimed his hope that young Americans would bring about a more active, socially 
concerned electorate.
18
 Kennedy admitted that the South and unions could not provide a 
reliable constituency for the party and he planned to replace them with “kids” as a vital 
segment to complement the black and poor white voters that he targeted. As a senator, 
Kennedy fought against the draft while supporting lowering the voting age. In addition, 
his law and order credentials as the former Attorney General and his family’s popularity 
amongst traditional Democratic constituencies made Kennedy a better choice than 
McCarthy (who also lacked the charismatic personality necessary to bypass the “smoke 
filled room”).19 In February, 1968, thirty-eight percent of young voters in a New York 
state poll supported Kennedy’s campaign before it even began.  
As a candidate, Kennedy further aligned himself with New Politics and 
challenged McCarthy’s claim to the anti-war youth vote.  Looking at the problems that 
plagued America, the Senator explained that the country was divided “between the world 
of memory and the world of hope; between the spirit of age and the spirit of youth. I 
stand with the spirit of youth.”20  The Kennedy machine could deliver more than 
McCarthy’s one issue campaign and student voters increasingly joined the Kennedy 
camp.  By May, a National Student Presidential Poll showed that Kennedy drew over 
forty two percent of students’ support, three times more than McCarthy received.21  The 
nomination process had not been entirely divorced from the “closed room” politics that 
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McCarthy hoped to replace as binding primaries existed in less than one-third of the 
states.  If Kennedy could win enough delegates through primary victories, his supporters 
hoped, he could capture the nomination at the convention with his gravitas. 
Robert Kennedy’s New Politics built on a decade of Democratic dominance with 
young voters.  While John Kennedy’s appeal to the New Frontier and his Peace Corps 
symbolically captured the youthful vision of a new decade, Robert Kennedy offered 
liberal approaches to popular youth issues in the 1960s such as poverty and racial 
equality.  In addition, Bobby Kennedy maintained the family’s aura of celebrity. 
Wherever Kennedy went, youngsters ranging from sixteen to twenty-six years old formed 
“a cheering honor guard” to greet him with the star treatment.  The Kennedy Girls, “trim 
and cute in their blue outfits” which included hats and sashes, served partly as loyal 
cheerleaders and partly as the adoring, fawning harem one would associate with a rock 
star.  Kennedy’s handlers chose the Kennedy Girls based on two criteria: attractiveness 
and enthusiasm.
22
  “Wherever the action is,” explained one Kennedy press release for 
tabloids, “that’s where you will find the real live wires of this campaign—the Kennedy 
Girls.”  This served Kennedy’s first goal—looking good. 
Robert Kennedy inherited his older brother’s youthful image and used media to 
build his own brand of New Politics. In California, the Kennedy Girls numbers reached 
only two hundred and fifty, but the campaign placed them prominently to energize 
Kennedy’s brand.  At one major gala in a southern California arena, Kennedy’s 
Hollywood supporters promoted the Standing Room Only show for RFK with headliners 
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which included popular rock bands such as The Byrds and other celebrities such as Sonny 
and Cher, actor Jack Lemmon and Hall of Fame football player Roosevelt Grier.
23
  Billed 
as the “biggest, brightest and swingingest show of this or any other season,” advertising 
for the show promoted the event’s ushers, the Kennedy Girls.  
Kennedy merged young liberals’ politics with their generation’s role in popular 
culture.  Hundreds of celebrities immediately volunteered for his campaign, as Sammy 
Davis Jr. performed on college campuses to rally students for Kennedy. Lesley Gore, the 
teen sensation who sang “It’s My Party” and a member of Sarah Lawrence College’s 
graduating class of 1968, headed the First Time Voters for Kennedy who targeted the 
thirteen million new voters. Kennedy understood how to utilize the youth vote, rather 
than rely on it.   
Still, the Kennedy Girls also fulfilled less glamorous jobs such as distributing 
literature at shopping centers and their more mundane responsibilities at the campaigns 
headquarters equaled their time at appearances. Concerning more substantive positions, 
the Kennedy campaign initially hesitated to involve young people in its central 
operations, as one memo to the Washington D.C. office dictated that “No college students 
from the area are to be used to fill any volunteer needs at National Headquarters.”24 
While this concern spoke to the traditionally limited roles Kennedy’s campaign offered to 
young supporters, the 1968-generation’s unruly reputation made youth politics unreliable.  
Even student leaders shared their fears about the rise of factionalism when the National 
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Student Association president addressed the nine hundred attendees at the yearly 
convention by claiming that the “unabashed optimism” young people emitted in 1964 and 
1965 had disappeared.
25
 
Kennedy’s experience on the campaign trail confirmed this cause for concern. In 
one gathering of 6,500 young people just blocks from the hippie epicenter of Haight-
Ashbury in San Francisco, Kennedy defended himself against a barrage of hecklers who 
chanted “Victory for Vietcong.” The Senator shouted back, “You should do the same 
thing I did and get a haircut” and turned attention to the “problem of the ghetto or the 
Negroes” in San Francisco.26  Building a campaign on more than one issue, Kennedy 
struck a balance between anti-war cynicism and political realism. Kennedy blunted the 
radical thrust of young liberals and channeled youth politics into less divisive issues. 
Racial equality offered New Politics a cause that could rally young liberals rather than the 
divisive politics of Vietnam. 
According to Kennedy’s campaign coordinator in Indianapolis, Walter Sheridan, 
the difference between John Kennedy’s campaign in 1960 and Robert Kennedy’s in 1968 
was “not the fact of kid volunteers, but the fact of organized kid volunteers.”  Despite his 
skepticism about New Politics, Sheridan admitted that New Politics proved successful in 
urban, black communities and that young white volunteers were “willing to go anyplace 
and went into the black neighborhoods.”27 Sheridan claimed that Mike Riley, the head of 
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the Young Democrats “was probably more help than any one person in the city of 
Indianapolis,” noting that “the kids’ approach was canvassing, and they felt that by going 
to a person as a representative of the candidate and as a good-looking representative of 
the candidate and as a person with a mind of their own, that they could… convert 
them.”28 They had their own approach to politics, which was absorbed by the Kennedy 
organization, as the candidate “appreciated what they were all about more than most of 
the pols around him anyway” and “was very interested in gradually working this thing 
into his idea of the campaign.”  Kennedy eventually offered students the unprecedented 
opportunity to serve as “full-fledged members of a presidential delegation to a national 
convention.”  This move, gloated a Students for Kennedy release, created the chance for 
young voters to “become involved in the political process at a meaningful level” and 
“contribute our ideas as well as our manpower and time.”29 
While young voters became more valuable in his campaign, Kennedy quickly 
learned of complications.  Kennedy’s slick political campaign (they called it “cornball 
exhibitionism”) did not always sit well with young voters. After surveying hundreds of 
campuses, one eminent researcher determined that Kennedy soon became “archaic.” 
Students, increasingly sensitive to distortion and public relations manipulation, found 
Bobby less sincere, as the report observed that “Senator Kennedy’s credibility gap makes 
President Johnson’s look like a crack in the sidewalk.”30  Print journalists also objected, 
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“Even on family raft trips,” one joked, “he takes publicists along to aid his self-
aggrandizement.”31 Another editorial claimed: “Yes, we believe Bobby is well 
off…casting away the ‘new youth’ look.”32 
Although Robert Kennedy could flash his establishment credentials to quiet the 
critique that his campaign overemphasized his popularity with youth, he still got young 
people to work and vote for him. This version of New Politics did not survive, as an 
assassin ended Kennedy’s bid for president only hours after his hard-fought win in the 
California primary on June 6. The anti-war senator, George McGovern, accepted 
Kennedy insiders’ request to pick up the pieces after this tragedy and inherited the 
decimated organization Kennedy had developed with little success.  While McGovern’s 
candidacy lacked recognition and viability, he would turn this short-lived run into a more 
successful campaign for New Politics in 1972. 
After Kennedy’s death, a successful campaign built on anti-war youth politics 
seemed a distant prospect. The 1968-generation’s rebellious cohort, despite the “Clean 
for Gene” effort, did its share in provoking New Politics’ critics. Yippies, radical liberals 
led by irreverent countercultural heroes such Abbie Hoffman and Rennie Davis, 
organized a demonstration outside the convention hall that stirred the backlash to youth 
politics. To some observers, even those on the left, the Yippies would not participate in 
the system. Citing a new, protest sensibility that the Yippies channeled, RollingStone 
pronounced, “The Spirit of Rock and Roll, hippies, lsd users, or the new youth, or 
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whatever catch all phrase may be used to denote this mood (which can’t properly be 
called a “movement”), wants no part of today’s social structure, especially in  its most 
manifestly corrupt form, politics.”33 While youth politics’ leaders attempted to influence 
political elites in 1968, the Yippies cemented its radical stigma that prevented this 
possibility. 
Yippie leaders anointed themselves the vanguard of this cynical sensibility. 
Blending his hipster lexicon with political statements, Abbie Hoffman organized Yippie 
“happenings” around music, as the protest in Chicago’s Grant Park planned to include 
well known protest singers such as Phil Ochs and Country Joe McDonald as well more 
mainstream acts such as the Monkeys.  The young throngs in the streets quickly realized 
their limits when the Vice-President and establishment candidate Hubert Humphrey won 
the nomination while Chicago’s police arrested and beat protesters outside the 
convention.  The Yippie culture motivated Chicago’s police force to act with brutality.  
Speaking about the protesters, one police officer in Chicago explained, “You can’t tell 
the boys from the girls. They wear their hair alike, and they both cuss the same.”  Not 
only did the demonstrators’ appearance offend this officer’s gendered sensibility, they 
also challenged the virtue of decency.  Mayor Daley argued, the majority of young people 
did not share this cultural image. The Yippies, he said, “aren’t the youth of this 
country.”34 Youth politics had had fallen victim to the rising role of law and order and the 
backlash against the generation gap’s threatening image. Young McCarthyites could not 
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overcome their rebellious cohort that stigmatized New Politics. With these obstacles, the 
attempt to channel young Americans’ protest culture into a political coalition could not 
occur in 1968.  Richard Nixon focused on a more attainable goal with youth politics: 
creating a youth-friendly image without needing their votes.  Given the limited 
organization and resources Nixon devoted to this effort, even this practical goal proved 
elusive. 
New Nixon and Youth Politics 
Several factors motivated Nixon’s reach for young voters.  First, his aides wanted 
“maximum visible support” to overturn Nixon’s dated reputation and “demonstrate to the 
public that the student generation wants the Republican ticket.”  In addition, the desire to 
win student votes and mock elections’ influence on the campaign’s “win psychology” 
also inspired the organization of Youth for Nixon.
35
 As New Politics became central to 
the image-focused political environment, Richard Nixon’s campaign needed young 
supporters to counter popular perceptions that he stood on the wrong side of the 
generation gap. As he became the party’s frontrunner, Nixon convened his top aides in 
his Florida home to discuss his “‘new’ New Nixon” during the campaign’s next phase. 
They decided in Key Biscayne that Nixon would emphasize his “statesmanlike image” 
while his campaign projected him as “a ‘swinger’ with youth appeal.”36 Still, though 
pundits and historians described his stylized political reemergence in 1968 as the New 
Nixon, youth politics presented barriers to Nixon’s political makeover.  Nixon instead 
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relied on his law and order position in the politics of youth that solidified his claim to 
social conservatives who despised the 1960s permissive youth culture.   
Nixon’s initial effort channeled his former boss, Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose 
well-heeled student volunteers in Youth for Eisenhower arranged rallies, floats, and had 
Ike Girls handing out buttons. He also inaugurated Bikes for Ike, when college students 
formed a publicity catching “cycling junket” from Maine to San Francisco where they 
delivered a “pledge of support and enthusiasm” at the Republican National Convention.  
While Eisenhower’s media savvy campaign utilized the politics of youth to shape his 
image, Nixon feared that his lack of “charisma” would become more apparent in the 
public eye during his own bid for the presidency in 1960.  Kennedy’s campaign 
represented youth and vigor while Nixon offered maturity and leadership.  Youth won.  
According to journalist Joe McGinnis’, Nixon felt that he lost to Kennedy in 1960 
“because the American voter was an adolescent whom he tried to treat as adult.”37  
During the California gubernatorial race in 1962, the transition to the New Nixon began. 
Nixon used uniformed and attractive young women known as the Nixonettes to cheerlead 
his campaign events. While this effort followed the politics of youth that had fed into the 
rising role of image in politics, Nixon’s campaign also sought to mobilize youth politics 
for the GOP. Nixon first turned to reliable organizations that could offer conservative 
young voters. 
Though a creation of the conservative journalist William F. Buckley Jr., the 
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Young Americans for Freedom soon stood on its own legs and spearheaded the effort to 
draft Barry Goldwater for the Republican nominee in the 1964 presidential election. In 
1960, YAF members led a contingent of conservative voters under thirty years-old to 
build a grassroots effort around their core tenets; anti-communism, free markets, and 
opposition to New Deal programs that they viewed as bloated and corrosive to 
Americans’ individualism. The young leaders on the right considered themselves agents 
of change, calling themselves “movement conservatives.”  The YAF’s significance in 
electoral politics caught Nixon’s attention.  As one political pundit observed, the 
Republican Party had surprisingly emerged more youthful during the mid-1960“s: “Until 
1966, Republicans had an abundance of tired dreary politicians, whereas Democrats 
seemed to have a monopoly of political sex appeal.”38 
Republicans’ recent political success with young voters also pushed Nixon to 
increase his attention on them. In 1966, Nixon watched the Republican John Rockefeller 
lead a group of young conservatives known as the “New Majority” to win the 
gubernatorial election in New York. Nixon began his own reach for young supporters, 
and his initial effort to win over young Americans looked to a reliably conservative 
YAFer. After meeting with YAF leader Pat Buchanan in 1966, Nixon brought the young 
“thoroughgoing conservative” into his camp as a “research assistant.”39 
Looking ahead to 1968, the YAF President admitted that only Nixon offered a 
candidacy acceptable to all Republicans.  Buchanan set up meetings between Nixon and 
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YAF leaders in Washington and Newport, Rhode Island to smooth over the differences 
(many conservative ideologues preferred Ronald Reagan’s ardent stand on the right over 
Nixon’s moderate positions).40  In addition, Nixon’s campaign stocked its personnel with 
conservative “Young Turks” such as Buchanan, Kevin Phillips and Richard Whalen who 
wrote speeches and formulated tactics.  Still, Nixon’s moderate position did not inspire 
YAF members. “Richard Nixon may not be the conservative candidate in the sense that 
Senator Goldwater was,” admitted one YAF leader, “but he is certainly a candidate that 
we can and should support.”41 Considering this hesitance amongst young purists, the 
YAF showed that the youth in the 1960s could not be easily enlisted for Nixon’s cause.  
Eyeing the growing role that young people played in the Kennedy and McCarthy 
campaigns, Nixon positioned himself to capture “non-partisan youth” who would lack a 
“hero-leader” should LBJ win the nomination.  In contrast to the YAF’s rigid, 
ideologically driven movement conservatives, the Young Republicans and College 
Republicans became a vehicle to channel young people into the GOP. Even though the 
College Republicans out-organized their Democratic counterparts on campuses across the 
country, over sixty percent of student voters claimed themselves as independent, leaving 
both sides relatively impotent.
42
 
In addition, the YR had internal divisions that hampered its leadership’s ability to 
mobilize young voters. In 1967 YR Chairman Jack McDonald’s leadership represented 
the culmination of ultra-conservative’s ascendancy in the Young Republican National 
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Federation.  Considered a “Goldwaterite,” McDonald belonged to a group known as “the 
Syndicate.”  This group, under the tutelage of former Goldwater insider F. Clifton White, 
maintained a tight alliance with the right and influenced Young Republicans on the state 
and local level.  Under the YR constitution, the organization’s president appointed thirty-
four of the executive committee’s sixty-seven members and established “the Syndicate” 
as the majority.
43
 As “the Syndicate” consolidated its power through “intra-party 
warfare” that divided YR clubs, the majority of its members who fell into the moderate 
camp attempted to broaden the Republican base.  That challenge proved frustrating, 
prompting one Massachusetts YR delegate to protest: “Their horse-nonsense drives 
workers out of the organization…and then conservatives can win by default.”44 
One of Tennessee’s six YR chairmen, McDonald ran his victorious campaign for 
president against “the servant-boss relationship with the National Committee.”  When the 
RNC’s chairman Roy Bliss attempted to bring the YR under the RNC’s umbrella, YR 
convention delegates rejected all of the proposals except a stipulation that allowed two 
non-voting Republican representatives to sit on the YR executive board.  As the party 
favorite, this arrangement left Nixon with limited sway over the GOP’s major junior 
organization.
45
 Once their autonomy had been established, McDonald saw the YR 
leadership’s opportunity to build a new Republican Party. “The center of our political 
stage is now being taken over by a new voter group,” McDonald wrote, “—the young 
voter.” As traditional and family loyalties to political parties waned, McDonald 
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emphasized that “Party identification is at its weakest among voters in their early and 
middle 20’s.”  This gave the Republican Party an “excellent opportunity to establish itself 
once again as the majority party in the United States.”46 
As its first step to accomplish this, McDonald suggested the organization had to 
build an “image of the Young Republicans as a vital part of Young America.”47 
McDonald argued that “Republicans must develop a ‘fresh’ approach. We must appeal to 
young voters on terms of their own problems, their own issues, their own needs and 
hopes.”48 To do so, McDonald recommended a series of “America Tomorrow” seminars 
to discuss answers for American youth’s problems concerning the draft, the role of the 
federal government, education and the environment.  “Our nation is placing an ever 
increasing emphasis on young leadership in business and education,” argued McDonald, 
“Why not expand this emphasis into the realm of political policy making?”49 
 In addition to attracting young people, YR leaders aimed to educate its rank and 
file as they sponsored a National Leadership Training School in 1968 to recruit members 
and create future Republican organizers.  Pointing out the success of the National 
Leadership Training School in Washington D.C. for seven-hundred students, McDonald 
called for similar schools overseen by the YR Leadership Development Team in each of 
the YR’s eleven regions and eventually within each state.50 This plan intended to 
motivate its members through competition.  Using a national publication, YR leaders 
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published each clubs progress quantitatively, including totals for club membership, 
registrants, fundraising, and solicitation of absentee ballots.
51
 
In response to this rising demand for inclusion and the professionalization of 
youth politics, RNC Chairman Roy Bliss initiated a new recruitment program for young 
people, “Opportunities Unlimited.” This program, half political conference and half job-
fair, included seminars titled “Opportunity in Communication,” “Opportunities in 
Business, the Professions and Social Service” and “Opportunities in Government and 
Politics.” Describing the program’s goals to show young people different careers in 
public service or within the Republican Party, Bliss claimed, “It is a matter of plain hard 
fact, that we must sharply increase support of the Republican Party among young 
people.”52 Attempting to co-opt this effort, Nixon had experienced and trusted advisors 
such as Len Garment and Bill Gavin run Youth for Nixon to avoid the divisions that 
defined conservative youth politics in 1968.  Because the YR gained strength, the Youth 
for Nixon did not go over well with Young Republicans who “saw no need for a 
campaign group separate from theirs.”53 However, the territorial turf fights that defined 
these groups convinced Nixon’s campaign in 1968 to take no risks, and the YN assumed 
complete control of Nixon’s youth campaign. 
Youth for Nixon 
Richard Nixon’s image focused campaign in 1968 pushed him to consider youth 
politics more carefully than he anticipated. While he could not claim significant support 
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among conservative and party youth organizations, Nixon developed a youth plan that 
claimed his popularity with young people. Thus, the main consideration in Nixon’s 1968 
youth campaign, besides getting votes, focused on the way it could soften his image by 
moderating his attack on young people as the source of the counterculture and street 
protests. To do so, Nixon advocated policies to end the draft, form a Youth Agency in the 
White House and lower the voting age.  While this effort indicated the slick, highly 
packaged campaign practices that Joe McGinnis criticized; young American’s demand 
for an authentic candidate limited this youth-friendly appeal to image politics.  Nixon 
learned of this powerful symbolism from his Chairman of the National Business Alliance 
and President of PepsiCo, Donald Kendall, who built the company into Coca-Cola’s 
competitor during the 1960s under the youth-focused slogan, “The Pepsi Generation.”54 
Pepsi Cola Company’s young executives and their innovative advertising firm, Batten, 
Barston, Durstine and Osborn, rebranded their product in the early 1960s to appeal 
directly to this emerging consumer bloc.  This emphasis on a youthful image also 
translated into politics. 
As Nixon’s point man on the youth vote, Len Garment suggested that Nixon 
should emphasize his authenticity in contrast to Bobby Kennedy’s image conscious 
campaign.  “Dick Nixon is not going to gain adherents among the under 30 generation by 
insulting their intelligence,” quipped Garment, “as Bobby does when he tries so 
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desperately to be the teen-age 43  year old father of twelve (or whatever).”55 Nixon’s 
campaign researchers identified the key elements of the “Now Generation.” Describing 
young adults in 1968, one report described them as “anxious,” “idealistic,” “sensitive” 
and “mobile.” This meant Nixon had to convince young voters “they could be 
participants.”56 
Initial efforts missed the mark, as a campaign film intended to show Nixon to 
college audiences in a “friendly, human vein” that came across as “not oriented enough 
toward issues.”57  Issues required action, something the Now Generation demanded. 
Thus, Nixon proposed establishing an independent Youth Services Agency while 
promising to end the draft and lower the voting age. The Young Voters for Nixon 
campaign poster, considered the Youth Division’s “most famous contribution,” 
proclaimed “Nixon is the One,” depicting the candidate surrounded by Republican Party 
leaders, Nixon’s children and Wilt Chamberlain.58 In the background, the image shows 
clean cut young people happily carrying signs that read “18 Year Old Vote,” “Student 
Coalition” and “Dick Wants Volunteer Army” while the poster’s border blends a strange 
mixture of patriotic images such as the White House, the bald eagle, and the stars and 
stripes, with a “neo-psychedelic” style.59  According to one aide, “because it was ‘in,’ the 
poster “attracted several major press stories, manage an appearance on a top rated 
                                                          
55
 Gavin to Garment, WHCNF, SMOF Len Garment, 1968 Campaign File, Name File, Box 69, Folder: 
Gavin [1 of 3]. 
56
 “Young Adults for Richard Nixon,” WSOF Leonard Garment Box 82, Folder: 1968 Political Campaign 
File, Young Adults for Nixon. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA. 
57
 William Dowd to Garment, “Campaign Film for TV Spot Use: Using Law Students.” June 7, 1968, 
WSOF Leonard Garment, Box 82, 1968 Political Campaign File, Young Adults for Nixon.  
58
Allin, Final Report, p.19. Papers of JSM Box 27. 
59
 See appendix A.  Allin, Final Report, p.19.Papers of JSM Box 27. 
47 
 
 
 
television program and has found a place in the Smithsonian Institute.”60 While more 
image than substance, the poster shows that policy framed Nixon’s image as the two 
became less distinguishable. This tinkering with the politics of youth helped Nixon’s 
image, but the rise of young voters marked the difficulties youth politics presented to 
Nixon’s campaign.  As many young campus conservatives preferred more personal 
interactions, Nixon sought young leaders to increase his student supporters. 
On campuses, Nixon’s campaign managers poached two of Rockefeller’s “New 
Majority” leaders to organize the Student Coalition.  This group developed ways for 
student campaign workers to get involved in urban problems while still attending schools.  
Though similar to Kennedy’s focus on young people’s overwhelming priority, poverty, 
this effort served to cultivate Nixon’s own young supporters. At twenty-eight years old, 
only four years before his own gubernatorial campaign in Tennessee, Lamar Alexander 
of United Citizens for Nixon and Agnew sold the Student Coalition’s potential, claiming, 
“If you want to film Nixon in a give and take with students, why not do it with this group 
of outstanding students and upon this subject?” (He promised, “the students will not 
embarrass R.N.”).61 
Mock elections on campuses also grabbed Nixon’s attention during his campaign.  
The most prestigious and respected college poll conducted at Washington and Lee had 
become well known for its accurate predictions, and Nixon’s campaign funneled 
campaign funds into securing his victory and high standing with student voters.
62
 To help 
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recruit students, Nixon’s state campaign managers formed Student Leadership 
Committees to organize the reach for young voters.  Developing a campus newspaper 
advertising campaign and planning “giant” youth rallies, the student leaders who joined 
the Leadership Committees contested the prevailing view, as one student claimed, “The 
hippies, yippies and war protesters may make the news.  But make no mistake about it! 
They are not representative of the overwhelming majority of young Americans who still 
believe that free men working together can achieve miracles.”  If you considered yourself 
one of “America’s thinking young adults” who searched for “a national spokesmen with 
whom they have confidence,” they argued, “…Nixon’s the one.”63  On April 24, 1,300 
campuses participated in a mock election entitled, “Choice ’68.” Despite a late start, 
Nixon’s campaign disseminated 500,000 “Nixon and the Issues” brochures, 14,000 
“relatively ugly psychedelic posters,” 100,000 buttons and one-hundred showings of a 
Nixon film. Against the odds and a crowded field that included New York Mayor John V. 
Lindsay, Senator Charles Percy (R-III.), California Governor Ronald Reagan, New York 
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, and former Governor of Alabama George C. Wallace, 
Nixon finished third to New Politics’ practitioners McCarthy and Kennedy-- but first in 
the GOP.
64
 
Nixon’s campaign managers also sent surrogates to lead seminars for a select 
group of politically active conservative students on campus. Stating its goals to “take this 
dissident group…and convince it that its best interest lies in voting against Johnson,” the 
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program’s organizers hoped, “If good, it will reach the media.”65  Concerning these 
meetings with small groups of students, one Youth for Nixon field representative 
commented, “those voters annoyed with young and college aged ‘rebellion’ will like to 
see the candidate ‘stand up’ to the ‘kids,’” while offering something for those voters 
“favorably impressed with a man who has a rapport with youth.”66 As Nixon’s personal 
public relations man, former advertising executive Harry Treleavan at a ripe old age of 
forty-six, summed up Nixon’s appeal; “Not glamorous, he does have a certain star quality 
going for him.'' Along these lines, Treleavan came up with the campaign slogan, 
“Nixon’s the One!”  Speaking with young people would underline Nixon’s particular 
brand of charisma.   
At first, Nixon hesitated to speak to any students, as his Youth for Nixon director 
pleaded, "I can understand that he doesn’t want to play the Bobby circuit, but a speech or 
two on the theme, ‘You have been promised candor but have been given cant’ can help 
things.”67  When Nixon finally did address a crowd at Syracuse University, he invited 
several students to voice their concerns through song.  When they finished their a 
cappella that listed their fears about the war, the environment and student rights, Nixon 
regained control, stating, “We have allowed them to talk, now we are going to talk and 
they are going to listen for a while.”  Comparing this subdued and harmless voice of 
dissent to the violent Columbia University uprising, Nixon claimed that “these students 
                                                          
65
 REH to RMN, March 29, 1968.  Papers of Len Garment, Box 82, Folder: 1968 Political Campaign File, 
Youth for Nixon.   
66
 Charles McWhorter to Len Garment, August 23, 1968. Paper of Len Garment Box 82, Folder: 1968 
Political Campaign, Students for Nixon.  
67
 Gavin to Garment, February 2, 1968, WHCNF, SMOF Len Garment, 1968 Campaign File, Name File, 
Box 69, Folder: Gavin [1 of 3]. 
50 
 
 
 
have set an example” while suggesting student protesters at Columbia should be 
expelled.
68
  Nixon’s campaign publicized this effort by disseminating recordings of this 
speech to radio stations, bolstering his claim that he could unite America and end the 
divisive 1960s. He could even make students sing. In addition to Nixon’s reach out to 
students, his campaign carefully positioned Youth for Nixon’s female contingency of 
ebullient, well-mannered Nixonettes at rallies and campaign events while they held signs 
that read “Apple Pie, Mother and Nixon” and “Bring Us Together.”69 This balanced 
approach sought inclusivity while maintaining loyalty to the parents’ politics that called 
for discipline through law and order.
70
 
The Republican National Convention in Miami would put Nixon’s image to the 
test. The most notable confrontation came between the YR conservatives and the 
Rockefeller liberals who came from the “Northeastern liberal establishment.”71 While 
Rocky’s youth cadre fought for his nomination to no avail, they prompted Republican 
brass to take note of young voters’ importance in 1968 politics. Balancing the 
convention’s “conservative, suburban-oriented, law and order tone” with “coolness” that 
the New Nixon image projected,  Nixon had the moderate and youth- friendly New York 
Mayor John Lindsay second the vice-presidential nomination for the “short-fused”  Spiro 
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Agnew.
72
   As for the GOP platform, the preamble began, “Today, we are in 
turmoil…Many young people are losing faith in our society.” The platform first made 
clear, “We will not tolerate violence,” but then recommended lowering the voting age 
and shortening the period for draft eligibility, claiming: “Their [young people’s] political 
restlessness reflects their urgent hope to achieve a meaningful participation in public 
affairs.”73 Governor Ronald Reagan, vying to challenge Nixon for the nomination, 
sported a youthful image as critics accused him of “trying to sway the teenie-bop vote” 
with his “two toned saddle shoes.”74  Though Reagan’s tough approach against “student 
power” demonstrations in his own state had developed a strong following amongst 
movement conservatives in the YAF, an article in one of the radical left’s most highly 
circulated underground newspapers, The Rag, called Reagan’s youth-image absurd. 
“Nixon had already wrapped up the party youth,” and Reagan’s clothes simply, “matched 
his politics, reactionary.”75 
  In the GOP, co-opting youth came across as pandering. In addition, Nixon as hip 
struck many pundits as laughable.  Walking this line, Nixon could not dodge the same old 
criticism, as one Rolling Stone critic considered the New Nixon a sham, contending that 
“Nixon’s presidency will be a collection of those things that can be salvaged from the 
past.”76 One Life magazine interview explored the “New Nixon,” now “mellower and 
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wiser” than earlier in his political career.77 While Nixon downplayed the change, 
claiming his credentials as a “straightshooter,” the interviewer wondered in the article: 
“Is he going to be capable of reaching the imaginations of those young voters to who he 
is largely a dim figure out of some bygone era?”78   Even if Nixon tried, it would have 
looked bad. “Never before have the boys in the backroom of American politics paid such 
obeisance at the altar of youth” cried one reporter.  “A tongue-and-cheek-report that 
Nixon has been fitted with a Nehru Jacket is circulating at the Republican National 
Committee.”79  Despite, or because of, these accusations, Nixon stayed clear of any risks 
as he lacked both the will and ability to emphasize his YVN during the convention.  
While Nixon dabbled in the politics of youth to emphasize both the New Nixon and his 
law and order image, the political environment did not compel him to whole heartedly 
embrace youth politics.   
Young observers found the RNC disappointing.  Calling the convention’s 
decision makers “party machine regulars” and “aristocratic bigots,” one nineteen year old 
from Chicago found the event “tawdry” and “boring.”  Even worse, another youth 
complained that image had become central: “Now it’s getting so that even the wives are 
getting looked at, the way they dress…their hairstyles.”  Hoping for a more meaningful 
convention, a nineteen year-old from Chicago hoped, “Maybe the Democratic 
Convention will be more exciting.”80 Even his choice for the Vice-President indicated 
Nixon’s distance from youth politics, as one Congressman complained: “The selection 
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ignored the youth movement.” Choosing Agnew, who one delegate described as a “shoot-
the–looters boy,” Nixon appealed to the South and passed over New York City’s Mayor 
John Lindsay, a moderate who attracted young supporters.
81
 
After the convention, Nixon stuck to his law and order position on youth issues.  
In one interview while on the campaign trail, Nixon espoused a no-nonsense approach on 
campuses, as he advised college and university leaders “to get the spine and the 
backbone” to expel any student or faculty member who “breaks the law and engages in 
violence.”  Nixon took an uncompromising line against protesters, arguing, “This idea of 
sitting down and negotiating with the leaders of a mob…all that does is encourage this 
kind of stuff.” While Nixon offered little in terms of policy to suppress campus unrest, he 
promised, “That would be the national tone I would set.”82 
Nixon’s campaign ads relayed his outward stand on the generation gap.  To define 
his approach to youth through “law and order” politics, he hired filmmaker Eugene Jones 
who centered on hippies and young radicals as a source of anxiety rather than a 
rejuvenation of the American spirit. One controversial ad, titled Contravention, 
juxtaposed still shots of wounded GIs in combat, poor in Appalachia, and bleeding 
protesters outside the DNC in Chicago to enhance the chaotic affect while pulsating 
psychedelic sounds played over the Dixieland song, “Hot Time in the Old Town 
Tonight.” In another ad, The First Civil Right, Nixon’s law and order stance comes 
through loud and clear, and youth are the primary target as the candidate speaks over 
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quickly shifting still shots of shouting youth and burning buildings, “the first civil right of 
every American is to be free of domestic violence.”  Rather than racial disturbances and 
street crime, Nixon’s brand of law and order politics focused primarily on the youth 
rebellion.   
Nixon’s attempt to build a national constituency on “law and order” required that 
he blame young people, rather than black rioters, for the country’s domestic turbulence 
while offering a less threatening vision of future Americans.  While Nixon bypassed 
youth politics in favor of his law and order politics of youth, Nixon could ignore the 
threat young voters posed to the conservative realignment he envisioned. As Nixon’s first 
term unfolded, however, the youth problem emerged as the central issue in the Nixon 
administration. 
Lessons and Legacy of 1968 
After the Democratic National Convention, Humphrey tried to pick up on any 
residual youth power he could muster. Trading the “smoke filled rooms” of the old 
politics for the “smoke filled discotheque” in New York City, Humphrey visited a dance 
club and took a “fling at ‘new politics,’ seeking identification with youth and the artistic 
community.”83 An awkward photo of Humphrey discussing politics with young people 
captured the sad state of New Politics in the 1968 campaign after Chicago.  Despite this 
attempt, young liberal voters found little motivation to head to the voting booths.  On the 
University of Missouri campus, the Committee of Concerned Students, originally a 
coalition of Kennedy and McCarthy supporters, voted in October to not endorse 
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Humphrey.
84
 Young Americans across the country led anti-election demonstrations, as 
one protester in Washington D.C carried a poster of Nixon, Humphrey and Wallace that 
read, "Are you kidding me?”85 
 Although Nixon’s youth campaign attempt stirred the political pot, it lacked 
emphasis. In total, the YFN gained 12,000 dues paying members.
86
  Nixon’s campaign 
spent $80,000 on the YFN, a pittance considering he raised over $20 million for his 
election.
87
   In addition, the YFN suffered from poor leadership. “The job often went to 
the person who asked for it,” Allin’s review of the organization joked, “or Charley GOP’s 
nephew.”88 In the end, only half of the youth vote showed up at the polls while sixty-one 
percent of the eligible Americans voted. Humphrey won forty-seven percent of voters 
under thirty while Nixon won thirty-eight.  Worse, Nixon could not nail down the non-
college youth.  While Wallace won disproportionate support from young voters, his 
support on campuses barely existed.
89
  Intensifying Democrats’ disappointment with the 
liberal youth’s poor turnout, Humphrey only lost the popular vote by less than one 
percentage point.
90
 
The election’s consequences frightened the liberal establishment when the 
Students for a Democratic Society National Council met in Boulder, Colorado after the 
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convention and adopted a resolution entitled, “The Elections Don't Mean Shit—Vote 
Where the Power Is—Our Power Is In The Street.”  To many observers, Humphrey’s 
nomination, the violence outside the Democratic convention and Nixon’s victory ended 
the young left’s role in the Democratic Party.  Yet, the 1968 election had the opposite 
effect: Nixon’s victory sent liberals into a soul searching reform to convince young 
Americans that Democrats learned from the loss.  One journalist predicted that Mayor 
Daley and his “city of big night sticks” meant “the last hurrah of the hacks.”91  For this 
pundit, the problem required that the war and draft end.  “That could blunt the radical 
direction of the New Politics and turn it back to old style liberalism.”92 New Politics 
continued to challenge the establishment and pushed Democratic reformers to oppose the 
party bosses and the war in Vietnam.  
In 1969, seven former McCarthy campaign workers ranging from twenty-one to 
twenty-nine years old won primary contests to become district leaders in Manhattan.  
Acting in concert, this group shared one of fifteen votes in the county executive 
committee, known as Tammany Hall, New York City’s shrine to the cigar smoking, back 
room politics.  Though one journalist observed that “the new politics being practiced by 
these young leaders…is strikingly similar to the old style politics of ward bosses who 
‘took care of their people,’” a twenty-two year old member of this youth cadre pointed 
out where they differed.  “We don’t deal in patronage or fix parking tickets” claimed 
Jeffery Brand, the leader of the Community Free Democrats. “We do draft counseling, 
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housing code enforcement and organizing block associations.”93 
While many McCarthy supporters took Humphrey’s nomination as a sign that 
“they should drop out of politics because the system could not be beaten,” more felt 
inspired as another twenty-one year McCarthyite district leader, Simon Barsky, quipped 
that “they offered too little, too late” in 1968. Barsky explained, “If it ever happened 
again we would have no one but ourselves to blame,” as they sought to re-build the 
Democratic Party from the ground up. Sending a message, the young district leaders 
nominated Barsky as the County Democratic Chairman, though he declined as he jested, 
“the job should go to a younger man.”94 Though their attempt to gain control of 
Tammany proved merely symbolic, these practitioners of New Politics spearheaded 
reform that allowed members to support any candidate for mayor and blocked the insider, 
Controller Mario Pucaccino, from receiving a majority of the committee’s support for his 
candidacy. 
 New Politics’ practitioners demanded open primary elections that decided each 
state’s nominees, and reforms that required delegates to represent each state’s population 
by gender, age and race. To ensure this change, the DNC Chairman, Fred Harris, 
appointed a twenty-eight member commission led by Senator George McGovern (D-SD). 
In one testimonial to the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Harris’ 
replacement and political veteran Lawrence O’Brien showed how Democrats felt the 
need to adapt.  Admitting that the 1968 convention disenchanted the youth, O’Brien 
observed: “On this subject, their memories are long, their charity short.”  Despite the 
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party’s culpability, O’Brien promised “we can pledge that we will do everything we can, 
as a party, to see that it never happens again,” as he explained , “that convention in 1968 
did  create the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection…To win, we 
simply must change.”95  The commission heard opinions across the spectrum. One 
student from Georgia testified that young people did not participate because they 
distrusted leaders, feared retaliation for voicing controversial views (especially on the 
war), and felt a lack of knowledge about the process.  Recommending new party 
leadership, this young Georgian stated, “One thing I value highly is honesty,” and that his 
generation demanded “honest politicians” who could counter the fact that “many 
politicians spend their time trying to be cool and suave.”  For liberal advocates of New 
Politics, the emerging emphasis on image stood as an obstacle to their mission.
96
 
As for Nixon, adapting to youth issues came slower, as he pressed on with his 
image-based politics of youth to reach parents’ concerns. Many scholars and pundits have 
mistakenly located the New Nixon in the 1968 campaign. While his modern advertising 
techniques and moderate political positions did reveal a shift in Nixon’s campaign 
strategy from 1960, his adherence to law and order along with his underwhelming youth 
effort did little to distinguish himself from the “old Nixon.”  Campaigning against young 
people proved a winning approach to the youth problem for the election. Governing, 
however, called this tough stance on the generation gap into question as Nixon would 
need to re-consider youth politics as an emerging political force during his first term.
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Chapter Two 
Nixon’s First Term: Law, Order and Youth Politics 
 
At first, the Nixon White House’s politics of youth continued the law and order 
approach that had shaped the campaign in 1968.  In an internal memo titled “The 
President and Youth,” Nixon’s aide William Gavin suggested that the President tone 
down “references to the glories of youth” and the “generation gap,” as that would “move 
the President into an area now dominated by others (the Kennedy Group and its 
creatures).” Nixon’s advisors on the youth problem initially cautioned him to avoid the 
“middle class, college attending section” that had become synonymous with “youth.”1 
Rather than embrace the rise of youth politics, Nixon’s administration used the  
“youth problem” to tap into Middle America’s (“the forgotten Americans”) anxieties and 
resentments after 1968. After all, nearly three-quarters of Americans, including half of 
the Americans who called the Vietnam War a mistake, saw protesters in a negative light.
2
  
Nixon advisor Kevin Phillips adapted the President’s term, the “silent majority,” for his 
book titled The Emerging Republican Majority which predicted the realignment toward 
the Republican Party fueled by a social “backlash” against the 1960s’ permissive 
reputation. As the President ordered his administration to attack “bad kids,”3 Nixon 
rallied white southerners, the Sunbelt’s suburbanites and former Democrats who he 
defined as “working class white ethnics” under the “silent majority” label. To do so, the 
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President focused on the image-oriented modern social issues that families confronted in 
the living room, while Democrats stubbornly clung to the bread and butter issues that 
dominated the kitchen table.
4
 
Nixon embraced this hard stance when  he called campus protestors “bums,” 
though his staff’s vitriol came less filtered in memos that referred to demonstrators as 
“rich college f—cks.”5   Nixon had railed against the drug culture’s role in the youth 
revolt as he cheered his aides to “hit it hard,” opting to, “Enforce the law, you've got to 
scare them.”6  Denying the New Left’s relevance and claiming that “this country is going 
so far to the right that you are not going to recognize it,” Attorney General John Mitchell 
confirmed the administration’s tough attitude on youth at a Women’s National Press Club 
cocktail party: “I’ll tell you who’s not informed, though.  It’s these stupid kids.”7  When 
Nixon designated the last week of September in 1969 as “National Adult-Young 
Communication Week,” he made clear the following day that while he expected protest 
to continue on campuses, “under no circumstances will I be affected by it whatever.”8 
Unfortunately for Nixon, that would not be the case. This chapter explores two 
important law and order issues for youth, marijuana use and campus unrest.  While Nixon 
continued to push hard against drugs, his position on student protests revealed the role 
young people played in forcing Nixon to soften his vision of law and order. Youth 
politics limited the conservative policies and the political culture Nixon espoused. Nixon 
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admitted in 1970, “On the issue side, we still haven’t gotten through the strong position 
on law and order.”  The President realized the limitations of this project, as he bemoaned 
his administration’s’ inability to pass tough laws “despite our leadership in this field, all 
of the public relations devices we use to get it across and my hitting it hard in the 
campaign.”9 Youth issues forced Nixon to reconsider his approach to the politics of 
image. 
Concerning marijuana and campus unrest, the youth problem confused the 
President. While Nixon talked tough in public, his administration’s internal dialogue 
revealed cracks in his law and order stance.  For example, H.R. Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief 
of Staff, disputed the wording of an administration report on Nixon’s marijuana policy 
that promised to fight drugs in a “variety of ways.”  This language did not work with 
Nixon’s tough talk, as Haldeman admitted, “But ‘handle it in a variety of ways’ really 
says we don't know how to handle it. Which may be the truth. But it sure isn't the thing to 
say."
10Nixon’s policies revealed flexibility that belied the administration’s tough image, 
often decreasing states’ marijuana penalties. The President’s own commission on 
marijuana, the Shafer Commission, recommended decriminalization while Nixon’s 
proposals allowed judges discretion when penalizing first time violators. 
Nixon targeted the American hippie as a convenient foil in expanding his 
conservative image on social issues, but the complex youth problem required the 
President to balance the more draconian approach he would have preferred.  First, Nixon 
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had to shield the silent majority’s children from his law and order politics. The 1968-
generation could not simply serve as cannon fodder, as one aide reminded the President 
that this generation’s young men and women, even some of its campus protesters, and 
even some of the pot smokers, also included the “the sons and daughters of the ‘silent 
majority.’”11  Second, the youth-oriented political culture demanded attention. Early in 
his first term, when Nixon looked for White House staff who “looked hippie” to join his 
meeting with “a bunch of long-haired college newspaper editors,” the best he could find 
was John W. Dean III, hardly Woodstock material.
12
 Last, Nixon had to consider his own 
“square” youth support. “Even though they don’t approve of the antics of the ‘weirdos’ 
and ‘hippies,’” one Minnesota Republican warned the President, “they resent [attacks] 
and stick up for their generation.”  Directly referencing Spiro Agnew, Nixon’s attack dog 
Vice President, the warning continued: “This language risks alienating the kids who are 
with us.”13 Thus, Nixon’s youth strategy also included a youth-friendly approach that 
would soften the President’s turgid reputation and settle Americans’ fears about a 
widening generation gap. 
Campus disorders and marijuana laws required some leniency, especially after 
Kent State, when the Ohio State National Guard shot at protesters and killed four 
students. In 1969, Nixon enjoyed a fifty-seven percent approval rating on campuses, and 
polls showed a sixty-eight percent approval among all Americans between twenty-one 
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and twenty-nine years old.
14
  After Kent State, some polls showed Nixon’s approval 
rating as low as thirty-one percent on campuses.
15
 This event heightened Americans’ 
fears that the nation’s young people had lost faith in the system.  A journalist from 
Christian Century editorialized that the best way to respond to the youth problem is “by 
planting, cultivating, pruning and the harvesting.”16 In building Nixon’s image as a 
unifier, he conceded the “problems of the generation gap” existed, but assured young 
people that “those of us in this administration…are concerned about the problems you are 
concerned about.”17  Shifting its approach, the White House grappled with the youth 
problem, forcing it to balance a tough approach with moral leadership. 
Finally, Nixon offered an alternative political culture that journalist John 
Chamberlain called “square power,” defined as “the fall in a community’s tolerance of 
moral looseness.”18 In forming this socially conservative constituency, Nixon utilized the 
youth of the silent majority to expand “square chic” and increase his influence with 
religious groups. In his first public appearance after the shocking events at Kent State, 
Nixon chose Reverend Billy Graham’s youth rally in Tennessee. As Nixon joined Billy 
Graham on stage, the evangelist spoke to 60,000 people who attended his Youth Night at 
the University of Tennessee, predicting that the 1968-generation’s questioning sensibility 
would lead to a more religious life -- “curiosity leads to Christ.” Nixon promised “the 
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great majority of our young people who go to colleges and universities” do so for the 
noble “purpose of getting an education” and “do not approve of violence.”19  Confronting 
the youth problem, Nixon began to shift from the law and order politics he rode to the 
White House to a more issue conscious version of his politics of youth  Though the 
experts considered anti-war youth politics an obstacle to the conservatism, Nixon’s 
nuanced approach to the youth problem built a conservative political culture that fueled 
the GOP’s resurgence. 
“It’s Getting Freaky”: Nixon vs. the Students 
In 1969, Nixon’s meeting with 300 delegates for a conference to improve 
communication among student, academic, business and government leaders focused 
specifically on campus disorders.  Addressing this audience, and alluding to his own days 
as a college card shark, Nixon dismissed rebellious students, arguing that “it is like a 
poker game. You can be sure that whoever is talking the loudest is sure to be bluffing.”20  
While he belittled the protesters’ hand, the President’s conciliatory gesture concealed his 
own. Nixon soon after called for one thousand extra FBI agents for “keeping order” on 
American campuses.
21
  By dedicating so many resources and so much attention to this 
vocal minority, social conservatives and Richard Nixon enhanced young radicals’ stature 
and significance disproportionate to their actual presence. 
 Nixon targeted campus unrest as the youth revolt’s most dangerous facet.  His 
hard approach to campus protest followed California Governor Ronald Reagan’s tried 
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and tested position, about which “polls” exclaimed, “Rarely has one single issue given a 
state political leader so much public support for his actions.”22  Student protest had 
become “the meat on which mini-Caesars feed.” 23 Due to this approach Reagan became 
so popular, especially with conservative youth, that he represented an alternative to 
Nixon for Sunbelt conservatives who had opposed the moderate, liberal Rockefeller 
Republicans for the nomination in 1968.  Though Nixon attempted to stay above the fray, 
his hard-line position on campus protest increasingly frightened activists, as one campus 
leader claimed, “Friendly reporters pass on word of calls from the FBI to campus 
Security Offices, inquiring after me.  It’s getting freaky.”24 
While liberals appreciated the campus as a bastion of the protest politics that had 
energized the 1960s’ political environment, more conservative students and non-college 
youth saw campus disorder as a danger to American society. Conservative campuses 
across the country fumed at the excesses of the student left after the 1960s.  For example, 
Lipscomb University, a Baptist institution smack in the buckle of the Bible belt, offered 
an alternative to the widely publicized chaotic campus culture.  This small Tennessee 
Christian college exemplified the oasis of tranquility and tradition that many educational 
institutions of all levels could only hope to protect amidst the era’s tumultuous 
environment.  One article in the campus newspaper, The Babbler, berated the small group 
of ten or fifteen students who turned a study break into a “a mess of intentionally spilled 
cake,” but also complained that the “mature majority remains silent.”  Making an 
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eloquent defense of  Nixon’s campaign for “law and order,” the student continued that 
“rules that seem petty have to be made since the ‘silent majority’ of students lack the 
intestinal fortitude to stand up to the few who make them necessary, and let them know 
they won’t stand for such childishness.”25 
  In many ways, Lipscomb’s campus culture formed around the campus disorder 
problem. Concerning its square reputation, the nearby and more irreverent Vanderbilt 
University’s student newspaper called Lipscomb “all wet,” joking that the Lipscomb 
president “has no need to worry about campus protests, their students don’t think 
enough.”  The Babbler editor responded, “we believe people show their individuality 
through their actions, not by the kind of clothes they wear or by the length of their 
hair.”26  Rejecting the notion that students could either be “rabble rousers” or “do 
nothings," one Lipscomb student argued that his cohort simply offered a moderate 
balance between “complete power” and “complete apathy.”27 
Lipscomb’s students who sought a more traditional, conservative campus 
environment did not question the radicals’ right to dissent, but asked about their methods, 
wondering, “What is violence accomplishing to make learning more effective?”28 
Disturbed by the student movement’s assertiveness, an editor of Lipscomb’s newspaper 
recoiled at the demands for “increased participation in the hiring and firing of teachers, 
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changing graduation requirements, and student government.”  “All is not right in the 
world of academics,” the article complains, “behavior that is rewarded is very likely to be 
repeated.” Hoping that recent events showed this lesson learned among administrators, 
the editorial concluded that the four-day protests at the University of Wisconsin provoked 
a militant response including 900 National Guardsmen and 200 police to “prevent the 
outbreak of violence.”29  These conservative students feared that the minority had 
stigmatized the majority. Another editorial in The Babbler wondered: “Could it be that 
the prosperity of the United States has bred its own generation of spoiled brats?”  The 
article continued, “student extremists making all the noise care very little about 
progressing toward reasonable solutions,” but they simply called “attention to itself and 
giving a false image of Americans students on the whole.”30  Even students themselves 
found campus unrest as a rallying point for contradictory visions of America’s future.  
One protest flyer railed against protestors: “These are the ones that hate Jesus Christ.”31 
In Nixon’s effort to divide and conquer the youth vote, attacking student protest became 
especially popular with his intended constituency from square America that included 
suburban whites, blue collar urban ethnics and southern, and religious conservatives. 
 As president, however, Nixon maintained a safe distance from this problem when 
he refused to intervene after he determined that campus unrest must be left up to the 
individual institutions and the states in which they reside.  While seemingly a diplomatic 
approach, California’s state legislature alone introduced over seventy bills in 1969 to “put 
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down students,” and one representative declared, they would rid the state campuses of the 
“typhoid Mary’s” of student rebellion. In addition, Nixon ordered his Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare to send a letter to universities across the country reminding them 
of their prerogative to revoke federal funding for any student found guilty of a crime. 
Referring to this letter, Nixon reminded university presidents that “expulsion has been the 
primary instrument of university discipline,” a punishment with added consequences 
considering the ongoing military draft system.
32
As campus unrest became a central 
concern, it motivated the President’s law and order approach to the politics of youth that 
focused on student demonstrators. 
 The shocking violence at Kent State brought anti-war youth politics into the 
national spotlight.  The nation reacted in horror as images relayed the bloody 
confrontation to Americans. Most famously, John Paul Filo’s Pulitzer winning 
photograph captured Mary Ann Vecchio’s anguish as she knelt over a dying student and 
cried for help.   The anti-war movement re-energized around this tragedy as protests 
mounted against Nixon’s policies on youth issues; both his decision to expand the 
conflict into Cambodia that sparked the Kent Sate protest and his callous approach to 
student demonstrators increased the tensions between an increasingly defiant student 
power movement and an increasingly troubled “middle America.”  The majority of 
Americans did not observe these images sympathetically; nearly 60 percent supported the 
National Guard’s use of violence.33  However Americans felt about it, Kent State brought 
disproportionate emphasis on college students as exemplars of a monolithic radical-
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liberal youth culture and the challenge to America’s central institutions.   
In one respect, the Nixon administration’s reaction continued previous efforts to 
marginalize student protesters.  Attorney General John Mitchell announced that the FBI 
could investigate and prosecute students suspected of using explosives with or without 
consent from local police or college presidents.  Law and order prevailed at first. While 
students opposed any FBI role on campus by an overwhelming ninety percent, local 
police supported the administration’s aggressive use of federal agents by eighty percent.34  
Kent State’s aftermath also pronounced the divide between young Americans themselves. 
 In the days following Kent State, protestors flooded the streets outside the New 
York Stock Exchange to demonstrate against the relationship between corporations and 
the war, sparking a violent confrontation with pro-Nixon “Hard Hats.”  This 
confrontation brought together the divergent elements of the 1968 generation, and even 
strengthened Nixon’s hand.  Defending patriotism and Wall Street, pro-establishment 
Hard Hats in New York publicized young ethnic blue collar workers’ shift from the 
Democrats to the Republican Party. One advisor on the ethnic vote pointed out that “it is 
needless to emphasize the ethnic composition of the hard hats” and “the conspicuous 
absence of youth of the so called ‘working families’” during “youth disorders.”35  Ken 
Jurewicz, a twenty-seven year old Polish-American factory worker in Detroit summed up 
this tension, claiming that students think “they’re better than you and you’re nobody.” 
While Jurewicz voted for Humphrey in 1968, the youth revolt inspired him to support 
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Nixon, as one observer argued “the young guys in the auto plant are pi—ed off at the 
liberals.”36  As non-student youth rallied against long-haired protestors, Kent State also 
enhanced these divisions on campus.  
As liberal student bodies such as Boston University’s held huge marches that 
forced “Berkeley East” to cancel its commencement, more conservative universities also 
felt this effect. If Kent State, a “Middle America” campus, could suffer such violence, 
students imagined that it could happen anywhere. As one University of Tennessee student 
wrote, “We could easily identify with Ohio-Ohio is not unlike Tennessee.”37 Now, the 
violence and instability seemed rampant, and even respectful southern students feared 
that they could not maintain order.  The University of Tennessee’s campus, a calm 
exception amid the growing “student power” movement that disrupted universities and 
colleges across the nation, joined the fray after Kent State. The student leadership called 
for its own three day student strike as sixty-five percent of the students did not attend 
class for several days. Still, only two thousand students attended the anti-war rally, while 
“the Aquatic Center pool was crowded.” One student, observing the live music at the 
rally questioned, “Are they mourning the deaths of the students at Kent State with a 
rockband?”38 While student power lacked hard core adherents in Tennessee, 
conservatives feared this campus culture had spread across the nation as protest became 
“in” on campuses.  
This wave of protest inspired a conservative response when students themselves 
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took offense to campus unrest. As a small anti-war demonstration at the University of 
Tennessee continued on the ground, the YAF’s campus chapter paid for a plane to circle 
overhead with banner that read, “Give Nixon a Chance.”39  Attacking the student strike, a 
flyer distributed on campus asked, “Who helped these long haired, unintelligent, dark 
skinned, poorly dressed…protesters?”  Connecting this controversy with national politics, 
the flyer continued, “It seems Vice President Agnew knew what he was talking about 
when he stated that there was a small group of people trying to create the cultural 
thinking for our country.”40  This protest still created considerable consternation in the 
wider community, as any sign of the Vietnam Era’s student politics “gave Knoxvillians 
something other than the weather to discuss at dinner that night.”41 This consternation 
over campus unrest pushed Nixon’s hard approach, yet it also exacerbated the youth 
problem he set out to solve. As moderate voices in the White House urged a conciliatory 
tone, convincing Nixon about the limits of law and order did not come easily.  
The argument for the reaching out to youth had an economic incentive. After the 
news of Kent State hit the wires the stock market dropped precipitously. The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average suffered its greatest loss in one day since the assassination of 
President Kennedy in 1963.
42
  In his speech to the National Food Brokers association in 
1970, Pepsico CEO and Nixon adviser Donald Kendall pointed out the generation gap’s 
economic consequences, observing that  “this challenge and change generation has 
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focused on institutions near at hand, college campuses, draft boards and recruitment 
centers.” “The next target,” Kendall warned, “is likely to be American business.”43 
Fortune magazine commissioned a Yankelovitch survey of 250 chief executive 
officers to record their opinion of the White House that revealed growing sentiment for 
bridging the generation gap.   “Most strikingly,” Yankelovich observed after examining 
the negative responses, “the Administration’s lack of communication with the nation’s 
youth has come from nowhere to rank right up with Vietnam. The President’s failure to 
unite the country also was mentioned for the first time.”44 Soon it became clear to Nixon 
and the White House that the youth revolt would not go away, and memos began to fly 
about the “youth problem.”   
The administration’s approach to student protestors began to divide Nixon’s 
cabinet. Nixon’s Secretary of the Interior, Walter Hickel, wrote a letter to the White 
House protesting that the administration “is turning its back on the great mass of 
American youth and thereby contributing to anarchy and revolt.”  Citing the youth of 
Revolutionary era leaders such Patrick Henry, Hickel continued, “youth in its protest 
must be heard.”  That same day, a White House director of student and youth, Toby 
Moffett, resigned along with several other members of his staff.  In leaving, Moffett 
criticized Nixon’s handling of Kent State and charged the president with using the “most 
vicious tactics” against dissenters.45  As one young Nixon advisor observed, “When 
Secretary Hickel admonished Nixon about student discontent, he was instantly 
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transformed, in the eyes of many, from a polluting profiteer to a knowledgeable and 
objective government official.”46 Nixon’s tough approach landed him on the wrong side 
of the generation gap. 
In addition, the Kent State violence rattled Nixon.  In the strangest moment of his 
political career, Nixon slipped out of the White House in the middle of the night to walk 
through the Lincoln Memorial only weeks after Kent State, and smack in the middle of a 
three day demonstration that had invaded Washington D.C.  The ensuing meeting and 
dialogue with several young protesters passed without significant incident, as Nixon 
uncomfortably attempted to strike up conversation with demonstrators about their college 
football teams.  Nixon’s closest aides quickly located him and whisked him away.  Still, 
despite the relatively innocuous outcome, Nixon’s awkward mingling with protesting 
youth indicates an unusual break from the White House’s tightly managed public 
relations effort.
47
 
On May 9, during the student moratorium protesting Kent State’s tragic outcome, 
eight junior staff members reported to the President, White House aide Jeb Magruder and 
Haldeman on their recent campus tours.  In one meeting, Haldeman suggested options for 
responses to the “youth phenomenon.”  While he left the previous effort to “repress and 
isolate the militant students so as to gain political mileage” on the table, the entire group 
chose the alternative option to “create a conciliatory mood between the administration 
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and youth.”48  Signaling the new direction, Magruder and Haldeman supported “the 
eight.” “Our concern should not be to pacify the left fringe,” Magruder suggested to 
Haldeman, “rather, we should attempt to split off the left from the moderates.”  With this 
strategy, Magruder felt, “We should not lose, by default, the allegiance of the vast middle 
segment of collegiate youth.”49  The White House could not continue to “repress and 
isolate” as the tense political environment during the hot summer of 1970 forced a more 
youth friendly image that courted the independent majority.   
 In late June, Nixon’s special consultant on campus affairs, Vanderbilt 
University’s chancellor Alexander Heard, captured the administration’s concerns in a 
report based on interviews from campuses across the country.  Central to Heard’s 
committee report, the recent campus unrest highlighted that young people “just wanted to 
be heard.”  However, as one of Haldeman’s young aides, Tom Davis, argued “it is one 
thing to be heard, and another to be obeyed.”  Suggesting substantial policy initiatives 
may not be necessary, Davis claimed that while Heard’s report did not satisfy “hard core 
dissidents,” “The sons and daughters of the ‘silent majority,’ who were lost on Cambodia, 
are yet saveable.”50  The administration needed to act, but drew the line between 
openness and acquiescence. 
In response to Kent State, White House aide Jeb Magruder, only thirty-two 
himself, produced a memo recommending the President send his staff out to better 
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communicate the White House’s positions to students or else “we can expect trouble on 
the campuses similar in nature [to Kent State].” Magruder’s memo pointed out the 
practical benefits of having a wider presence in the student community, as it would 
“diffuse the activities of the moderates and push the radical fringe as far left as 
possible.”51  Nixon’s appeal to moderates attempted to separate them from the radicals 
who they joined in anti-war protests.  Furthermore, Magruder framed this suggestion 
within Nixon’s “silent majority” of southern conservatives, blue collar labor, and 
suburban whites.   Magruder understood how to present issues on terms that Nixon 
understood, pointing out that “the Dayton housewife won’t be upset if her president sends 
out his staffers to talk things over with students.” Magruder made clear that this strategy 
will “create no new enemies.”52 As Nixon looked to cultivate a more receptive young 
constituency, his administration looked beyond the radical students who had become 
synonymous with youth. 
Nixon’s first public appearance after Kent State, Billy Graham’s 60,000 person 
youth rally at the University of Tennessee’s sacred building, Neyland Stadium, made 
perfect sense.  Whether Nixon invited himself to the event on May 28, or whether 
Graham invited the President remains uncertain. Yet, his decision to attend reveals the 
lengths Nixon would go to recruit Christian conservatives into his “silent majority” 
around youth issues.  The President chose Tennessee for several reasons.  A recent article 
on UT had claimed that “football, fraternities and fundamentalism controlled the 
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campus,” and a poll of the Crusade’s attendees showed that seventy-one percent had 
voted for Nixon in 1968.
53
  Testifying to the sold out crowd at Neyland Stadium, one UT 
football player thanked Christ for the “greatest thrill,” as the offensive lineman explained 
that he learned about the power of prayer when he first came to college and felt alone.
54
 
Graham’s ten day rally in Knoxville primarily attracted older evangelical 
Christians but gathered young people from the area as the focus on youth issues bridged 
the generation gap.  Young people had flocked to Christianity during this period, creating 
a Jesus Movement, complete with its signature hand signal.  A slight adaptation of the 
1960s peace symbol, Graham described the “One Way” gesture as simply a “raised index 
finger pointing upwards.”  While Graham welcomed traditionally “straight,” middle class 
youth groups such as Intervarsity Christian Fellowship members, a religious revival 
within the counterculture resonated with Graham’s quest to bring America back from the 
1960s through a spiritual awakening. Co-opting the counterculture’s language during one 
speech at to the Kansas City Youth Crusade in 1967, Graham asked the audience to 
“Tune into God, then turn on…drop out --of the materialistic world. The experience of 
Jesus Christ is the greatest trip you can take.”55 
Young conservatives tried to link their politics with the self-described Jesus 
Freaks around a common foe-- the counterculture. One columnist for the YAF’s New 
Guard, explained that though Jesus Freaks lived in communes while they dressed and 
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talked like hippies, “they break sharply with the hippie subculture at crucial points—at 
the points of morality and religion.”  In turn, conservative politicians resonated with these 
“hip” evangelicals who “campaign actively against the moral laxity and putrid 
permissiveness that have gone so far in corrupting American middle class, especially 
suburban middle-class, society.”56As his youth gatherings gained popularity, his Crusades 
at Neyland Stadium melded with Nixon’s attempt to revive America’s spirit by attacking 
the generation gap. Speaking about campus unrest on one night, Graham argued “this 
nation could not withstand another depression because of its lack of moral fiber.”57 
Campus protesters defended themselves at the Youth Rally with their own, anti-war 
morality.  
Nixon’s appearance provoked the University of Tennessee’s diminutive protest 
movement to action.  Hundreds of demonstrators sat together amid the sea of over 60,000 
Nixon supporters, standing and shouting with signs that read “Thou Shalt Not Kill.”  
Though the police arrested only a handful of students, they did photograph protesters who 
they later arrested for “disrupting a religious service.” The courts eventually dismissed 
most of the charges after a lengthy battle over whether or not the President’s presence 
made the event something other than religious. In addition, Graham’s presence riled some 
campus religious leaders.  A local university chaplain complained that Graham refused to 
meet with students, instead limiting his engagement to his “skillfully controlled Crusade 
meeting where the audience is barraged with attractions, revival music, personalities and 
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a promise of deliverance from their deepest anxieties and fears.” Adding to this 
inaccessible affect, two University of Tennessee linemen flanked Graham when he took 
the stage. Furthermore, the chaplain observed, Graham’s audience only included the 
white middle class who shared his concerns.
58
 
  Nixon’s speech at the Youth Rally signaled the president’s deliberate 
identification with religious Christians to cultivate a conservative campus culture. 
“Government can provide peace, clean water, clean air, clean streets and all the rest,” he 
clarified, but “that quality of spirit…that each one of us hungers for must come from him 
[Graham].”  While he may not have been known for his religious convictions, Nixon 
argued that every president left office “more dedicated and more dependent on his 
religious faith than when he entered it.”59  Beyond this consideration, Nixon spent the 
speech focused on the business at hand: student protest.  Pointing out the crowd’s loyalty, 
Nixon claimed, “I am just glad that there seems to be a rather solid majority on one side 
rather than the other side.”  Contrasting this gathering with the bloody confrontations on 
campuses that spring, Nixon continued, “I am proud to say that the great majority of 
America’s young people do not approve of violence.”  
This event combined the disparate elements that pushed the Republican Party’s 
move on social issues to merge with growing religious developments.  For parents, 
religious students and the adherents to UT’s traditional football culture, Graham’s rally 
countered the youth problem on campuses with Nixon’s “square power.”  After the 
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protest, one UT flyer claimed, “the good citizens of this community are beginning to see 
a climate of concern growing and are anxious to see Christian Leadership take control of 
the University of Tennessee and use of the strictest discipline against this minority 
element of evil and demonstrate to our nation we have courage to handle these law 
violators.”60 Continuing Nixon’s effort to address campus unrest, the president set out to 
examine its causes. 
This controversy pressured Nixon to examine possible culprits for campus 
violence. On June 13, Nixon ordered former Governor William Scranton (R-PA) to head 
the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest.  Four of the commission’s nine members 
came from academic institutions, while it included law enforcement officials, a journalist 
and Cleveland’s Director of Public Safety. The most controversial appointee, prominent 
student leader and Harvard graduate student Joseph Rhodes III, shed light on the 
commission’s purpose to defuse young liberals’ anti-administration vitriol.  None other 
than Ronald Reagan, the model GOP crusader against campus unrest, fumed that Rhodes 
should be fired from the commission, as the young campus activist once claimed the 
Governor was “bent on killing people for his own political gain.”  After Rhodes called for 
the commission to investigate the correlation between campus unrest and Vice President 
Agnew’s inflammatory rhetoric, this scrutiny only increased when the vice president 
accused him of “immaturity” and demanded his resignation from the committee.61  In 
addition, Reagan questioned the appointment of Howard University’s President, James 
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Cheek because he had accused the Nixon administration of “repression.”62  Even before 
the commission issued its findings, conservatives dismissed its legitimacy. William 
Buckley Jr. wrote, “it is an executive habit to convene a presidential commission 
whenever something reaches the status of national worry.”  Claiming that a fair-minded 
report that holds all parties responsible could not emerge due to the commission’s liberal 
bias, Buckley held Scranton’s conciliatory tone responsible for “the result that the left-
militants on the commission began to walk away with the show.”63 
Not only conservatives criticized the composition of the commission. Pressure 
also existed on the left, as one young professor spoke on behalf of his radical students, 
“None of us have too many illusions about the effectiveness of a Presidential 
Commission.”  “Nixon has tricked some liberal students into thinking that the answer to 
campus problems lies in more communications,” one such student railed. “What we want 
is for him to give in. We want action, not talk.”64 In addition, critics pointed out that 
previous presidents including LBJ had already directed similar commissions.  New York 
City’s liberal Mayor John Lindsay complained that the Scranton commission would not 
have been necessary “if the recommendations of three past Presidential commissions 
were implemented.” In a resolution unanimously approved during the 1970 Conference 
of Mayors, Lindsay challenged the government to implement past recommendations 
rather than set out to renew them.
65
 In this case liberals called for real leadership on 
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student unrest—more than commissions and pronouncements, young Americans 
demanded a role in government.  
Under these polarized circumstances, the commission conducted open hearings in 
Washington D.C; Jackson, Mississippi; Kent, Ohio and Los Angeles over the summer 
and Scranton submitted the three hundred and fifty eight page report to the President in 
October.  The study, completed in the mandated three months, made up in length what it 
lacked in specifics.  The commission decided not to name names, and instead claimed the 
cause for student unrest “is not a single or uniform thing. Rather it is the aggregate result, 
or sum, of hundreds and thousands of individual beliefs and discontents, each of them as 
unique as the individuals who feel them.” Calling attention to the generational crisis, the 
commission spread blame and warned that “a nation driven to use the weapons of war 
upon its youth is a nation on the edge of chaos. A nation that has lost the allegiance of 
part of its youth is a nation that has lost part of its future.”66  In addition, the commission 
connected the unrest to the President, claiming that “only the President can offer the 
compassionate, reconciling moral leadership that can bring the country together again.”  
Nixon’s opponents agreed with the expectations the Scranton Commission set out 
for a moral leadership from the White House. Representing thousands of churches, the 
president of the National Council of the Churches of Christ asked Nixon for the 
reconciliation with young people and students that Scranton’s commission recommended. 
While denouncing violent methods that both radicals and law enforcement employed, the 
letter affirmed the report’s comments on the President’s role: “But there is no one, Mr. 
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President…who can better exercise the reconciling moral leadership that is needed today 
by the whole country than yourself.”  The politics here leaned left, urging the President to 
end the war, continue student financial support, and stating that “the idealism of our 
youth must be affirmed.”67 Students on the left too felt that Nixon’s attempt to dodge the 
moral leadership role looked to “shift the blame for campus disorders…Which many 
would consider to be ‘passing the buck.’”  While agreeing with the President’s claim that 
“moral leadership…does not reside in the Presidency alone,” one student leader at 
Michigan State, Harold Buckner, asked Nixon, “If you cannot provide leadership 
necessary to ‘bring us together’, to whom we can turn?”68  Buckner continued, “You are 
the symbol of moral leadership to whom millions of Americans look. Yours should be the 
example from which all take inspiration.”69 
Nixon kept his distance, limiting his leadership on campus unrest to a symbolic 
role. His youth man, Robert Finch, responded: “government institutions have too often 
replaced religious ones.”  The youth problem forced Nixon’s administration to reconcile 
its law and order appeal with its attempt to limit government.  Speaking to young people, 
but also the liberal ideology that Nixon sought to end, Finch claimed, “modern ‘other-
directed’ man is looking to government and to his political leaders for direction, 
discipline and inspiration of a nature and character that the American Presidency was 
never designed to provide.”  In closing, Finch firmly explained that Nixon “does not 
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pretend to be the moral and spiritual leader of 205 million Americans.” Thus, in this case, 
the President felt that “to extend a Presidential or Federal template across these schools 
would be intolerable to academic freedom.”70  While Nixon looked to expand his role as 
a moral leader, it would not be in the name of reconciliation. 
Calling the report "more pablum for the permissivists,” Vice President Spiro 
Agnew complained that the commission had deflected blame onto the administration.
71
In 
the President’s letter responding to the report, Nixon rejected the report’s claims about 
the need for “moral leadership” and took exception with its liberal characterizations of 
students and the generation gap, claiming he met “tens of thousands of young people who 
do not in the slightest conform to the predominant description of students and young 
people in this report.”72 Thus, Nixon’s administration sought to bolster the President’s 
leadership image with a different, conservative youth segment. 
Following the University of Tennessee speech with Billy Graham, Nixon set out 
to address youth on other friendly campuses, including the University of Nebraska.  Here, 
he called on young people to put aside their generational differences. Nixon’s politics of 
youth shifted its focus from the hippies and students who inspired his law and order 
approach. In the months following Kent State,  Nixon carefully distinguished his vision 
of a “new prosperity” for America’s youth from the youth revolt’s anti-establishment 
sentiment that prevented them from buying into the system.  In complimenting the 
students on Nebraska’s national championship, Nixon lauded competition and 
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individuality as the foundation of the American work ethic (with a nod to his own 
career’s setbacks and perseverance). 
You can all take pride in your great team. It is a splendid thing to be champions. 
But a more splendid thing, I believe, is the process by which a team becomes 
champion, the long struggle through defeat, through doubt, and then on to victory.  
There is satisfaction here, and for all of us there are valuable lessons as well. For 
as vital as the understanding we gain in the classroom is the deeper understanding 
of ourselves that comes from competing against others and competing against 
ourselves.
73
 
In context of Nixon’s intention to counter campus unrest, this example grants insight into 
the traditional campus life he espoused as an alternative to the more publicized student 
power movement. While Nixon celebrated the merits of competitive individualism in 
educational institutions, his aides wished he would strike a more conciliatory tone. Mort 
Allin laid out the problem: “The hippies can be roundly criticized if need be, but we can’t 
allow parents to think the administration is against their children.”74  Explaining that 
many parents “look with disfavor on the youth culture, they look with familial pride on 
their individual sons and daughters.”  Besides, “many of their kids have long hair.”75  
After Nixon’s Nebraska speech, he had a mixed reaction to the media coverage.  While 
the President agreed that his call for an “alliance of generations” differed from his law 
and order image before the summer of 1970, he took issue with journalists’ omission of 
his “determination not to tolerate violence on the part of the minority of the young.”  
Thus, while Nixon softened his tone for the “sons and daughters of the silent majority,” 
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he struggled to control his media image on youth issues.
76
  Nixon wanted to defuse the 
youth revolt through leadership, not as a conciliator.  
While the Scranton Commission called for the President to use moral leadership 
to calm campuses and reconcile with student protestors, he developed connections with 
religious leaders and organizations to lead a different, square youth cohort. In cultivating 
this conservative culture, Nixon’s aides recommended that the Republican Party form a 
“platform plank against extremism” and pressure the Democrats to do the same. Nixon’s 
researchers concluded that the youth revolt could help him exploit divisions in the New 
Deal coalition and proposed a speech “after some particularly outrageous campus 
incident” to denounce “those who have attempted to politicize and destroy the great 
American universities.”77 
Nixon’s attempt to foster a conservative campus culture after Kent State had help 
as the students cooperated. In journalist David Broder’s distressed plea for responsible 
party politics, The Party’s Over, he observed the change even in America’s most liberal 
academic enclaves. Walking through Harvard’s famed courtyards and out into the 
notoriously bohemian urban environs, Broder noted “the startling return of squareness to 
Harvard Square” and that “Campus bulletin boards advertise more concerts and poetry 
readings than political meetings.”78SQUARE Magazine even hoped to capitalize on the 
new “square chic,” as “Students Quietly Undertaking American Revolutionary 
Endeavors” attempted to boost its readership with spokeswoman Nancy Jones who 
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claimed to be “the first SQUARE Cher.”79 
As Nixon restrained the federal government’s role on campuses, he encouraged a 
conservative campus culture.  After all, many social conservatives connected the 
permissive counterculture to student power.  “Habitual users of marijuana,” one 
columnist argued, “tend to go along when the excitement of a demonstration begins.”80 
The Vietnam War wound down and campus protest culture practically disappeared. 
However, students had changed as well.  In 1972, an Esquire article on campus life 
claimed, “Your pot parties have turned into beer busts,” sarcastically lamenting that “we 
never thought to see Consciousness III awash in the suds of the hard hats.”81Even if 
campuses did not live up to Nixon’s ascetic standards, better beer than that “evil weed.” 
Thus, campus unrest tested Nixon’s ability to adapt to his silent majority’s changing 
constituency.  Nixon’s approach to student protest forced him to rethink the 
conservatives’ assumption that considered campus politics categorically as a problem.  
While Nixon struggled to enforce his law and order approach to student protest, the 
marijuana issue would allow a tougher approach. The origins of the war on marijuana 
explain Nixon’s effort to fulfill his campaign’s law and order image. 
War on Marijuana 
The war on marijuana had begun even before Nixon took office. From the 1930s 
through 1962, Federal Bureau of Narcotics director Harry Anslinger saw marijuana 
through an anti-Mexican lens. In keeping with the anti-marijuana message from the 
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infamous 1936 film Reefer Madness, Anslinger affirmed the drug’s reputation as a 
violence inducing “evil weed” while he presumed most users to be Mexican immigrants. 
By the late1960s, after the baby boomers got a hold of marijuana, those assumptions had 
become untenable. Estimates for Americans who had tried marijuana in 1968 ranged 
from eight to twelve million, including one third of college students.
82
 Middle America’s 
opposition to marijuana sharpened when the crime rate for young Americans rose 
dramatically throughout the 1960s, as it became twice as high among youths between 
fifteen and twenty-five than among older Americans.
83
 
Under the larger project of curtailing young Americans’ narcotics abuse at the end 
of the 1960s, local enforcement efforts disproportionately punished marijuana users. One 
opportunistic State Attorney in Florida’s Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Frank Schaub, proudly 
announced in 1968 that his own “war on narcotics” had yielded “32 charges for 
possession…mostly marijuana.”  With harsh penalties, including a minimum sentence of 
one year probation for possession and some sentences reaching five years in prison for 
selling, Schaub proclaimed, “we are dealing with young people. I hope that our progress 
in this area will make other young people think before becoming involved in drug 
abuse.”84 The punishments State Attorney Schaub handed out paled in comparison to the 
thirty year sentence one man received for crossing the border into Texas with a matchbox 
full of marijuana cigarettes or the ninety-nine year sentence on the books in North Dakota 
for selling pot.  
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Fears about marijuana as a gateway to the drug culture inspired this crackdown. In 
addition, LSD cast a dark light on both pot and the drug culture that linked the two.  
Although reports showed that LSD usage peaked and began to decline by late 1968, 
conservative student papers such as the Lipscomb Babbler amplified the anecdotal 
madness that LSD caused, including one University of Loyola student who “grabbed a 
live kitten and ate it while under the influence of LSD.”85  As acid’s dangerous reputation 
grew, a physician in an outpatient psychiatric clinic argued that many in the drug culture 
went “from LSD to marijuana because they have simply decided LSD is not safe.”  This 
proved little comfort for the conservative student columnist who claimed that on college 
campuses and in the “dark, frightful communities of hippies…Drug taking is no gag… 
it’s a way to die.” Further spelling out the gateway potential that marijuana presented, 
Nixon confided to Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, “once you cross that line, from the 
straight society to the drug society -- marijuana, then speed, then it's LSD, then it's 
heroin, etc. then you're done.”86  Following this logic, the director of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, John E. Ingersoll, responded to the growing protest 
against the severity of penalties for use of marijuana, stating that “people who use 
marijuana extensively also have a tendency to branch out into more damaging drugs.”87 
The case against marijuana also included a scientific basis. In October, 1969, 
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Congress held hearings to consider the Report of the Special Presidential Task Force 
Relating to Narcotics, Marijuana and other Dangerous Drugs which warned of physical, 
mental and social breakdown due to marijuana use. The Justice Department study-- 
predictably “law and order”-- found the “pothead” suffered from “apathy, loss of 
effectiveness,” “notable conjunctivitis, chronic bronchitis and certain digestive ailments” 
as well as “adverse psychological effects.”   The report also analyzed “users” progression 
to other drugs from marijuana, pointing out that “half of the heavy users of marihuana 
had tried LSD.”88 In addition, marijuana had a racialized, urban stigma. The Task Force 
Report explained that although pot began with “ghetto dwellers, it has now appeared 
among the middle and upper class.” This growing controversy over marijuana pushed 
both Nixon and the Congress to continue investigating marijuana’s influence on young 
Americans.   
While common perceptions about marijuana’s negative health and habitual effects 
caused concern, pot played a new role in society as one anti-marijuana journalist in the 
National Review admitted, “I care not a fig for its physical effects.”  Rather, the article 
continued, the problem with pot was that it initiated “a lifestyle that generally rejects or 
seeks to bring down ‘ordered life as we know it.’”  According to this framework, anti-
marijuana laws meant “to lean on, to penalize the Counterculture.”89  Social conservative 
proponents of strict marijuana laws also connected the marijuana problem to liberal 
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elitism. YAF leader Ferdinand Mount argued against legalization, pointing out that 
“When only the poor sought paradise by way of pot….They just flung ‘em in jail.” 
Quoting a Yale administrator who claimed that “marijuana does not have, in the college 
culture, the force of initiation” into the harder drugs, Mount claimed that the “the less 
educationally privileged are to be allowed to go hang.”90 Thus, while Mount’s argument 
against legalization claimed that “public health,” not “moral conduct,” inspired his 
position, his vitriol for campus culture still framed the discourse.  The article blasts the 
ivory tower that had become a symbol for conservatives’ perceptions of the 
establishment’s liberal cabal. Nixon agreed: “It is doubtful,” Nixon pointed out, “that an 
American parent can send a son or daughter to college today without exposing the young 
man or woman to drug abuse.”91 
Marijuana’s prevalence on American campuses linked conservative fears about 
privileged, idealistic campus liberal activists with the 1960s’ pot culture.  Traveling 
around American campuses in the fall of 1972, conservative journalist James J. Kilpatrick 
observed that one topic came up as often as Vietnam, “This is marijuana.”92 During the 
Democratic primary to determine the party’s candidate for Texas’ Lieutenant Governor, 
party regulars criticized “rich boy” Bill Hobby for telling an audience of University of 
Texas students “he favors legalizing the private use and possession of marijuana.”  
Pointing out Hobby’s “law and order” message in television commercials, his critics 
argued that he should “say the same thing in Abilene or Lubbock that he says in 
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Austin.”93  Pro-pot advocacy smacked of elitism, as the marijuana controversy became an 
obvious opportunity for Nixon to build his populist conservatism.  
Providing testimony at the congressional hearing to establish a commission on 
this issue, William F. Buckley Jr. summarized marijuana’s cultural and spiritual threat. 
The leading conservative journalist read one letter from a distraught mother who lost her 
son to the drug culture.  Despite her attempts to build an atmosphere of “cheerfulness and 
joy” for her boy (“so beautiful, the angels looked on him with envy”), he left her for “that 
Devil’s Weed: Marijuana.”  While this anecdote pulled at the familial heartstrings, it also 
threatened American values, as the letter closed, “And I am not just grieving for him, it is 
the race too.”  Buckley suggested that the commission investigate marijuana’s sinister, 
cultural and religious influences.  Citing pot’s eastern origins, Buckley worried that 
“marijuana is an internalizing drug…that diminished the interest in other people.”  
Conversely, “alcohol in moderate quantities is a gregarious drug.  It is one that is the 
western tradition of participation as opposed to the eastern tradition of copping out.”94  In 
these terms, the marijuana culture, or hippies, presented a foreign and religious threat to 
Americans. In a rare moment of disagreement, the liberal Democrat AbnerMikva, who 
had missed the subcommittee’s previous day’s hearings due to his participation in the 
Moratorium to End the War, recoiled at Buckley’s interpretation, stating that he would 
“be troubled with any legislative action that would follow on such a finding.”95  Here, 
marijuana’s countercultural symbolic significance shaped the dialogue around its effects.   
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Buckley, however, conceded that he did try pot. “I did not blow up,” he admitted, 
“nor did I want another one the next day.”  Thus, Buckley argued, “if marijuana does not 
instantly do to you what the literature says it does to you, then the whole epistemological 
process of the law comes into question.”96  The credibility gap surrounding marijuana 
exacerbated the generation gap, threatening America’s legal institutions.  Buckley argued 
for decriminalization, but later wrote that Americans decided legalization could not occur 
less it “appear to capitulate to the counter-culture….But at the same time, American 
parents…did not desire their 18-year-old boys and girls to be sent to jail for smoking 
pot.”97  While Buckley acknowledged law and order’s limits here, he could not concede 
this ground to his hippie enemies. The conference panelists could, as they all defined 
possession laws as “draconian” and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics assistant director 
noted that a co-sponsored bill by the Nixon administration “might reduce penalties for 
marijuana possession and use.”98 
Many young Americans, right and left, agreed that draconian marijuana laws 
deserved rethinking.  In 1968, the voice of American conservatism, the National Review, 
published an issue dedicated to the marijuana controversy.  One article arguing for its 
legalization interviewed James White III, legal counsel for the Committee to Legalize 
Marijuana (LeMar).  Surprisingly, White was no hippie.  “At least, he voted for 
Goldwater in ’64.”  According to White, conservatives and liberals agreed that the 
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marijuana laws were “reducing respect for law enforcement--just as prohibition did.”99  
The uneven and severe punishments for marijuana in different states undermined law 
enforcement’s credibility.     
 The 1969 Young Americans for Freedom convention witnessed a rise of 
libertarian purists who opposed government regulation that extended beyond its most 
basic functions. They found their supposed “godfather” William F. Buckley, had become 
too attached to “traditional values” and “a tired, cowardly moderator for the 
establishment” as he opposed abortion rights and called for more laws against 
pornography and marijuana.
100
 When the Libertarians introduced resolutions to legalize 
marijuana at the convention, forty percent of the YAF membership agreed.  Even the 
mainstream youth groups on the right agreed, as the platform adopted at the 1972 College 
Republican Convention in Virginia said that “there was no evidence the use of marijuana 
leads to experimenting with hard drugs nor does its use play a part in the commission of 
crimes.”101  On issues like marijuana, some members of the New Left and young 
libertarians from the right joined to hold “left-right” conferences and combined to 
establish the Libertarian Party in 1971.  As one Nixon advisor answered his own question 
about the YAF purists who recruited Goldwater, “Where do you think most of the 
‘students for AuH2O’ are now?  Not in our corner…”102  Nixon’s opponents in Congress 
viewed marijuana as the President’s vulnerability. 
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 Representative Ed Koch (D- New York) took up the effort when he sponsored a 
conference in 1969 featuring a panel which consisted of three doctors, a lawyer an 
official of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Bardelle Gosse, the twenty-six year old 
director of the National Student Association’s drug studies program.  One student witness 
argued that marijuana laws undermined law and order--“as long as you are lying about 
pot, and as long as you have these laws on pot, the kids are not going to listen to you.”103 
Gosse put the conflict in generational terms more clearly, stating that it was “between 
your recreational drugs [alcohol and tobacco] and my recreational drug.” Nixon did not 
buy this equivalence. The issue resonated too much with the “silent majority” for Nixon 
to ignore, as one disgruntled Spokane Daily reader asked, “how can you be of greater 
service to your city than by helping to finance an all-out war on drugs?” Urging 
Spokane’s entire citizenry, from the American Red Cross to the business community, to 
participate in this effort, the letter makes one last request, “How about some drug laws 
with teeth in them?”104  If Nixon wanted to rally a constituency of social conservatives, 
he would have to resolve the pot problem. 
In 1970, at Nixon’s urging, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act. Although the bill dedicated over two million dollars to 
rehabilitation, the proposals’ teeth gained more attention as it contained a “no-knock” 
provision that allowed narcotics agents to enter a house without warning. Revealing this 
problem’s increasing relevance to his rural and suburban constituencies’ families, Nixon 
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likened drugs to “a tide which has swept this country in the last decade and which afflicts 
both the body and soul of America.”105  “Marijuana is no longer a ghetto drug” one 
expert pointed out, “it has entered the suburbs, the board rooms, the colleges and 
even…the sanctity of the family living room.”106 Nixon noted in his address that “it 
comes quietly into our homes, and destroys children, it moves into neighborhoods and 
breaks the fiber of community.”107 The youth problem here called for a concerted federal 
response as it provoked the silent majority’s concerns about urban crawl and protecting 
their families from the 1960s permissive counterculture. 
 Nixon’s approach to marijuana adhered to his tough stance despite the pushback 
from his opponents. In 1969, police arrested over 250,000 Americans for marijuana 
possession, mostly below the age of thirty.  Nixon expanded this effort yearly, arguing in 
1972 that “there isn’t a penalty too great for drug traffickers who prey upon youth” as he 
requested $600 million from Congress to support his newly established Office of Drug 
Abuse Law Enforcement. Nixon called for “strong, tough prosecution” to combat what he 
termed “the number one domestic problem that concerns the American people.”108 
During Nixon’s presidency, spending on criminal justice as a percentage of U.S. GNP 
increased from 1.0 percent ($10.5 billion) to 1.4 percent ($15.0 billion) from 1971 to 
1974 alone. Over the same short period, federal spending on the judicial system grew by 
62 percent and on policing by 52 percent, while the number of police nationally grew 
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13.6 percent, from 575,000 to 653,000 personnel.
109
  Buttressed by the formation of the 
Drug Enforcement Agency in 1971, marijuana arrests jumped from 292,179 to 420,700 
from 1972 to 1973.
110
 
Even in the most conservative bastion of Nixon supporters, such as the University 
of Tennessee, more police meant an attack on the student counter-culture.  For example, 
federal drug enforcement agencies funded and organized drug sweeps in Knoxville with 
handles such as “Project Aquarius” that revealed their targets.  Confirming its focus on 
students, the Knoxville police arrested twenty-two UT undergrads for marijuana 
possession in one day.  Randy Tyree, Knoxville’s Safety Director who UT students 
dubbed the city’s “number one narc,” explained the motivation for the crackdown: 
“Young people have always experimented….and to this generation the experimentation is 
with drugs.” Indicating the futility of such efforts, according to the UT’s Yearbook that 
year, students still found drugs readily available on campus.
111
  Whether or not his war on 
drugs succeeded, the youth controversy proved to be a crucial area in which Nixon 
appealed to Middle American backlash against 1960s students’ social permissiveness.112 
Marijuana arrests also became an effective way to silence young activists who 
opposed Nixon.  In one popular example, a leader in Ann Arbor’s anti-war movement 
received a ten year sentence in state prison for selling two joints to an undercover agent.  
This controversy crystallized the youth revolt’s transition into politics, as several 
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musicians including Stevie Wonder , Phil Ochs and John Lennon joined radicals such as 
Jerry Rubin and Bobby Seale for a “John Sinclair Freedom Rally.”  As the headliner, 
Lennon closed the eight hour program with a song that protested “Law and Order,” 
written especially for the event--“It Ain’t Fair, John Sinclair.”  According to the FBI’s 
confidential dossier on Lennon, he sang, “They gave him 10 for 2, what more can [Judge] 
Colombo, Nixon, Agnew do?”113  Although Nixon’s War on Drugs dedicated 
unprecedented support for rehabilitation and education, his emphasis on enforcement 
enhanced young liberals’ perception that he stood on the wrong side of the generation 
gap.  As Nixon’s initial approach to marijuana emphasized enforcement, he would also 
have to adapt this “law and order” strategy in response to youth politics. 
In the wake of Kent State, the drug problem touched a chord in the heightened 
discourse over the “generation gap.”  In late May, Mitchell continued to play the “strong 
man” in the war on drugs.  Concerning the Attorney General’s call for more enforcement, 
a concerned reader of the Modesto Bee protested this authoritarian approach, pointing out 
that “tough laws” do not always work.  Instead, the letter suggested “perhaps, by working 
hand in hand with our youth we can discover together the real underlying causes.  Who 
knows, maybe we can even get to know and like one another.”114 
 While giving “10 for two” sat fine with Nixon, it proved problematic with his 
growing suburban constituency. After meeting with twelve young white house staffers, 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Robert Finch feared the generation 
                                                          
113
 Jon Wiener, Gimme Some Truth: The John Lennon FBI Files (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), p.114.  While the lyrics are on the back jacket of Lennon’s next album, Some Time in New York 
City, the FBI marked the report on the rally and the lyrics as confidential. 
114
 “Must Learn Cause,” Letter from the People, Modesto Bee, July 29, 1970, p.49. 
98 
 
 
 
gap’s political influence and sought to diminish Nixon’s role in the war on marijuana, 
leaving it up to departments  and agencies, not the White House.   Finch explained one 
problem with “Law and Order” in a memo warning Nixon to stay out of the pot issue as it 
“accentuates any generation gap there may be.”  While parents wanted “reassurance that 
the president is concerned,” Finch underlined the obvious fact that “they do not want 
their own youngsters condemned nor put in jail.”115 At the heart of the problem, Finch 
pointed out that the “unknown facts about marijuana make it difficult to talk about except 
in the moral context—where the greatest controversy lies.”116 
 The youth crisis brought moderates such as Finch into prominence. One 
journalist labeled him the cabinet member most “in tune” with the New Politics that 
appealed to “youth and independents over the heads of established political leaders 
without regard to the shibboleths and doctrinaire positions of traditional politics.”117  
Showing sympathy for American youth, Finch admitted during a dinner for Sigma Delta 
Chi journalists that he hoped “[student] ferment never ceases,” while he couched his 
approach in conservative terms that blamed unrest on one of Nixon’s favorite enemies, 
“unstructured data from that bloody tube,” explaining that demonstrators comprised part 
of the “first generation raised on TV.”118  Image became front and center in the war on 
drugs.  Nixon used his own modern media influence to challenge the anti-Nixon youth 
narrative he hoped to disprove. 
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 Nixon targeted this cultural threat by utilizing advertising, radio and television 
to combat drug use.  The President addressed the public relations problem that youth 
issues caused, bringing on a special consultant on youth affairs, Bud Wilkinson, who 
used his “friendly smile and soft voice” to “improve the President’s image with youth.”  
While Wilkinson claimed, “What I do is not directly related to politics,” his role in the 
politics of youth expanded the focus on image in the White House.
119
 In an 
unprecedented effort, Wilkinson recruited the previously non-political, non-partisan 
Advertising Council which had been in existence for public service announcements since 
World War II. As Nixon’s youth problem became a popular story within the eastern 
establishment media, Nixon looked for more friendly sources to counter the narrative that 
pitted the President against young people. This effort, and its shortcomings, showed 
many of the problems young Americans’ presented to Nixon's image.   
 First, Nixon’s aides overemphasized advertisement’s public-service potential to 
sway young people, claiming that “Modern day advertising has literally performed 
miracles in making a soft drink seem like a sip from the fountain of youth.” “Surely,” 
Ingersoll confidently stated, “these same techniques can turn a(n)… individual away from 
seeking relief through drug experimentation.”120  However, the campaign’s slogan, “Why 
do you think they call it dope?” lumped in all narcotics under one label, revealing the 
square culture that spawned it.  In addition, the ads geared their message to the problems 
people had in finding jobs after receiving a marijuana conviction. Convincing young 
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people to trust the government and some slick advertising agency about drugs proved 
more difficult than anticipated. For this audience, threatening them with jail time that 
would hurt professional goals fell flat. One Nixon aide pinpointed the problem, “With 
today’s youth continually questioning the existing values in society, is the motivation ‘to 
get a good job’ really valid for this group?”121  Despite its attempt to gain credibility 
through a relevant, non- pedantic approach, the campaign rested on the assumption that 
all drugs were the same and continually tested young people’s shared emphasis on 
authenticity.  
Nixon’ war on drugs also pressured radio executives to avoid music with drug 
references while he utilized the Advertising Council to produce anti-drug pop songs 
including “God Save the Soul” and “Help a Junkie, Bust a Pusher.”122 As an anti-drug 
musician and record company executive, MGM President Mike Curb dropped eighteen 
acts who he thought promoted hard drugs through their songs.  Curb lacked industry 
support, and Columbia Records President Clive Davis accused him of grandstanding to 
become “a minor hero of the Nixon administration.”123 
As for television, Nixon invited producers to the White House in April, 1970 for a 
day-long conference to encourage the networks to develop more story lines revolving 
around the horrors of drug culture.  Unfortunately, after twenty-four different episodes 
dealt with the drug problem from 1970 to1971, most blamed “the American social and 
political system” for youthful drug taking.  One producer admitted: “President Nixon got 
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the very opposite of what he was looking for.”124 In both radio and television, Nixon’s 
reputation as square, and Madison Avenues’ inability to “unsell” anything proscribed an 
effective anti-drug campaign. While media proved a challenging venue to build a 
conservative political culture, Nixon found religious connections as an effective way 
counter youth’s permissive culture.  While Nixon struggled to provide moral leadership 
on the campus unrest controversy, he could take a more austere position on marijuana.  
The political role for youth in this religious appeal became clear when Billy 
Graham organized an “Honor America Day” at the Lincoln Memorial on the 4th of July.  
This event, endorsed by Nixon, meant to exhibit the young Americans who fit into the 
silent majority.  Before the scheduled flag procession to the White House Ellipse, 
Graham addressed 10,000 people at the capitol steps for the morning’s religious service 
to warn about the “rising sea of permissiveness,” urging young people in the audience to 
“pursue the vision, reach toward the goal, fulfill the dream-and as you move to do it, 
never give in.”125  Here, Graham’s spiritual revival, steeped in the anxieties of a shifting, 
more suburban demographic in the Sunbelt synergized with Nixon’s appeal to an 
American “renewal of spirit.”  
Graham stood directly in contrast to the drug culture, as one young banker 
explained, “It’s nice to get away from the problems of the cities…Instead of smoking pot, 
you go hear Billy Graham.”126 Graham shared this sympathetic view, as he even grew his 
hair long, and would wander in disguise through protests marches, demonstrations or 
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rock concerts to engage young people in conversation.  When one young man recognized 
Graham at a show, he asked the evangelical leader to “pray for good weed,” to which 
Graham responded, “You can also get high on Jesus.”127  That evening, the “Honor 
America Day” crowd swelled to over a hundred thousand for the entertainment and 
fireworks. Complete with a five-hundred-member youth choir, the US Army Band, Bob 
Hope, astronauts and flag carrying relay runners from Valley Forge, Walt Disney 
Productions staged the event to allow Americans to “let go after countless demonstrations 
against one aspect or another of American life.”128 
Underlining the youth problem’s threat to American institutions, Yippie leader 
Abbie Hoffman had also called for an event at the National Mall for a fourth of July 
celebration and to protest marijuana laws.  While the contrast between the thousands of 
Smoke-In attendees and Grahams’ crowd on that hot Independence Day could not have 
been more extreme, it appeared familiar to many Americans.  In one photo that captured 
that day of unity in the nation’s capital, two scowling women, young children by their 
side, berate a young, shirtless man while he held a joint between his puckered lips.  One 
Cincinnati native who attended the rally made his stance clear, suggesting one way to 
protect America, “Any form of drugs should be outlawed…that’s a first step.”129 As 
Nixon attempted to move the country to the right, marijuana offered an issue he could 
exploit to tap into Graham’s Sunbelt evangelicals who one journalist described as an 
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“electoral bonanza.”130 
Marijuana, the symbolic drug of the counterculture, quickly became a political 
football in the increasingly heated dialogue surrounding the generation gap. Hoping to 
diffuse this tension, President Nixon appointed Governor Raymond P. Shafer of 
Pennsylvania, a former prosecutor known as a “law and order” governor, as head the 
National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse to develop guidelines for prevention 
and law enforcement. Shafer, along with White House liaison Geoff Shepard inherited 
the commission’s impetus to build credibility in Nixon’s law and order campaign.   The 
Committee’s personnel exemplified the White House’s intention to legitimate the study 
as an indication of Nixon’s sensitivity and fairness.  
Tension surrounded the commission’s personnel and credibility, and Congress 
held hearings to resolve this issue. Since this commission intended for this study to shape 
the information that guided new approaches to prevention and rehabilitation, its audience 
included young Americans.  For many participants in this hearing, this meant that at least 
one of the nine commission members should be younger than twenty-five years old to 
ensure a “a better understanding between the youth of today and what they term ‘the 
establishment.’”131  Buckley testified against a young representative on the commission, 
dismissing “the youth lobby” which “would be dissatisfied unless the appointment was 
also a habitual pot user.”132  This commission, and its results, had been under fire since 
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inception. While politicians bickered about this marijuana task force, the bipartisan panel 
included a congressman and senator from each party, as well as the nine people appointed 
by Richard Nixon. 
 Despite earlier concerns that the committee would either include a youth 
representative or only include “law and order” types, the commission drew on a variety 
of experts-- four academics, two physicians, a television producer and a law enforcement 
agent.  While the Scranton Commission on campus unrest had relative autonomy, the 
Shafer Commission would not enjoy the same latitude.  Nixon met with Shafer before the 
study began, and communicated the desired result of the commission.  While Shafer 
suggested that Nixon’s firm public stance against any legalization hurt the committee’s 
morale, Nixon emphasized his need to be consistent in his position. “I mean, they say 
well they're a bunch of old men who don't understand, that's fine,” Nixon told Shafer, “I 
wouldn't mind that, but, but if they get the idea you're just a bunch of do-gooders that are 
going to come out with a quote soft on marijuana report, that'll destroy it, right off the 
bat.”    Understanding the political weight of his commission and the tension over youth 
issues Shafer explained that he wanted to produce a Nixon friendly product, “I could see 
clouds of what happened with the Scranton, uh, Scranton Commission. I thought that was 
a disgrace.”133  While the commission on campus unrest gave fodder for Nixon’s 
“enemies in Congress,” the marijuana commission would help the administration. Nixon 
left Shafer with firm advice, “get your commission in line” and beware the “muddle-
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headed” psychiatrists. 134 
The Shafer Commission conducted the most extensive and comprehensive 
examination of marijuana ever performed by the US government. They recorded 
thousands of pages of transcripts of formal and informal hearings, solicited all points of 
view, including those of public officials, community leaders, professional experts and 
students. They also organized a nationwide survey of public beliefs, information and 
experience with drugs. In addition, they conducted separate surveys of opinion among 
district attorneys, judges, probation officers, clinicians, university health officials and 
“free clinic” personnel. In total, they commissioned more than fifty projects to survey 
enforcement of the marijuana laws in six metropolitan jurisdictions.
135
 
In its study of drug penalties, the interim report in 1972 laid out the conflicting 
views that they hoped to reconcile; the “law enforcement view” which the commission 
described as “an insistence that a person be held morally and legally accountable for his 
behavior with the criminal justice system;” and the “medical” approach “with a 
skepticism about the utility of criminal punishment and with the notion that drug 
dependence is an illness requiring treatment.”136  In this context, the commission hoped 
“the polarity of these two approaches should not be allowed to obscure the fact that 
public policy has always reflected elements of both views.” In evidence of this tension, 
the study showed that courts increasingly utilized “diversion” as part of a “full-fledged 
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movement” against using criminal sanctions.  Cheaper and more successful in reducing 
recidivism, prosecutors and judges increasingly utilized their legal leverage to offer 
defendants in drug related cases the option to seek treatment rather than face criminal 
proceedings. While law and order policies expanded enforcement, its applicability 
became a challenge at the ground level.  
In addition, the commission claimed that marijuana was not harmful, did not 
cause hallucinations and that there was no evidence pot itself caused “crime, sexual 
immorality or addiction to hard drugs.”  Thus, the commission recommended that private 
use be legalized, and other penalties lessened. Throughout the process, the Shafer 
commission’s members grew anxious that their efforts were in vain.  Nixon exacerbated 
this concern in a press conference a week before the interim report, where he 
categorically rejected any suggestion that legalizing marijuana could happen.  Nixon 
considered the report to be a critique of “law and order.”   
Considering the commission’s unprecedented price tag, Nixon maintained a 
conspicuous distance from the study.  In one memo revealing Nixon’s position on the 
commission, Geoff Shepard wrote, “I cannot see any presidential meeting, except for him 
to use as a forum to blast marihuana again!!!”  Instead, Shepard hoped to placate the 
commission with certificates, “because they think they are doing a good job for the 
President---misguided though they be.”137 Nixon never wanted the commission, and his 
relationship with its ongoing study confirms that he supported it only out of necessity.  
Nixon refused to accept a proposal that would contradict his war on drugs.   
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When the commission reported that seventy five percent of marijuana users were 
white and under twenty-five years old, Nixon appreciated this trends’ political 
significance for his conservative voting base, pointing out, "It's now becoming a white 
problem."
138
 Thus Nixon suggested a heftier sentence for those selling marijuana, leaving 
room for judges to show leniency for first-time users, as he claimed “everyone knows a 
kid next door who is smoking dope, but not everyone knows a pusher.”139  Nixon’s voters 
smoked pot too. This meant Nixon could rationalize more lenient penalties for marijuana 
use while increasing his emphasis on the supply side. 
Through politicians’ reactions to his commission on marijuana, Nixon quickly 
found out how important this issue was in tying together his “silent majority.”   James 
“Curley” Walsh, an Indiana State Representative, attributed his political resurgence after 
a twenty-five year hiatus to two issues; property tax exemptions and marijuana, the  
“Assassins of Youth.”  Protesting the commission’s lax approach to pot, Walsh asked the 
President to “purge the report” and start a new one that included “parents of son and/or 
daughter who are addicts.”   Revealing its religious sensibility, the letter concludes, “Why 
give god’s blessing to the devil?”140 
Law enforcement especially took offense to the report, considering it an attempt 
to push the drug into mainstream society.  One article, in response to increased local 
legalization legislation interviewed four policemen who pointed out the report’s central 
misconception that “marijuana use may be a fad that will recede substantially in time.”  
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The study’s methods also brought out contradictions between officers and the 
commission, as the medically based research methods employed in the commission could 
not compete with the policemen’s anecdotal evidence and emotional appeals. To these 
men, the marijuana threat had only just begun, as the article finished “it is time to raise 
the hue and cry against any public servant who supports the legalization of marijuana or 
any kindred menace.”141 
Another important component of Nixon’s New Majority, Sunbelt suburban 
women, also voiced displeasure with the report. In a letter to the President, the president 
of the Del Rosa Federated Junior Women’s Club in San Bernardino underlined that “a 
serious drug abuse problem existed not only among the minority community”  as she 
spelled out the role marijuana played in spreading drugs to the youth “who were 
supposed to come from backgrounds immune to drug related problems.” Confirming 
Nixon’s understanding of marijuana as an entry drug, the letter argued that of the 
seventy-five percent of the youth in San Bernardino who had tried drugs, almost all of 
them began with marijuana. “If a youth is brave enough to experiment with marijuana in 
the house,” the women wrote, “then he would be brave enough to experiment with hard 
narcotics.”142 While offering a softer method in combating drug abuse than Nixon’s law 
and order stance on pot, these women asked Nixon to “consider the long term impact 
which has not been determined by the [Shafer] Commission.”143 
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For these women, the problem required more than a carceral approach--it required 
spiritual leadership. This club had first-hand experience after it funded and organized the 
conversion of an old bank into the Christian, faith based Agape House for young people. 
Similar to the many youth centers that popped up across the nation during these turbulent 
years, the Agape included recreation, rap sessions with volunteer professionals in the 
field, and even attorneys to help with drug related legal issues.  Even though the city 
funded the drug abuse counseling programs, a walk-in drug abuse facility became the 
most controversial element of this center, dividing the thirty member women’s 
organization.  Set in an upper-middle class neighborhood, many on the board of directors 
feared a drug program would bring narcotics into the center. This focus on drug abuse 
also elicited controversy in the wider community.  When looking for a location for the 
center, many rejected the Women’s Club’s offers to purchase a building with the reply, 
“we really don’t want that element around.”144 
 In one typical city hearing to acquire funds, a community cynic argued, “the 
youth should be in jail if they have problems” and “you should build brick walls around 
them so they can’t cause problems.”145 However, the case for anti-drug programming 
became clear when supervisors found drugs on the least likely suspects, “kids coming for 
recreation.”146 While “law and order” protected children from pushers, many anti-drug 
activists agreed with the commission’s emphasis on treatment over punishment.  Still, the 
commission’s call for legalization came across as too passive and unresponsive to the 
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situation’s grave state. 
This reaction to the Shafer commission underlined the approach Nixon took on 
marijuana to punish the pusher.
147
 The politics made sense here, and no matter what the 
commission said, Nixon later admitted, he would not legalize marijuana.
148
 In the end, his 
tough approach proved well calculated, as the 1972 referendum on legalizing marijuana 
in California, Proposition 19, could only muster thirty-four percent of the voters’ support.  
While medical researchers and lawmakers agreed that one should not get “ten for two” 
(ten years for two joints), Nixon maintained the federal emphasis on law enforcement.  
Early in the commission’s effort, Shafer learned how inconsequential Nixon intended to 
make its call for less federal enforcement. Thus, considering Nixon’s New Federalism 
that promised to decentralize government, the youth problem inspired conservative 
politics to reinvent the role morality would play in federal government to protect 
America’s future. 
Concerning marijuana and student unrest, Nixon could not simply attack. Campus 
politics enhanced Nixon’s image as a law and order leader even though his policies 
ensured a safe distance from the problem.  Many students had expected law and order 
from Nixon. While one liberal student feared, “Nixon will use repressive measures to put 
down protest,” a campus conservative hoped the President would: “I think he’ll adopt a 
tough line of not tolerating rioting and he’ll probably favor cutting off aid to rioters.”149  
Nixon did take a tough line, but not to this extent.  
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As for marijuana, Nixon used his federal authority and added teeth to 
enforcement. Still, overreacting could do two things. First, he could ensnare his silent 
majority’s own children in his dragnet for student “bums” and hippie pot heads.  Second, 
young voters had developed their own political agency and to antagonize them would be 
an electoral risk.  Nixon’s tempered approach earned him faint praise, as one student 
explained his verdict on the President’s first year, “I’ll wait and see.”  A former 
McCarthyite admitted Nixon’s image favorably impressed her but questioned his 
credibility: “his public relations man probably deserves more credit than Nixon for 
that.”150 
Nixon’s ambiguous relationship with young Americans became even more 
obvious as the youth vote gained political momentum and Nixon’s liberal opponents in 
Congress threatened an alliance with their young counterparts. The youth problem 
ostensibly presented a barrier to Nixon’s conservative agenda, but actually created an 
opportunity to improve his leadership image and develop a conservative political culture 
more receptive to the GOP’s law and order politics.  However, while Nixon could afford 
to beef up his law and order credentials and religious appeal as he attacked delinquents of 
the 1968-generation, he could not flex the same political muscle when it came to issues 
such as the environment, the draft and other concerns that rallied young Americans across 
the spectrum. The politics of youth during this period, despite Nixon’s initial tough 
stance, offered young Americans unprecedented influence on policy. 
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Chapter Three 
Defending the System: Nixon and Youth Issues 
 
Even as Congress moved with historical haste to lower the voting age in 1971, the 
prospect of twenty-seven million first time voters frightened the president. “Give 
someone direct orders and responsibility to stop this: Highest Priority,” Nixon wrote 
White House aide John Ehrlichman.
1
 The President’s concern about the lower voting age 
for the 1972 election crystallized two of his most notable political problems.  First, it 
signaled the generation gap that separated Nixon from young Americans born after World 
War II.  Second, the youth vote heightened the structural obstacles to Nixon’s turn to the 
right, as many of his liberal opponents in Congress embraced the youth movement by 
lowering the voting age and advocating on behalf of issues near and dear to young 
people. The White House had to walk a fine line here, as its concessions to youth politics 
threatened Nixon’s “law and order” appeal. The lowered voting age forced Nixon to 
show young Americans that his administration could respond to their issues: college 
loans, the draft, and the environment.  
Youth politics, with its increasing demands on political elites, gave liberals in 
Congress the impetus to push through legislation that they hoped would both motivate the 
1968-generation’s transition into “the system” and corral young people as a constituency. 
Nixon aide Mort Allin accused the White House of “sticking our head in the sand and 
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ignoring the reality after the 18-year old vote decision was handed down while the Dems 
jumped on the bandwagon.”2 Countering this concern, Nixon eventually held a ceremony 
to celebrate the voting age amendment’s ratification, playing to his public line that 
“Youth today is just not as young as it used to be.” Whether or not Nixon appreciated it, 
young Americans’ independence separated them from their parents. Dwayne Draper, the 
president of the left leaning Association of Student Governments, scoffed at the idea that 
new voters would follow their elders: “It’s the silliest thing in the world to say that they 
will vote like their parents.”3  Thus, looking at the urgency young Americans brought into 
the political system, Nixon acted defensively. 
This chapter first analyzes the different, sometimes contradictory reasons behind 
lowering the voting age. While liberals thought this could bring in a new constituency, all 
lawmakers used this maneuver to mollify campus youth who had gained unprecedented 
attention after Kent State. The twenty-sixth amendment achieved unprecedented 
popularity as even Republicans, especially those from the Sunbelt, recognized how young 
voters could feed into either party’s constituency.   
1970 marked the emergence of youth politics on a new scale, and a poll taken in 
December of that year showed potential Democratic opponents for the 1972 election 
trouncing the President with this segment. The environmentalist from Maine, Senator Ed 
Muskie, gained forty-nine percent of young voters’ support with only twenty-two percent 
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going to Nixon.
4
 The growing relationship between youth organizations such the Youth 
Franchise Coalition and liberal Democrats in Congress who came into office during the 
Kennedy era forced Nixon to accept the moderate approach that tempered his law and 
order campaign and replaced the conservative revolution many in the GOP had wanted to 
initiate.  
Nixon subsequently came to support new programs for college loans, as the Basic 
Education Opportunity Grant (Pell Grant) became an important new way Democrats 
could harness young Americans’ emerging political power.  On the environment, young 
people from across the political spectrum shared ecological concerns. Nixon’s 
administration could not resist demands for new regulations when an equally diverse 
cross-section of congressional members advanced laws that protected air and water from 
pollution. Finally, Nixon’s move to end the draft served as the piece de resistance in his 
administration’s effort to control the generation gap’s political damage.  Contrary to 
interpretations that view Nixon’s policies as liberal or conservative, this chapter argues 
that Nixon’s concessions on youth issues cut across the political spectrum and meant to 
defuse anti-Nixon youth politics but also to build trust with moderate and conservative 
young voters.
5
 This problem divided Nixon’s focus between his short term focus on re-
election and his conservative political agenda.  Hardly the “evil genius” in this realm, the 
president struggled to keep up here.  Many historians magnify Nixon’s Machiavellian 
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leadership and overlook the pall of confusion that youth politics cast over his 
administration. 
As the White House scrambled to get a hold of the youth problem, its defensive 
posture went against Nixon’s political philosophy. This opening produced lasting and 
influential changes. Young Americans did not win these policy victories on their own, the 
1968-generation’s demonstrable alienation from American political, educational, 
business and military institutions inspired Nixon’s enemies in Congress and prompted the 
President’s acquiescence on key issues. Still, while youth politics threatened Nixon’s 
attempt to move the nation to the right, he utilized issues that motivated the politics of 
youth to build trust with the “sons and daughters if the silent majority.” 
The Vote 
In 1970, polls indicated that the youth vote could offer the Democratic Party a 
new and desperately needed constituency.  After polls showed Humphrey gaining ground 
among young people after Kent State, Charles Colson wrote that this “underscores its 
[youth] volatility” as “Humphrey did very badly in this group” during the 1968 election.6 
A Gallup poll of college students in that same year showed they declared themselves as 
liberals at a ratio of two to one, as they ranked Spiro Agnew last among seventeen 
government officials with an eighty-seven percent negative-putting his re-nomination as 
the vice-presidential candidate for the 1972 election into question.  “Republican-Liberal” 
Mayor of New York City, John Lindsay, scored the highest, followed by Muskie as 
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Nixon placed ninth.
7
  While Kent State inspired Nixon to reach out across the generation 
gap, the specter of eleven million new voters intensified his resolve to “bridge the gap” or 
at least appear to try.   
Young people played an important role in organizing the youth vote movement.  
One group, Project 18, combined the National Education Association (NEA) educators 
most committed to expanding citizenship. Project 18 formed when the NEA’s 1968 
National Representative Assembly voted overwhelmingly to make the youth vote its 
major objective. This leadership then founded the Youth Franchise Coalition which 
included members from groups such as the NAACP and the AFL-CIO.     
While many young Americans lobbied for the vote, political elites called the most 
loudly for lowering the voting age. As youth politics became known for its protest 
politics during the late 1960s and early 1970s, anti-war and liberal congressional 
members embraced the effort to expand the youth vote. Democratic Senators Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA) and Mike Mansfield (D-MT) attached a rider to the 1970 extension of 
the Voting Rights Act that included lowering the voting age.  Although this bill focused 
on ending the literacy tests that prevented blacks from voting, the on-going attempt to 
lower the voting age since 1943 had reached its moment.  While many subsequently 
explained the reasons for this change due to the “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” 
argument, the debate after Kent State focused on how best to control the youth problem 
and channel it into the political system.  During the 1960s politicians who tried to lower 
the voting age faced stiff opposition. 
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In 1969, Warren D. Chamberlain, a conservative state representative in 
Minnesota, spoke to the League of Women Voters against the eighteen year-old vote. 
Chamberlain linked the problems back to Dr. Spock. “The same loving permissiveness 
that allows unlimited candy and pop to decay their children’s teeth,” he said, “begets the 
permissiveness that decays morals, life and all sense of responsibility.”8 Pointedly, 
Chamberlain asked Minnesotan mothers, “Would you turn the most important decisions 
of your family over to your 19 year old child?” For conservatives, this moral problem did 
not require an accommodating political solution.  After 1968 referenda to lower the 
voting age failed in Ohio and New Jersey, politicians attributed their defeat to this 
“backlash.”  One concerned citizen from Connecticut asked Nixon to oppose the twenty-
sixth amendment because “the young are fanatics,” “immature” and “incapable of 
reasoning.”  To solve the youth problem, this letter instead called “for law and order and 
logical reasoning which can solve all the problems and the one way to effect this is to 
deny the vote to the ‘mentally ill generation.’”9 
Before Kent State, in Congressional debates over lowering the youth vote, 
Louisiana Democratic Representative John Rarick, a hawk on Vietnam policy (and the 
1980 nominee of George C. Wallace’s American Independent Party), pointed out the 
limits of connecting the war with young voters’ rights. “[T]he screaming mob espousing 
[‘old enough to fight, old enough to vote’] are not veterans nor fighting men but rather 
draft dodgers, draft card burners, and revolutionary vandals who have no intention 
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whatsoever of fighting – at least not for the United States.”10Rarick rejected the notion 
that contemporary youth were more intelligent and better informed than previous 
generations. Unimpressed, Rarick found that “records in our public schools, the Selective 
Service System, and our Armed Forces show a constant decline in both intelligence and 
aptitude averages.”  Anecdotally, Rarick also observed, “The common experience of 
adults – especially employers – is that today’s young people cannot spell, cannot read, 
and cannot reason.”11 
Advocates for the vote, such as the Youth Franchise Coalition’s Clark Wideman, 
hoped the image of “radical campus protesters” would not sway anyone’s opinion on 
lowering the youth vote either way.  Claiming that the national focus on “the militant 1 
percent” distorted youth’s reputation, Wideman explained that the politics of parenthood 
shaped how “the average voter identifies with basically three different young people--his 
son, his neighbor’s son, and what we call the ‘media kid.’” According to Wideman, “the 
media kid” gained the most visibility because of the “breakdown in family structure.”  
Thus, alienation due to inadequate nurturing in the home, not young peoples’ naked 
antipathy, could be blamed for popular fears about marauding students.  This shifted 
responsibility for youth’s radical image, and emphasized the structural causes for the 
youth problem.
12
  Still, the idea that young people stood out as the most educated and 
civically minded generation in American history dominated the dialogue. 
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 Liberal Democrats in particular appealed to the promises of citizenship instead of 
stoking the fears of a revolution when they advocated for the youth vote. These leaders 
emphasized young people’s higher levels of education, making them ready for higher 
responsibility and even capable of improving the political system.  While only fourteen 
percent of young people graduated high school in 1940, 1970s graduation rates topped 
seventy-eight percent.
13
  Representative Herbert Tenzer (D-NY) agreed: “In these 
troubled times, [lowering the voting age] will give us the opportunity to bridge the 
‘generation gap’ by reaching out to the youth of the Nation and not merely allowing 
them—but asking them to join hands in the process of self-government and share in the 
establishment of the goals necessary for the improvement of society.”14 For voting rights 
advocates, especially after Kent State, the system relied on a lower voting age. Ted 
Sorenson, John F. Kennedy’s former adviser and speechwriter, claimed lowering the 
voting age had become a “moral issue” to protect the “essence of democracy.”15 
Despite conservatives’ opposition, many in the GOP appreciated the defusing, 
steam valve effect of lowering the voting age. In 1970 Representative James Cleveland 
(R-NH) warned: “A consequence of not lowering the voting age seems to be that young 
people who are interested and involved in public issues tend to become frustrated, thus 
providing a ready audience for the small number of radical disrupters who are always 
looking for a confrontation.”16  Those harboring this rationale hoped that opening the 
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system would contain the problems.  
After Kent State, while some Republicans supported the youth vote for defensive 
purposes, others believed that it offered an opportunity to build their own youth 
constituency. As Barry Goldwater spoke for lowering the voting age, he gushed that 
youth’s idealism “is exactly what we need in this country…more citizens who are 
concerned enough to post high social and moral goals for the nation.”17  While the 
motivations may have been practical and political, this change also appealed to a 
common desire for a spiritual renewal through a youth vote.  Expanding the vote became 
the patriotic thing to do.  After Goldwater witnessed the way conservative youth 
organized when he ran for president with the support of the YAF, he understood before 
Nixon that not all youth leaned left.  Setting the stage for Nixon’s own youth campaign in 
1972, Sunbelt Republicans like Goldwater and Bill Brock (R-Tennessee) disputed the 
youth vote’s characterization as a monolithic bloc.  Nixon’s administration did not share 
this optimistic survey of the GOP’s chances with youth politics. 
Even as politicians of all stripes soon found common cause in lowering the voting 
age, Nixon remained half-hearted.  While his Deputy Attorney General, Richard 
Kleindienst, supported lowering the voting age for federal elections, he advised restraint 
and argued that individual states should decide voting ages for local or state elections.  
While this “compromise” made sense, as a federal statute would face legal challenges 
concerning local and state elections, Kleindienst made clear that the White House wanted 
an amendment that still left the voting age up to states despite its constitutional authority 
                                                          
17
On Lowering the Voting Age, Amendments to Senate Joint Resolution 7, 92
nd
 Congress,  Judiciary 
Committee Report, February 17, 1971, p.6. 
121 
 
 
 
over all voting procedures.
18
 
When Senators Kennedy and Mansfield set off a campaign to convince their 
cohorts to lower the voting age, they hardly needed to do much. In 1970, one month after 
Kent State, the vote won approval in both houses.  While Nixon’s advisors suggested a 
veto fearing he would enfranchise “voters who would defeat him in 1972,” Nixon signed 
the bill.
19
 As predicted, the law immediately ran into problems as the Supreme Court 
ruled in the Oregon v Mitchell that Congress could not extend the vote to eighteen-year-
olds for state and local elections.  That required a constitutional amendment. Faced with 
the dizzying and costly prospect of dual-voting, or two ballots, the consensus easily built 
around the amendment.  During the 1960s, twenty states had defeated efforts to lower the 
voting age. The results changed in 1971 for two reasons. First, Americans had developed 
a more sympathetic approach to youth issues after the Kent State “massacre.” Second, as 
the ratification process concentrated votes in state legislatures that also dictated election 
rules, these politicians understood the need to act swiftly and avoid a bureaucratic 
nightmare. Only hours after Congress voted overwhelmingly for the amendment in 
March 23, 1971, both Minnesota and Delaware’s legislatures raced to become the first to 
ratify. On July 1, Ohio’s state representatives voted 81-9 to become the thirty-eighth state 
in favor of the amendment, making it law.
20
 
 Ken Rietz, the director of Nixon’s incipient Young Voters for the President, 
prodded the White House to embrace the amendment through a signing ceremony. “Some 
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will call it a political move,” Rietz predicted, “but in the long run there will be more of a 
negative reaction to no action.”21 Nixon’s decision to sign the amendment, not a 
constitutional requirement, spoke to his defensive approach.  His administration went to 
great lengths to control the situation.  They scrambled to find the perfect backdrop for the 
ceremony.  A local musical orchestra, the Young Americans, happened to be in town on 
July 2 before they headed to Europe for a two month tour.  This 500 member ensemble 
included an orchestra, a choir and a concert band. Ranging from fifteen to twenty years-
old, this group represented the exact affect Nixon desired.  Nixon staffer Ron Walker 
went to New York only three days before the ceremony to “get backstage so as to obtain 
a good reading on the caliber and character of these kids.” They passed the sniff test. In 
their matching blue blazers with grey pants or skirts, “They are all races, all colors and I 
would imagine all creeds…and they are very beautiful children.”  “There are only a 
couple of long hairs,” noted Walker, “and I talked to both.”22 As for the music, Walker 
recommended one of their numbers, We’re Going to that Ball: “It’s a knee slapper and 
lots of clapping.”23 
 On July 5, Nixon joined the Young Americans in the East Room. As they sang 
their “knee slapper,” Nixon signed a certificate with three members from the group and 
the photo op had been achieved.  Though, hardly the maestro here, Nixon’s smile 
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concealed the concerns he held about the youth vote. As Nixon spoke to the Now 
Generation, he emphasized the speed and efficiency with which the government extended 
the vote. “Let this historic amendment, then, be a sign and pledge of solidarity of our 
land, ” Nixon proclaimed to his youthful audience, “of the trust of the older generation in 
the younger, and the younger in the older.”24 
 Despite the youth vote’s liberal potential, conservative young people interpreted 
the amendment as the end of the 1960s, when students “marched with a bomb in one 
hand and a desecrated flag in the other.”  In one article, a Lipscomb University student 
editorialized that after Kent State, “The 1970s foreboded a continuation of these 
practices.”  After the vote, however, young people learned that “rose bushes will not 
grow from thorns,” bringing in a new era where young people worked “within the 
established system in a decent, orderly manner.”25  This refrain, “within the system,” 
became a staple in each debate on the different youth issues.  In this context, defending 
the system motivated Americans’ support for these concessions. 
This sanguine hope did not hold up as young Americans still found obstacles in 
the registration process.  Only six months away from the primary season, regulations 
required voters to register fifty-four days prior to the election, before interest peaks, and 
before college freshman get settled on campus in the fall of 1972.  Anecdotal evidence 
began to creep in about students getting “hassled” by officials in Alabama when they 
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tried to register.
26
 In addition, the cumbersome absentee registration process still 
threatened the campus vote, and students studying far from their parents’ homes found 
many obstacles in exercising their new voting rights.  A Harris survey in June, 1972, 
showed that “the feeling of alienation” rose from forty to forty-seven percent over the 
previous year.  Testifying to Congress, Common Causes’ director of the Voting Rights 
Project argued that “a very important way to reduce these unacceptable high levels of 
alienation is to remove any barriers which may block the ballot box.”27  In response, 
groups like Common Cause and the National Movement for the Student Vote put their 
efforts towards registration.   
One branch of Common Cause, the National Student Lobby (NSL), formed to 
publish how politicians voted on youth issues, including registration reform that allowed 
students to register where they attended school. NSL also convinced Congress and Nixon 
to declare September “National Voter Registration Month” and keep registration open 
until October 7 for students returning to campus in the fall.
28
 Anne Wexler of Common 
Cause, and Senator George McGovern’s future campaign aide, led a series of lawsuits 
that attacked any barriers to the youth vote.  Most important, a suit to allow students to 
vote in their college towns hoped to increase registration for young voters. Thus, 
Common Cause and other groups such as Student Vote and the ACLU developed a legal 
strategy to expose discrimination.  As one youth vote advocate in New York wrote, 
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resistance to student registration undermined “whatever confidence the state’s young men 
and women may have had in the willingness of society to open its orderly processes of 
change to them.”29  Proving discrimination came easy, as students from out of state first 
fulfilled their requirements by registering their cars and acquiring drivers licenses in 
states where they attended college.  Once enough students had been denied, they filed 
lawsuits throughout the nation that earned victories which relaxed residential 
requirements, though local registrars continued to resist. As young people secured the 
vote, Nixon could not risk alienating them.  Still, his approach to the politics of youth 
limited this capitulation to the minimum required to gain his young voters’ trust.  
The Pell Grant 
 When Nixon took office, Congress had developed a new cohort of liberal 
members who cut their political teeth during the tumultuous sixties and viewed young 
voters as a core constituency.  In turn, the Democrats on the left end of the political 
spectrum offered policies that would solidify this support.  As students comprised the 
majority of this emerging voting bloc, politicians such as Rhode Island Senator Claiborne 
Pell tried to lighten the economic burden of higher education.  In 1969, private higher 
educational institutions found their resources drying up as private support dwindled amid 
the chaotic campus disorders.  Traditionally liberal Democratic representatives such as 
Chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Education, Edith Green, hoped to increase 
funding through existing channels to keep the colleges and universities open. She found 
unruly students unhelpful in securing these funds. In fact, in 1969, Green proposed an 
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“anti-campus disorder bill considered by her fellow Democrats so repressive they bottled 
it up in committee.”  Blaming students, Green explained, “I can’t see how we can get 
support for a bill now.”30 While students hoped to capitalize on the youth movement in 
politics, they faced a considerable backlash that remained after campus disorders 
disgusted Americans through 1970.  A 1971 House bill denied any money to students and 
faculty deemed guilty of preventing the school from operating.
31
  This approach operated 
under the tough pre-Kent State position on the politics of youth. 
While Green aimed federal aid at maintaining institutions, Pell hoped to channel 
the money directly to students. Pell led a legislative effort to offer federal aid, “no strings 
attached,” that would defray up to half of tuitions that averaged $2,800 per year in 1971. 
Whether or not to expand this aid to Americans in various income brackets motivated the 
debate around new funding programs for students.  First, Pell hoped that expanding direct 
aid to all students would placate the educational institutions that demanded they receive 
the funding directly.  If this plan brought in new customers, rather than simply rewarding 
those already enrolled, colleges and universities would benefit.  Second, selling the 
program as a democratization of higher education quelled criticism that this simply 
transferred tax revenues from lower and middle class Americans to “wealthy families 
sending their sons to Stanford or Harvard.”32 Pell also wanted to include middle class 
students so that aid would not only go to the poorest Americans and limit the program’s 
political effect. 
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Pell’s attempt to reform student aid faced significant challenges due to the 
negative stigma campus unrest had cast upon America’s higher education.  As one Pell 
spokesmen explained, “The senators are very conscious of reaction to campus 
violence…”33 Still, the issue gained salience and Robert Finch, Secretary of HEW, 
offered the White House’s softer side.  Pell acknowledged that Finch represented the 
administration’s efforts to “cool the heated atmosphere,” stating, “as you know, on our 
side of the aisle, we don’t throw many bouquets to the administration on this connection.” 
Nixon’s position on student aid needed finessing, as he favored government support to 
private lenders, a position that would increase the debt that students from lower income 
families accumulated. Here the debate centered on the purpose for financial aid, as the 
President hoped reform would eliminate the large bureaucratic machine behind student 
loans and privatize lending while focusing specifically on lower income families to 
shrink the project’s scope and size. Pell preferred a plan that would offer a direct subsidy 
that covered half the tuition and also a $1,000 grant to institutions to take students from 
lower income families. Leaving the door open for families with middle class incomes, 
this approach could “provide assistance to all young people.”34 
Pell used the hearing with Finch to expose the White House’s flawed plan.  In 
addition, Pell capitalized on the times, and needled Nixon’s point man with the growing 
national anxiety over young people in America and Nixon’s own image as unresponsive 
to the youth problem. During the debate over the Basic Education Opportunity Grants 
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(the Pell Grant), reactions to Kent State colored the dialogue. Speaking to Secretary 
Finch during the Congressional hearings, Pell asked, “Do you see any actions that 
you…can take to funnel these young people into activities related to the system so as to 
prevent their going outside the system?”35  While Ted Kennedy also favored a program 
that offered federal aid directly to students, he picked a bigger fight. Kennedy wondered 
if Kent State could be investigated as a “microcosm” of the larger youth crisis that this 
legislation could alleviate, recommending that Nixon meet with two “extremely sensitive 
and impressive” Kent State students with whom Kennedy had recently met.36  Finch 
agreed to offer ways for young people to participate in government and that the 
administration could do its part by hiring young employees. Again, discourse around the 
politics of youth lapsed into larger generational anxieties. 
 Young Americans played an important role in solving the student aid problem. 
The National Students Lobby quickly formed to represent over 115 colleges and 
universities and pushed first for Pell’s Basic Education Grants. Many youth-friendly 
liberals in congress embraced these activists, inducing other lawmakers to do the same. 
Even Democrats adverse to New Politics, such as Illinois’ Roman Pucinski, jumped at the 
chance to win young votes, inviting the young lobbyists to lunch and calling over a 
photographer to document the meeting.
37
 Edith Green (“Mrs. Education”), in a terse 
meeting with NSL members, quipped, “I don’t see any reason why students should be 
treated as a privileged class.”  “We aren’t asking for any special privileges,” answered 
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one NSL member, “We’re asking that the government show the students how responsive 
it can be.”38  As the first youth vote approached, legislators increasingly heeded these 
requests. 
 Finally, on June 14, 1972, the Basic Education Opportunity Grants passed with 
bipartisan support as a small part of the Emergency School Aid Act -- a larger eighteen 
billion dollar bill aimed at educational equality and experimental busing approaches to 
desegregation.  While the bill appropriated one billion dollars to aid students from poor 
families, it created a commission to determine if middle income families could also 
receive aid.
39
  Despite rumors that Nixon meant to veto the bill as he had in 1970, the 
political climate pushed him to give in to Pell’s program that distributed funds directly to 
students to with low incomes and expanded financial aid opportunities to families with 
middle class incomes.  
Conservatives did not approve as they feared fraud. Citing anecdotal evidence, 
one financial aid officer who oversaw loans under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program 
since 1967 claimed, “these loans have bought more cars than hours of academic credit” 
as a federal study found students used funds to buy “drugs, liquor and to finance trips to 
rock festivals.” One conservative columnist agreed: “colleges and universities-even those 
that have deteriorated into anarchic playgrounds for problem brats- should not be the 
exclusive preserve of the well-to-do,” but warned that as Democrats and Republicans 
courted the youth vote through college loans, “the politicians may have sold the country 
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the Brooklyn Bridge.”40 Still, Nixon’s liberal opponents in Congress, buoyed by their 
claim to a youth constituency, forced the government to enhance federal aid to students 
when the administration hoped to shrink it.  While Nixon struggled to balance his 
political interests with student issues, he met young Americans’ demands on 
environmental policy with similar reluctance.    
The Environment, Industry and the Youth Problem 
The environment cannot entirely be pigeonholed as a youth issue.  A study of 
mainstream magazines such as Readers Digest shows a spike in environmental stories 
that Americans of all ages read during the 1969-1971 period.
41
  Still, most Americans 
understood the focus on environmental protection as a result of young Americans’ 
growing concerns. One White House memo suggesting a “Youth Strategy” to Charles 
Colson pinpointed the policy initiatives that held “special appeal to Young Voters.”  The 
list included a “youth ecology corps” and “strong Presidential emphasis on pollution free 
automobiles by 1975.”42 Furthermore, environmental issues became an extension of 
movement politics. 
 In 1970, during a lull in antiwar protest, youth protest politics turned towards 
ecological concerns. On the first Earth Day in April, 1970, thousands of people joined 
Phil Ochs in singing his popular adaptation of the anti-war song, “All we are saying, is 
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give earth a chance.”43  This movement, similar to its antiwar predecessor, allowed anti-
establishment liberal youth to continue their critique of American society and capitalism.  
One environmentalist speech, published in the University of Texas’ underground paper 
The Rag, argued that “there will be no clean air in this society” unless America changed 
“the values of overconsumption, growth for its own sake, profit and competition.”44 
As did the anti-war movement, the environmental movement helped transition the 
counterculture into politics.  Hippies clearly understood the environment’s significance as 
the alternative to the consumer-driven world from which they escaped. Describing the 
initial Earth Day, a New York Times article reported a “block long polyethylene bubble 
on 17
th
 Street where crowds could breathe pure, filtered air that reeked of marijuana after 
only half an hour.”  Guerilla theater, the entertaining version of the 1960s youths’ street 
politics also worked on Earth Day when University of Minnesota students interrupted the 
General Electric stockholders’ meeting with a mock funeral for a coffin filled with 
appliances.
45
 
 While America celebrated the first national Earth Day in April 1970, Nixon made 
himself conspicuously absent from the day’s festivities. After all, Republicans such as 
Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado complained that “some extremists want to use the 
environment issue as one more club with which to beat America.”46 Still, his ambivalence 
towards the first Earth Day betrayed the White House’s environmental staff’s advice.  
Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel urged Nixon to embrace the opportunity and issue 
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an executive order that declared Earth Day a national holiday.  Pointing out the political 
benefits, Hickel claimed this more assertive role in the environmental movement would 
“involve young people in national concerns.”  Hickel had reason to believe this possible, 
as he had held nine regional seminars for a student advisory board named Student 
Council on Pollution and the Environment (SCOPE) with all positive responses towards 
the administration.
47
 Instead, portending Nixon’s 1972 surrogate election strategy, 
Nixon’s aides sent representatives across the country to speak on behalf of the president 
and show his environmental concerns. Walter Cronkite affirmed the political 
consequences, as he described the Earth Day crowd as “predominantly white, 
predominantly young and predominantly anti-Nixon.”48  Young Americans on the left 
saw Nixon as an obstacle to their environmentalist agenda.   
 While Nixon could dismiss young liberals’ criticism, conservative youth groups 
shared a concern about the degradation of the environment. The YAF mouthpiece, the  
New Guard, explained the environmental quality program within its mostly anti-
communist and anti-government Young Americans’ Freedom Offensive.  In the May 
1970 environmental edition, the New Guard published YAF member Randall Cornell 
Teague’s memo to the YAF’s board of directors before the vote during its conference in 
Washington D.C. earlier that year. Teague asked the board to look past the environment’s 
political implications, and instead consider the environmental agenda because “it is our 
air, water and land that we will have to be a part of for a longer period of time than many 
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of those who will do the proclaiming about it.” In the same edition, a Missouri college 
student wrote, “Environmental control is not something we can allow to become the 
monopoly of the liberal and radical left.”  If this happened, he warned, “pollution might 
well be what finally radicalizes the ‘silent majority’ of young people.”49 As a result, these 
young Americans would lose faith in the system and turn to “advocates of sabotage.” 
That the YAF’s libertarian, free market defending, conservative ideologues from the 
YAF would support any political interference seems contradictory. Pragmatic YAFers 
realized the inevitable compromise with the growing environmental movement by the 
early 1970s.  
After all, even some captains of industry acknowledged the need for 
environmental protection and government regulation. In 1970, Fortune magazine 
published an edited compilation of articles titled The Environment: The Mission for the 
Seventies. One entry pointed to the way the environment filled the activist vacuum in the 
1970s after the civil rights movement and anti-war protest petered out.  “Environmental 
groups are sprouting on campus just as S.D.S. chapters did a while back,” explained one 
corporate insider.  The environment assumed a new political significance, as students 
replaced 1960s politics by “parading, picketing, threatening boycotts of polluters and 
turning up at conservation conferences to pepper the speakers with difficult questions.”   
This did not follow partisan political lines, though as the commentator claimed “even 
members of the John Birch Society and the S.D.S can agree that clean air and water are 
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desirable.”50 
Corporations and the White House shared the concern that young Americans’ 
emphasis on environmental issues hurt their image.  In 1970, the international pulp and 
paper company, Boise Cascade, attempted to soften its reputation as an environmental 
enemy. Picturing two young people planting trees, one ad included the caption, 
“Opportunity: We think youth can be shown that business also shares their reasoned 
concerns.”51 In one attempt to “welcome the questioning of the young,” Nixon’s former 
ad agency that created the Pepsi Generation, Batten Barston Durstine and Osborn 
(BBDO), invited eight student leaders into their new “‘ad lab’ for a rap session.”  While 
the students agreed that “Capitalism is, in reality, socialism for the few,” they learned 
about “the genuinely good things businessmen are doing in the area of ecology,” citing 
the paper industry for “going all out to make their products bio-degradable.”  In radio 
coverage of the meeting, the announcer commented, “They [young people] are not 
always right, but it would be healthy for the country if the business community started 
listening to them.”52  This could easily pass for political advice as well, and Nixon’s 
youth campaign quickly obtained BBDO’s video tape of the session for research. 
 Liberal Democrats certainly appreciated the political benefits here. “The 
environment movement, as it has emerged this spring for the environmental teach-in,” 
Congressman Stewart Udall (D-AZ) stated, “is a movement of the youth.”53  In his 
testimonial on the issue during Udall’s hearing on environmental education, the artist 
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Robert Motherwell put it more bluntly. “We talk about a generation gap,” Motherwell 
opined, “I prefer to call it a ‘sanity gap,’ of a young generation saying to their elders, 
‘The way you go on covering our natural parks with filth, waste, and vomit, for the sake 
of monetary gain and monetary economy is insane.” For Motherwell, environmental 
pollution explained the youth problem, “millions of young people now seem only happy 
when drugged” as they confront the depressing “waste of modern civilization, covering 
the landscape like a slimy coating of vomit.”54 While Udall had supported environmental 
protection for a decade, the youth movement provided him and other liberals with the 
impetus to push the administration harder for immediate change. 
 In addition, the environment provided Nixon one of the few areas in which he 
could deliver on the campaign pledge to “bring us together.” In this light, Nixon’s search 
for consensus became most evident, though it should not be confused with a liberal bent 
to Nixon’s politics.   Environmental concerns focused the growing anxiety Americans, 
left and right, fostered towards industry and the capitalist system.  Nixon soon realized 
the political necessity, but also the political opportunity to make the environment a high 
priority before the 1972 election. 
 In his introduction to Fortune’s environmental issue, Richard Nixon connected 
three post-1960s areas of crisis: environment, industry and youth rebellion.  In his effort 
to transition the 1960s into a more conservative decade, Nixon compromised his 
economic dogma to negotiate a series of reforms between the growing environmental 
movement and the corporations that they targeted.  The results, a series of acts that 
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regulated aspects of environmental concern ranging from reform in energy production, 
pesticides, and water pollution to the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
met the growing disillusionment with business on terms acceptable to business. As 
Nixon’s environmental advisor John Whitaker argued, Nixon conceded only what he had 
to, and carefully considered the corporate and industrial leaders’ input when he made his 
decisions on environmental policy.
55
 This context clearly frames Nixon’s environmental 
position--willing, but not eager.  This shifting political terrain produced a Janus faced 
politics that historians struggle to explain. Despite the rise of conservatism in the 1970s, 
the politics of youth continued the 1960s’ liberal political sensibility during the Nixon 
Era. 
By 1971, Nixon utilized his environmental program to improve his image.  
Returning to the University of Nebraska in January of 1971, Nixon encouraged a 
receptive audience to work within the establishment, “If we suffer a setback or if we lose 
on an issue, the answer is not to blame the system but to look within ourselves to see how 
we can strengthen our resolve and intensify our effort.”  Nixon asked the crowd to 
“Consider the environment” as a problem “we must face together. There can be no 
generation gap.”56 The YVP  brochure to attract Nixon voters bragged, “The President’s 
environmental package was drafted by a twenty three-year old.”57  Though Nixon could 
not embrace the environmental movement, he could not deny its political influence as the 
1968-generation gained the vote and established its influence in the system.   
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The Draft 
Concern over Kent State created a more concerted effort to alleviate young 
American’s frustration.  Considering the role of the Vietnam War and the draft in feeding 
into the youth’s anti-establishment sentiment, Nixon accelerated his efforts to make 
American military service purely voluntary.  One concerned citizen wrote Nixon, “young 
people in this country are close to revolution against what they justifiably feel is a society 
operating against their interest.”  Pointing out that young people felt excluded, the letter 
continues, “Selective Service Boards represent clearly vested interests…heavily weighted 
toward white, aging, conservative, ex-military men.”58 Critics of the draft also felt that 
selective service remained a relic of the past that denied this generation’s focus on 
individuality, as one female freshman from the University of Tennessee editorialized in 
the school’s paper that “these laws should be changed; not only in this matter, but in all 
situations where sex, race, age or origin pigeonhole an individual into a stereotyped 
role.”59Nixon-friendly campuses such as Lipscomb University saw the draft as a 
“specter” that “haunts every college campus in America.”60When Milton S. Eisenhower 
led a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, his twelve page 
report emphasized lowering the voting age and ending the draft as two crucial steam 
valves.
61
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Nixon agreed that America would need to modernize the system and move 
towards a voluntary military in 1970, and he moved the draft to a lottery system that only   
included nineteen-year old men rather than the nine year draft eligibility.
62
 In addition, 
the minimum age for draft board membership dropped from thirty to eighteen-years old. 
Conventional interpretations of Nixon’s motivations to end selective service often 
promote this move as a political maneuver that allowed the executive power to maintain 
control over the military and the national security state.
63
  The draft had given Americans 
too much stake in its foreign policy as it stirred popular resentment and restricted the 
President during Vietnam.  Young Americans new voting rights also motivated this 
reform, as the politics of youth brought added attention to the draft controversy. 
 Congress saw the draft as another way expose Nixon’s youth problem. Liberal 
Democrats such as Congressman Frank Thompson Jr. (D-MD) called the draft 
“indefensible” and refused to testify during a hearing on draft reform because the 
subcommittee had not opened it to the public.
64
 Congressman Ed Koch (D-NY), younger 
blood, held an even more sympathetic view, claiming that young men “are forced to into 
the heartrending dilemma of service in a war they deeply oppose or prison or flight from 
the country…we have an obligation to free decent and ethical young men from this 
terrible choice.” The first term New Yorker even extended the agenda to develop 
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leniency for conscientious objectors and “draft dodgers.”65 
 Republicans also found the draft troublesome. At the same hearing, the moderate 
Republican Congressman Fred Schwengel (R-IA) made sure to denounce student 
protesters and reminded them “they are not emulating the early revolutionaries if they 
have not exhausted every remedy under the law.” Still, he agreed that should the 
government end the draft, “we would be very close to doing away with one of the most 
undemocratic institutions in the United States, one of the aspects of American life which 
has been the most responsible for the disillusionment of America’s youth.”66  This issue 
gained wider significance, as stemming youth violence and rebellion appealed to older 
Americans as much as ending the draft mattered to the young people eligible for the 
selective service.   
Central to Nixon’s attempt to end the draft was the requirement that he replace the 
aged, cantankerous head of Selective Service, General Lewis Hershey.  Hershey had 
become a symbol of the Vietnam War, as the draft itself inspired much of the youth 
rebellion.  As one internal memo admitted, this image matched reality, claiming: “The 
Organization set up by General Hershey is inadequate for the management of a modern 
draft system.”  In addition, “The personnel are old and of generally limited ability.”67  
Thus, the transition to new leadership had been part of the White House’s larger, careful 
attempt to reform the draft.  Events conspired to accelerate this plan, as the Vietnam 
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Moratorium in 1969 landed just as Nixon announced Hershey had been awarded a fourth 
star--promoted out of the job.   
Dan Rather from CBS jumped on the story, as it seemed Nixon had “acted hastily 
to take the steam out of the Moratorium.” Suddenly, Nixon’s critics thought he caved in. 
Denying this, Nixon’s aide Ken Cole told the staffers to refute this accusation. “You 
should work together to get out a story on your outrage that the Hershey event had 
anything to with the Moratorium,” Price forcefully suggested. “The fact is that it has been 
in the works for quite a long time.”68 Whatever motivated Nixon to replace Hershey, his 
replacement, Curtis Tarr, helped resolve the draft controversy. While Hershey cared little 
for image and youth issues, Nixon’s aides wrote that Tarr’s “campaign for Congress in 
California gives him some political awareness and his having been a university president 
should enable him to relate to youth.”69  Presiding over Lawrence University throughout 
the 1960s, Tarr sustained a strong rapport between the administration, faculty and 
students with the Lawrence University Community Council which he established in 1968.   
While Nixon envisioned draft reform as a way to preserve America’s ability to 
maintain national security, this move’s larger political significance became obvious.  
Replacing Hershey with Tarr portended a wider change in the Selective Service 
Administration. When Tarr immediately requested retirements from two officers from 
state offices in Tennessee, Mississippi and North Carolina, Bill Nichols (D-AL) 
questioned his motives. “I think they were doing a good job,” Nichols protested, “perhaps 
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you as a new Director wanted to present maybe a more youthful image.”70 New 
leadership helped the transition to an all-volunteer armed forces and also answered his 
critics’ claims that Nixon stood on the wrong side of the generation gap.  
Continuing this youth-friendly direction, Nixon had formulated a Youth Advisory 
Commission that would recruit young volunteers from each state to advise local draft 
boards on decisions around exemptions, ensuring equity and to determine larger reforms 
to the system.  Meeting with its pilot group, Nixon spoke to the press and claimed, “It 
will provide a way in which young people can help to shape government policies in 
which they have very special stake.”71  The President warned, “Established institutions of 
all varieties are under attack today, especially from youth, for being distant and 
unresponsive…the Selective Service System has been a major target for such criticism.”72  
Nixon’s effort to end the draft, similar to his approach to other youth issues, caused 
controversy. 
Even after Nixon unveiled his Youth Advisory Commission, Nixon’s critics 
questioned his sincerity. A twenty-year-old college junior wrote the President with a 
skeptical tone. After observing a photo of the ten member pilot group, the architecture 
major complained, “They all look like young Republicans—light ties, black laced shoes, 
short hair, etc.” “May I remind you,” the letter continues, “only 23% of college students 
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considered themselves Republicans to the 33% Democrats and 44% Independents?”73 
Another letter accused the Youth Advisory Boards of serving as “public relations fronts 
to legitimate illegitimate policy decisions.” Denying the group’s lack of representation, 
Assistant to the President, Peter Flanigan, explained, “it included three blacks and one of 
Chinese extraction.” In addition, four were Democrats and “one of the blacks was a 
ghetto youth worker from Harlem.”74 
While the Youth Advisory Committee played a central role in Nixon’s public 
relations attempts to deal with the draft, it also created an opportunity for young people to 
play a role in the reform.  By March, 1970, more than six hundred young men and 
women combined to make up fifty-six Youth Advisory Committees.
75
  Along with this 
effort, the Selective Service sent speakers to meet with high school. Celebrating their 
momentum, the Youth Advisory Groups held a national conference that included one 
hundred and nine delegates from across the country to announce their progress in June, 
1970.  In clear terms, the commission recommended an end to the student deferments and 
the establishment of an all-volunteer armed-force, as “compulsory military service 
creates the feeling that military service is a punishment which the nation inflicts upon the 
citizen, not an honorable occupation.” Furthermore, Tarr agreed with the youth delegates’ 
recommendation to provide a “draft education and information program directed at high 
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school seniors.”76   Reflecting on the conference, Tarr boasted that the recommendations 
“appear to me to be the responsible suggestions made by youth who are working within 
the system to effect positive change.”77  Again, operating “within the system” offered 
young people a way to make change. 
Introducing its changes, the Selective Service System’s headquarters issued a 
report bragging that in one year it “came under new leadership, changed the selection 
process, introduced a new ‘image,’ and instituted new policies that spread the obligation 
to serve more equally among the nation’s young men.”78 After Tarr took over, and in the 
din of the post-Kent State youth crisis, the White House invited fifteen representatives of 
the Youth Advisory Commission to a conference in July, 1970 to meet White House 
staffers.
79
 
The meeting came across so well that a White House aide asked Tarr and his staff 
if they could make some suggestions for the upcoming decennial White House 
Conference on Youth and Children so it “can be carried off in a similarly successful 
manner.”80  While White House youth coordinators such as Nixon staffer Jon Rose 
claimed these programs “aimed at getting new ideas into the system” they also provided 
“an important means of making youth aware that their problems are being considered 
                                                          
76
Tarr to Rose, July 21, 1970.  EX FG 216, 7/1/70-8/31/70.Richard Nixon Presidential Papers, NARA II, 
College park, MD. 
77
House Review of the Administration and Operation of the Draft  Law, United States Congress, Special 
Subcom  on Draft, Committee on Armed Services, July 23, 1970, 12562. 
78
 News Release, Selective Sevice System National Heaquarters, “1969-1970: Time of Change in Selective 
Service,”  EX FG 216, Selective Service System, [1/1/71- 12/31/72]. [3 of 3].Presidential Papers of Richard 
Nixon, NARA II, College Park, MD. 
79
Tarr to Rose, July 21, 1970.  EX FG 216, 7/1/70-8/31/70.Richard Nixon Presidential Papers, NARA II, 
College park, MD. 
80
Rose to Tarr, July 8, 1970.EX FG 216, 7/1/70- 8/31/70.Richard Nixon Presidential Papers, NARA II, 
College Park, MD. 
144 
 
 
 
sympathetically and that they are being listened to.”81  Clearly, image mattered here, as 
the Selective Service’s Public Information Officer doubled as the point man on these 
youth programs.  But it would be a mistake to call this a simple charade, as the need to 
moderate Nixon’s image for the 1968-generation required substantive changes as well.  
The lines between image and policy blurred as young voters became increasingly 
significant to political elites.  
Ending the draft revealed the immediate concessions Nixon had to make. Still, 
while Nixon struggled to contain the anti-war youths’ political power, his quest for an all-
volunteer military also signaled his reach out to young people who would support him.   
One evening, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, had Young Voters for the President 
director Ken Rietz and other organizers over for dinner to discuss the President and 
young voters. When Haldeman asked what Nixon could do, they responded emphatically 
and in unanimity that he could end the draft.  “And I know that had an influence,” Rietz 
recalled, as three weeks later Haldeman called and said. “you are going to really like the 
announcement this afternoon.”82 Later that day, on July 28, 1972, Nixon announced that 
the draft would officially end the following July.  
 In 1980, Nixon characterized his decision to eliminate the draft as a 
miscalculation, one that limited rather than strengthened the national security strategy.
83
 
Long before this confession, however, Nixon had expressed regret over this decision for 
other reasons. In hindsight, Nixon saw 1970 as a period of weakness.  The tumultuous 
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political environment had put the White House on its heels.  Referring to the move to 
dump General Hershey from the Selective Service Agency, and in effect symbolically 
remove a relic from a past generation, Nixon barked in 1971 after meeting with students 
that his staff had to toughen up on youth issues, not “act under duress” to throw his 
“pearls before swine” and avoid “the same kind of thinking that got him to fire 
Hershey.”84 
Making concessions on the environment, the voting age and the draft made short 
term political sense as these issues resonated with young people across the political 
spectrum.  Rather than a brake on conservatism, these issues provided an opportunity for 
Nixon to get past the youth problem and advance his conservative realignment. While 
this approach made Nixon’s politics of youth defensive, GOP members such as 
Tennessee Senator Bill Brock would provide Republicans, and the president, with a more 
creative and proactive model to reach young voters.   
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Chapter Four 
Nixon and New Republicans 
 
 Despite the president’s support for youth issues, Nixon’s tough stance concerning 
the politics of youth continued to hurt his image.  After his summer internship under 
Secretary Finch, Princeton University student Harding Jones published a memoir 
disputing Nixon’s continually negative reputation among young people. Blaming 
colleges’ “brainwashing” and the news media’s “lack of sophistication” for young 
people’s attitudes, Jones noted that White House staff “are more than willing to hear from 
young people,” though interns “did not return the enthusiasm.”  Criticizing his young 
cohorts, Jones claimed that “Most had abysmal misconceptions about how government 
works” as “they still hold the childlike attitude that money is produced by the 
government, failing to recognize that it comes from their own parents.”1  Facing this new 
constituency, Nixon struggled for an answer to critics who took great pleasure in 
describing young Americans’ lackluster support for his administration.  However tough 
Nixon wanted to appear through his law and order policy, Nixon also had to reach out to 
youth.  Following Secretary Finch’s suggestion to “increase presidential exposure to 
youths” that defined Nixon’s previous contact with youth as “cosmetic,” the White House 
shifted to include young people.
2
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  Before 1970, Nixon responded defensively to youth politics. In policy, public 
relations, political organization and image, Nixon extracted whatever political capital he 
could from criticizing anti-war youth and the permissive counterculture without 
appearing too hostile to the “sons and daughters of the silent majority.”  He also 
neutralized the possibility of a mass mobilization of young voters against him in 1972 
through concessions on significant youth issues. Searching for a way out, Nixon looked 
South, to Tennessee.  Here, Senator Bill Brock (R-Tennessee) opened up the Republican 
Party to a new sensibility that cultivated the GOP’s own brand of youth friendly politics. 
Brock pioneered a New Republican approach to the politics of youth that built the GOP’s 
popularity with young voters through grassroots organization and mass media efforts.  
This approach provided Nixon with a way to turn a negative into a positive, proving that 
Republicans could mobilize youth politics—widely considered a liberal reconstruction of 
American politics—and energize the right.  
After Kent State, Nixon and Billy Graham headlined a youth rally at the 
University of Tennessee’s Neyland Stadium that attracted over 100,000.  The President 
and Graham claimed that the gathering’s religious motive transcended politics. On the 
stage, however, Bill Brock, Nixon’s favorite senatorial candidate for that year’s 
campaign, sat next to the President.  Nixon liked Brock’s chances, and saw the 
opportunity to defeat the longtime incumbent, Albert Gore Sr.  A prominent Tennessee 
businessman from the predominantly Democratic city of Chattanooga, Bill Brock made 
his way into influence as the owner of a major candy manufacturing company. Perhaps 
selling a product to young people gave Brock experience with the youth segment, but his 
148 
 
 
 
political approach appealed to young voters as he built a formidable Young Volunteers 
for Brock campaign in 1970 and he eventually headed the youth campaign for Richard 
Nixon’s reelection in 1972.3 
Nixon’s support for Brock in 1970 went further than an invitation to sit next to 
him at the Billy Graham Youth Night.  As the campaign heated up through the Tennessee 
summer, two professional admen from D.C. arrived and pushed the Brock campaign into 
overdrive.  Nixon’s infamous media guru, Harry Treleavan, and a young partner in his 
public relations firm, Ken Rietz, helped produce a campaign to build on Brock’s youthful 
persona and capitalize on the Republican Party’s potential with young voters who did not 
attend college. 
Brock’s victory in 1970 marked his transition from local businessman to a youth 
politics expert, as he shaped a conservative vision of an American future that included 
conservative, moderate, or “square” students and working youth.4  As Nixon’s 
administration scrambled to solve the youth problem before it hurt the President’s re-
election campaign, Brock’s inclusive approach provided a model to win young voters.  
As a result, Nixon tapped Brock to head his youth campaign early in 1971 as the 
administration began to court America’s young voters.  Brock’s enlistment marked a turn 
for the Nixon administration on the youth problem, as it moved to transform the 
president’s biggest weakness into a political strength.  This shift to an inclusive approach 
mapped out Nixon’s youth campaign, but also motivated his administration and other 
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New Republicans to reach new voter groups such as women and ethnic voters.  Shedding 
the GOP’s image as the “tired” and “dreary” party, the politics of youth became a vehicle 
with which Republicans could reassert their role in modern politics.  
Bill Brock 
As the youth vote became a reality, Bill Brock quickly emerged as a youth expert 
within the GOP. Brock had established his bona fides with students and Young 
Republicans well before his 1970 senate campaign. During his own youth, Brock served 
as the National Teen Age Republican (TAR) chairman, when he published the TAR 
manual.  During his 1962 run for Congress, Brock began to utilize young people. He 
grew up in a Democratic stronghold and he recalled, “no one wanted to listen under 
fifty.”5 His campaign used the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
organizing materials to mobilize young volunteers who knocked on thousands of doors. 
In addition, Brock recruited over 300 women as Brockettes who wore white skirts and 
red scarves while they campaigned for Brock outside supermarkets.  Brock claimed that 
the young supporters also gave his candidacy the allure as the “in thing” and enabled his 
campaign to persuade independent and even Democratic voters.  After becoming the first 
Republican Congressman in his district in forty-two years at the ripe age of thirty, Brock 
won the Outstanding Young Republican award in 1963.
6
 
As a Congressman, in 1968, Brock recoiled at his fellow Congressmen’s 
vituperative reaction to campus demonstrations.  Recalling statements on the floor that 
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called for the cancellation of any funding to school’s that had experienced violence, 
Brock called them: “probably the most idiotic suggestion I had ever heard.”  Brock 
decided to lead a junket of twenty-three youthful Republican representatives who broke 
up into smaller groups on a national tour of fifty college campuses across the nation in six 
weeks.  As Brock explained: “We would listen. Just sit on the lawn and talk to kids, go 
have a beer, go into the classes….a really serious effort to try to get a sense of what was 
going on.”7 This tour taught Brock that young Americans could not be simplistically 
categorized and that most wanted to participate in the system. 
Predictably, the Republican junket found antagonism towards political solutions.  
The more radical students continually claimed that “violence is justified when proper 
channels don’t work” and a theatrical demonstration on campus displayed a toilet bowl 
with a sign that read, “Proper channels.”8  Anecdotal accounts from students pointed to 
one common thread-- young people wanted respect.  As one Republican Congressman 
reported, nearly all of the students fumed at the police’s overblown crackdowns on 
relatively minor student demonstrations. In one incident at FSU, cops rushed a protest of 
thirty or forty students with fastened bayonets.  Reacting to this draconian approach, the 
Congressman noted that “the students feel that they’re not children…and unfortunately 
from the attitude of some of the faculty and administration, their feeling is that they are 
children.”  In addition, students explained their suspicion of the establishment and the 
political process, “We have a sense of powerlessness because we don’t have the vote,” 
one congressman paraphrased, “and elected people are responsive to older people who 
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have a different moral standard than we have.” As a result, students argued, “since we 
can’t work within the legal system, for a change, we tend to work in an unlawful way.”9  
While the majority of young people rejected the political extremes, convincing them to 
vote for Republicans seemed a daunting task. 
 These Congressmen found that students on the political extremes--left and right--
exaggerated their political significance. When Brock and company visited Florida State 
University, the GOP representatives attended a meeting that campus conservatives, the 
self-proclaimed “98%,” organized to counter the widely overblown SDS presence. Rather 
than embrace the “98%,” one Congressmen visiting FSU considered them 
“sanctimonious.” Brock agreed and claimed that more students “placed themselves in the 
middle,” rejecting the SDS even as they “isolated themselves also from this so-called 
silent majority.”10  Thus, a New Republican approach to mobilizing youth politics 
required a moderate appeal that could motivate the majority of students “in the middle.” 
 Brock and his fellow Republican Congressmen learned to appreciate the 
generation gap and recognized youth politics’ potential.  Brock developed a nuanced 
approach here, acknowledging that “everyone black or white has a problem with identity. 
Some find it by adopting this weird garb and beards…”11  Brock recalled that one 
bearded students explained the political significance of his personal appearance, 
claiming: “I want individuality. I want to distinguish myself from my elders whom I do 
not respect.”  Continuing along this line, the student claimed, “I also want to identify with 
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those concerned about changing things, so it [the beard] becomes a uniform.” This grasp 
for individual identity could be mobilized, Brock claimed, especially after he observed 
that students at Duke University “have come to a consciousness of their power” and “the 
students are coming to realize their collective power.”12  Brock’s team handed the White 
House a report that underlined the necessity to alleviate these various frustrations by 
lowering the voting age and ending the draft. 
 Rather than condemn beards and student power, Brock developed his political 
appeal to young voters that could harness this “collective power” for the GOP.  After all, 
while Republicans had gained considerable political traction in the South during the 
1960s, the party needed to revitalize its image to wrestle away control of the “Solid 
South.” Running for Senate in 1970, Brock tested his New Republican approach against 
the long-time Democratic incumbent, Al Gore Sr. 
Brock’s experienced opponent dusted off the tried and trusted criticism of the 
GOP as the anti-New Deal obstructionists when the incumbent argued, “How did 
Congressman Brock vote? No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, 50 times no.” Continuing, Gore 
joked, “His record is so negative that it makes Goldwater look a little socialistic.”13 This 
contest grabbed the President’s attention, as he poured more resources and personnel into 
the race. Nixon’s southern strategy for Brock was to think young. Concerning Brock’s 
negative campaign that rejected any and all economic programs that Gore offered, the 
President warned, “Let him be for something. On the economic issues, he has got to 
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prove he isn’t an encrusted old type.”14  However, on social issues, Nixon maintained a 
tough approach that tarnished the GOP’s image with youth. 
In 1970, Nixon’s campaign for GOP congressman continued his version of law 
and order as youth politics’ radical stigma colored the lens with which social 
conservatives viewed the politics of youth.  Swinging through Tennessee on Brock’s 
behalf in October, Nixon consistently met young protesters on the stump.  As Nixon 
answered the “hecklers, taunts and jeers,” one journalist noted that the president 
fashioned “youthful hecklers into part of the political weaponry.”  Nixon held up these 
“shouters” as a symbol of liberalism’s failings during the 1960s and told his ‘silent 
majority’: “they do not speak for youth and they do not speak for America.” Connecting 
the “shouters” in his own audience to the larger youth problem, Nixon warned about 
those who “try to shout down speakers with obscene words,” and proclaimed, “It is time 
we draw the line and say we are not going to stand for that.” “If the candidate has given 
encouragement to, has condoned lawlessness and permissiveness,” Nixon suggested, 
“then, you know what to do.”15 
Brock could also toss out the red meat on youth issues, as he sounded the alarm 
over campus turmoil.  In one speech, Brock accused liberal politicians of “publicly 
encouraging ‘civil disobedience’ and mob protest” that resulted in “246 reported cases of 
arson and at least fourteen known bombings.” Claiming, “The minority of trouble-makers 
among these [students] must be taught that they can’t spit in Uncle Sam’s face and pick 
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his pocket at the same time,” Brock argued, “if we can change the balance of power in 
the Congress…we can put some teeth into the law.”16 
Protecting young people, not punishing them, became Brock’s major focus as he 
argued, “Parents don’t want their children wearing gas masks to school just because the 
air is too thick to breathe.”17  While Brock opposed busing efforts to desegregate schools 
in Tennessee, he defended his position on these grounds, not a racist stand against 
desegregation many had come to expect. Rather than pursuing “some statistical ratio,” 
Brock emphasized, “as we try to implement the Supreme Court decision fairly and fully, 
that we must do so within the framework of recognizing the interests of the children.”18 
Brock applied this politics of parenthood and protecting youth to all of America’s social 
ills. 
When asked about the morality crisis in America, Brock first criticized the church 
for trending “away from the kind of faith that I think we were all taught.”  Quickly, 
Brock moved to parental anxieties, citing “the onslaught of dope and drugs and 
pornography that is destructive because it’s hitting young people before they have a 
chance to know the difference between right and wrong…parents feel so frustrated 
sometimes because we cannot control our children’s lives.”19 Rather than helping their 
cause, Brock blamed high schools and colleges for influencing this problem negatively, 
“They are very evil influences in many instances and that is what is so frustrating to us 
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all.”20 
Speaking to young people allowed New Republicans to sharpen their new appeals 
for American values.  At Lipscomb University’s commencement, Brock found ways that 
“the trend towards decadence can be reversed.”  Embracing individualism, Brock argued 
America could avoid the same symptoms that caused the fall of Rome: “an obsession 
with sex and a general desire to live off the state.”  Using their “Judeo-Christian 
tradition,” Brock argued, “If Americans will accept individual responsibility for their 
individual decisions, then these decisions will be geometrically raised on the moral 
scale.” 21 The rise of youth politics handed Brock the room to position his image as a 
New Republican and to carve out his own constituency on the social issues that 
threatened the New Deal coalition.  One article described the different approaches: “Bill 
Brock’s calculated effort to exploit the attitudes of Tennesseans and Albert Gore’s 
shrewd attempt to play upon their interests.”22  Throughout the campaign, Brock 
encouraged Tennesseans to vote according to their personal “attitudes” that embraced his 
square independent, anti-Washington and youthful  image. 
 As the 1968-generation established its individuality and independence, Brock 
couched these attributes in Republican terms. Speaking at commencement ceremony at a 
small college in Tennessee, Brock pointed out that this generation could be either the 
country’s worst or greatest.  To be the former, Brock warned, all they had to do was 
“make the tragic mistake of promoting the worth of the individual while supporting a 
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movement toward big government that takes care of all our problems.” For the latter, 
students would have to “build a government that doesn’t relieve individuals of their rights 
in exchange for taking the responsibility for providing their every need.”  To become “the 
greatest generation,” Brock advised young people to “help create a society that gives 
everyone the opportunity to grow and prosper in his own way and allows everyone to live 
their life as an individual.”23 
 
Students on the left certainly appreciated Nixon and Brock’s shared vision of the 
youth problem. Students opposed to Brock’s candidacy accused his people of “quietly 
passing the word” that if Brock wins he would end demonstrations at UT and that the 
Board of Trustees “set things up” for Brock to go “all the way (to crush dissent).”24 For 
Brock’s campaign, that did not present a significant concern as Brock’s aides broadened 
youth politics to include non-students as well. While Nixon limited himself to this more 
defensive approach that attempted to confront the youth problem as a threat, Brock 
sought to mobilize the silent majority’s youth into a political strength.  
 He embraced youth issues and charted an appeal directly to young voters.  In an 
interview during his campaign, Brock spoke of the 1968-generation’s worthwhile 
qualities and legitimate concerns.  “The great majority of our young people are 
tremendous,” Brock claimed, “They are dedicated, they are concerned, they are idealistic, 
they really care about this country and about their community and about their families.” 
Brock wanted to bring this generation’s sensibility into the system to bring back the 
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nation’s “virility,” as he glowed, “I think we ought to take the excitement and the sense 
of challenge that young people bring and channel it into the restructuring of the American 
Dream.”25  While Brock spoke specifically to youth’s concerns about the environment, he 
quickly moved this issue to parent’s anxieties over their children.   
  Saving room to stigmatize his opponent, Brock also used the youth problem, 
arguing that Gore did not represent young Tennesseans accurately. “I don’t think they are 
part of the new left, the radical left at all.”26 Brock cultivated future leaders who shared 
their generations’ concerns but also stood their ground for American virtues. Speaking to 
the Jaycees, the United States Junior Council dedicated to developing future leaders in 
business and community service, Brock emphasized the need for environmental action 
and tapping into the reservoir of “unselfish and idealistic vitality of young manhood.” 
While admitting that federal regulation played a role, Brock argued that the private sector 
and “every citizen in this nation is going to have to reassess his values and be willing to 
sacrifice to win this battle against the smog, smoke, and filth that is saturating our 
nation.”  Far from a liberal cry for government action, Brock continued that personal 
responsibility extended to confronting other problems such as “crime, drugs and 
pornography.”27 Offering a solution, Brock proposed to keep the kids down on the farm 
and away from America’s decaying cities. Blaming federal policies that destroyed the 
family farm, Brock noted that “we’ve force fed a whole generation of young Americans 
into the cities.” Brock argued that if the government could establish rural educational 
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programs, “we can hold our young people in rural areas where they have more 
opportunity and freedom.”28 
While Brock offered young Tennesseans an alternative, they made significant 
contributions to an his campaign as well. As Brock recalled, “the energy came from the 
young, excited that they could change the course of that election.” Before Brock’s 
campaign had hit full stride, the College Republicans Region IV director offered his 
“prestige and credibility” to organize Brock’s youth campaign on each college campus in 
Tennessee for his January independent study program.  Asking for a letter to gain 
approval for this project, the college senior argued, “I am sure you feel a strong youth 
organization, both in terms of hardcore workers and public image, is a very vital part of 
your campaign.”29 
 Considering Brock’s positive record with youth, Nixon hoped that the race in 
Tennessee could offer a new Republican “type” that would help the party redefine itself 
amidst the increasingly youth-centric environment.  Brock did just that, as Rietz recalled, 
“not many people thought a three term Congressman from Chattanooga could beat an 
incumbent Senator.” Young Volunteers for Brock (YVB) organizations spread across the 
state, as Rietz stated in retrospect, “Our primary objective in this youth movement was 
involvement.” Claiming that the Y.V.B.  accomplished just that, he bragged that more 
young people participated in his organization “than any previous youth movement that 
the state of Tennessee had ever experienced” as “it emphasized Bill Brock’s commitment 
to the youth of Tennessee through Y.V.B. organizations in every county, every city and 
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on every college campus, as well as in most of the state high schools.”30Rietz explained 
that Brock offered a “fresh face” that attracted first time voters on and off campus and “a 
lot of people became involved who had never participated in politics before.”31  Even 
with students, Brock’s campaign proved itself as mock elections on campuses, Rietz 
reported “Senator Brock’s record in mock elections on Tennessee campuses was: won 15, 
tied 1, lost 1. His campaign was organized, Gore’s was not.”32  The rise of youth politics 
within Brock’s organization influenced his image. 
Brock’s “fresh faced” appeal came through even more forcefully in his extensive 
television campaign that made pioneering use of shorter television spots to capture voters 
looking for an alternative.  Planning Brock’s advertising, his advisers attempted to 
“capitalize on all media—but especially television—on Bill Brock’s youth, vigor, 
attractiveness and contemporariness—contrasting these with the older, tired, out-of-date 
image of the opponent.” Another memo pointed out that “especially on television,” the 
campaign should emphasize his “good looks and ‘with-it-ness.’”33 Exaggerating this 
difference with Al Gore Sr., Brock’s campaigners hoped to “bring the Brock image 
profile in line with the configuration of the ‘ideal’ Senator.”34  While thirty percent of 
Tennesseans wanted a “Younger Man,” only fifteen percent wanted an “Older Man” and 
less than twenty percent sought a candidate who “Agrees With Me On Most 
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Issues.”35Merging modern strategies in polling, organization and image making, Brock’s 
campaign planned to make its candidate likeable through a youth strategy.  Likeability 
had taken over politics, as Brock’s advertising coordinators claimed that “this is a far 
more important factor than most politicians recognize or like to admit. More people vote 
emotionally than rationally—and that’s a fact!”36 Appearing modern fit this agenda, as 
Brock’s advisers suggested he develop a symbol, or “look,” that “should be contemporary 
and distinctive, but not far-out.”37 
In contrast, Gore’s youth campaign banked on anti-war politics. After the 
shooting deaths at Kent State, students from more than 450 colleges established local 
Movement for a New Congress (MNC) chapters to promote peace candidates. As 
organizations such as MNC animated Gore’s confidence in this segment, he dedicated 
himself to the more traditional constituencies as the bulk of his campaign in issues and in 
image returned to “kitchen table” politics of old.. For example, Gore’s television ad that 
long-time Democratic consultant Charles Guggenheim produced aimed at Gore’s older 
voters. Shown playing checkers while discussing Medicare and Social Security, the 
commercial focuses on a “wizened, aged” man who approached the incumbent. The man 
asks Gore, “Didn’t I tell you six years ago that I hoped to live to vote for you again? Here 
I am Albert.”38 
Speaking at one campaign stop, Gore set his terms for re-election on economic 
concerns of inflation and unemployment, “These are bread and meat questions that come 
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down to the problems that your wife has got to work with paying the bills and keeping 
the family budget.”39  Gore could match Brock in the traditional crowd gatherings, but 
when television commercials began bombarding Tennesseans with pro-Brock messages, 
Gore’s traditional speaking campaign could not compete.  The quantity of ads helped 
Brock, as his campaign coffers enjoyed the backing of Tennessee business, Nixon and the 
national party. Yet the quality sealed the deal, as the polished and youthful image 
Treleavan and Rietz developed around Brock’s already popular candidacy proved a 
winner.   
Brock admitted: “television was natural for me, I loved it.” Brock recalled that he 
knew he had Gore licked even before his debate on Meet the Press when old Albert 
walked in with piles of papers filled with data, facts and issues. Brock explained, “That’s 
not what television is about.”40  Responding to the advent of the thirty second ad in 1968, 
Gore complained, “It’s an abomination and I detest it.”41  While Brock spent over 
$300,000 on television advertisements, Gore spent under $100,000. Brock’s campaign 
mastered this format, and captured the emotion of the election that motivated the 
debate.
42
  In the end one journalist commented that this campaign also involved “a race 
between rival image –makers, media coordinators and advertising agencies…in by far the 
costliest senatorial race in the state’s history.”43 
Political observers, expecting the anti-war incumbent Al Gore Sr. to hold a grip 
on Tennessee’s youth, found the exact opposite.  As Brock recollected with relish, 
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“Throughout the campaign we had over 8,500 sincere, attractive, articulate young people 
working day and night for my election.”  Summarizing the reason his youth campaign 
succeeded, Brock emphasized, “we gave them a freedom of action sufficient for them to 
feel a personal sense of responsibility and a measurable sense of accomplishment.”44  
While Brock attributed his success to his strong youth campaign, the Congressional 
Quarterly did not list him among nineteen members of Congress who could thank 
students for their victories in 1970. In fact, of the thirty eight candidates who received 
significant student support, the list included Gore.  Brock’s new youth strategy, looking 
for working young people’s votes, had not yet gained attention.  Within the GOP, 
however, Brock gained notoriety for his youth campaign. 
 In his keynote speech at the Southern Regional Republican Conference in 1971, 
Brock outlined the New Republican approach.  Focusing on young people, Brock 
emphasized their independence, claiming, “Neither party now owns the youth vote. These 
young people are going to look beyond the labels and surface issues.”  Urging 
introspection, Brock asked the audience to “take a look at ourselves, our system and, in 
particular, our political party.”  To avoid apathy or worse, revolution, Brock suggested, 
“It is time we listen to people, all people—the young, the black and the Wallace voter.”45  
After Brock’s victory, he submitted a proposal to head Nixon’s young voter campaign, 
the Young Voters for the President (YVP).  Summing up his observations, Brock 
claimed, “…this generation is desperate in its search for personal identity and a sense of 
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personal involvement.”46 Nixon’s campaign director, Jeb Magruder, quickly suggested 
that Nixon develop a youth branch of the Committee to Re-elect the President and allow 
Brock to run it with Kenneth Rietz. While Nixon’s Attorney General and future campaign 
manager suggested Nixon downplay this meddling in youth politics, Nixon jumped at the 
opportunity to get ahead of the youth vote and stop the defensive posture he had assumed 
thus far.  After 1970, Brock’s New Republican brand offered the GOP an opportunity to 
fill the political void.   
Political elites set out to connect with youth politics, building an approach that 
considered the parents’ politics but also acted on issues that mattered to this increasingly 
influential and fluid constituency. In May, 1971, after becoming Nixon’s newly hired 
point man on the youth vote, Brock argued that the “youth-oriented” campaign Rietz 
organized proved, “This generation is pleading for maximum individual freedom and 
responsibility.”  This called for “meaningful involvement,” Brock continued, “that means 
more than stuffing envelopes.”47  Involvement became the central thrust in redirecting 
young people’s notions about politics and the president. 
Nixon and New Republicans 
The White House had already struggled with its image problem concerning the 
generation gap.  Nixon’s domestic affairs chief, John Ehrlichman, wrote a memo before 
Kent State that decried, “We have loaded aboard a lot of bright, young, able people who 
can present the President and his program in an excellent light” but “we are epitomized 
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by the Vice President, the Attorney General, and Judge Carswell.”48 Magruder traced this 
reality directly to the administration’s success with appealing to Middle America. 
Magruder pointed out that there existed a counterpart to the silent majority, 
“MetroAmericans;” college educated young-professionals “who enjoy art, attend the 
symphony, and read The New York Times Book Review." According to Magruder, 
“MetroAmericans” imagined Nixon’s typical voter  as a “fat, racist suburbanite sitting at 
home in front of a television watching a football game and drinking a half-case of beer.” 
Magruder suggested more publicity on the fact “the President has surrounded himself 
with bright, young, well-educated men who care.” For example, Magruder argued, 
“Young Metroamerica won’t listen to Mel Laird, but they will to Marty 
Anderson…because he’s got more hair, a Ph.D., a sexy wife, drives a Thunderbird, and 
lives in a high-rise apartment.”  While Haldeman responded favorably, writing excellent 
twice on the memo (which Magruder called “some kind of an all-time high in praise”), 
Nixon felt strongly that “there was only one man in the White House who needed 
publicity.”49  Kent State tested this approach, as Magruder’s suggestions and many others 
like his slowly converted the White House to a more youth-friendly public relations 
campaign. 
After the 1970 anti-war march on Washington to condemn Nixon’s expansion of 
the war into Cambodia, the White House began “Operation Dialogue.”  During a two day 
period, the President, White House officials, members of the cabinet and other high level 
officials held meetings with “small groups of young people.” In addition, HEW 
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coordinated an effort that received over three thousand calls and set up sixty-one 
meetings with over one thousand young people followed by eighty-eight meetings during 
the rest of the month.
50
 After stepping down as Nixon’s Secretary of the Interior, Hickel 
wrote an article in the syndicated Family Weekly suggesting that New Politics could be 
understood on Republican terms.  Noting that “both political parties have walked narrow, 
exclusive paths,” Hickel argued, “The young of thought are pulling aside the curtains of 
phoniness and are demanding the naked truth.”  Using his department’s changes in 
environmental policy as an example, Hickel claimed that he “left Washington totally 
convinced that our governmental system is sound.”  Asking the young not to “try to 
destroy the system,” he admitted that “there is a concern in America, that if ‘law and 
order’ stretches too far, it finally becomes hate and order.”  Sharing the left’s notion of 
New Politics, Hickel asked government to “welcome the questioning of the young,” 
because, “Perhaps youth does have part of the solution.”51 
In the winter of 1971, Nixon committed to a string of public relations moves 
meant to reverse his image as exclusive and inaccessible.  As his administration touted its 
“open-door” slogan to combat his reputation, Nixon spoke during his return visit to the 
University of Nebraska about an “alliance of generations.”   Addressing the reliably 
welcoming audience at the student-faculty convocation, the President announced a 
volunteer service corps (Action), a merger between the fledgling VISTA and Peace Corps 
(the Peace Corps had even begun to recruit older, more technically skilled volunteers). 
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While this move consolidated two large federal programs, Nixon espoused its 
opportunities for cooperation, claiming, “To those who have thought the system was 
impenetrable-I say there is no longer a need to penetrate-the door is open.”52 Still, 
Nixon’s move could not avoid cynical interpretations, as this new arrangement placed the 
leadership with Peace Corps and not VISTA which conservative politicians labeled “a 
federally financed hate-Nixon postgraduate school."
53
 Clearly, the administration would 
have to do more. 
The law and order emphasis in the 1970 election had not helped. As Colson wrote 
to Haldeman, “The feeling developed in the campaign that we were "exploiting" student 
dissent, using the student issue for political gain and scolding the youth.” As a result, 
“This in Harris' view caused the dramatic shift downward.” 54 The White House quickly 
noticed the need to shift on this issue, as Nixon aide, Jeb Magruder, recommended that 
the president reconsider his 1968 campaign pledge to establish a White House Youth 
Office.
55
  Bill Brock had already advocated for this change when he sponsored the Youth 
Council Act of 1971 that included a Youth Council in the Executive office of the 
President to coordinate all youth programs, advise the President on “policies and 
programs affecting youth” and strengthen communication between the President and 
young people.  After overseeing campus tours by eight staff members, Magruder 
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concurred, “A youthful member of the White House staff should be designated as the 
President’s liason with youth.”  This fresh faced representative of the administration 
would direct a “youth shop” in the White House, something young people from across 
the spectrum had requested throughout the staffers’ research tours.  Revealing young 
people’s rising political significance, Magruder wondered if “students can be ‘serviced’ 
in the same way Chuck Colson services adult outside groups, Harry Dent the Republican 
Establishment and Len Garment the minorities.”56  While Nixon had intimated that he 
would support such an agency, one White House memo revealed, “We plan to propose to 
the sponsors that the bill be allowed to die.”57 
Nixon’s staff agreed to squash it for three central reasons.  First, the creation of 
another bureaucratic institution would only reinforce the press’ criticism that Nixon stood 
distant from young Americans. Bill Gavin, Nixon’s Assistant Secretary of the United 
States Information agency, instead suggested highly publicized personal interactions with 
young people that would create “the ring of authenticity” more than some pandering 
report from “the Third Bureau of the Youth’s Under Secretary’s Committee for More 
Equitable Sock It To Em Among Pubescent Males.”58 Second, “middle America” might 
see the youth agency as political weakness.  Last, the administration feared that it could 
never find a trustworthy youth spokesman who would “follow our line one hundred 
percent of the time.”59 
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Recognizing this, Nixon’s administration reached out to “young America” 
through the White House Youth Conference in 1971.  Nixon’s staff already anticipated a 
conference on youth and children in 1970 as expected of the White House every ten 
years. Planning began in 1969, when Nixon unveiled his agenda to form a “youth policy” 
and named the Urban Affairs Council’s (UAC) deputy director, thirty-six year old 
Stephen Hess, as the conference’s national chairman.  Under Hess, a young aide in the 
UAC developed two significant reports on the relationship between government and 
youth in preparation for the decennial event.  Modeled on Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 
writings on national urban policy, Chester E. Finn Jr.’s “The Ecology of Youth” and 
“Toward a National Youth Policy” explained and proposed solutions to the youth 
problem.  The government, Finn’s report asserted, coddled young people and encouraged 
“dependency” on adult society with college loans and long term apprenticeships to 
“prolong their youth.” In addition, the system on which young people depended offered 
little opportunity for them to influence it.  Finn suggested the administration consider 
reforming youth’s legal standing, increase government backed volunteer groups 
“administered by young people themselves” and an effort to put young people in “policy 
making positions.”60 Considering this added significance, Nixon announced that he 
would change the conference format to reflect his “open door.”  This conference, unlike 
its predecessor, would include youth, as Nixon urged Hess to listen “to the voices of 
young America- in the universities, on the farms, the assembly lines, the street corners.”61 
Under Hess’s direction, the conference divided the youth issues into three age categories 
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and appointed appropriate adult leadership to each segment’s meetings. The eldest group, 
ranging from fourteen to twenty-one years old, would gather during April, 1971, at the 
YMCA camping grounds in Estes Park, Colorado.   
Nixon’s people explained this move as an attempt to isolate the event from the 
capital’s distractions, creating an environment where youth could play a more significant 
role than in previous White House youth conferences.  This decision invited immediate 
criticism that Nixon meant to remove the conference from the spotlight and relegated it to 
a remote location where his people could maintain control.  “The only authority to protest 
are the Rockies,” quipped one such critic.62 While journalists questioned Nixon’s 
sincerity, the White House paid close attention to the conference. 
One of the ten task forces, each charged with developing a research study to guide 
the sessions, prepared a report for the conference titled, “Student Participation in 
Governance.”  “Many of the problems confronting secondary schools in the ‘70s,” 
warned the paper, “will be those of the colleges of the ‘60s- student protest and violence 
and the rapidly increasing drug use.” The only solution, for this young attendee, required 
“student participation.”  “Many responsible students are ready and willing to solve these 
problems.”63  Allowing students, and young people, a role in government could head off 
this expanding youth crisis.  
The weather initially portended a positive vibe, as young people arrived to sunny 
conditions.  Soon, the snow began, trapping some in their cabins while others shared 
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overcrowded, under-heated dorm rooms. A few young people had to be evacuated by 
helicopter when they fell ill. According to one Rolling Stone Magazine, Nixon’s 
Woodstock “had become another Altamont.” The conference carried the same tensions 
that surrounded the larger youth problem. Over one thousand young people attended, and 
they brought a wide range of the 1968-generation’s political perspectives.  Upon entering 
the conference, a group of students greeted attendees with a flier that read, “The White 
House Conference on Youth, even before it begins has all the makings of an elaborate 
fraud.” 64  Revealing the problems this generation presented, a group of Puerto Ricans 
and Chicanos walked out to protest their lack of representation.  Young skeptics worried 
that Hess handpicked the adult delegates, as he held veto power over the selections that 
attendees nominated beforehand. In addition, many delegates gained access to the event 
through their Governor’s nomination, not exactly an open process.65 
The young delegates found divisions on cultural issues as well. After a police 
captain spoke in a session on the marijuana problem, someone stood in protest, “If you 
are going to lock up everyone for smoking grass, you are going to have to arrest half this 
conference.”  After all, a Rolling Stone reporter claimed that “the conference pot supply 
was ample and of good quality.”66  Still, many found the abundance of “squares” 
conspicuous. One Time reporter wrote, “many sported crew cuts” and that they took to 
dance floor when a rock band played one night, “dancing in 1950s style, cheek to cheek.” 
James Kunen, veteran of the Columbia student protests and author of TheStrawberry 
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Statement, represented the New Left, observing, “I didn’t know they could find this many 
straight kids in America.”67  Claiming that this mixing of American youth produced a 
curious stew, the Rolling Stone reporter continued, “In just four days, Nixon’s 
bureaucrats did a better job of radicalizing middle American youth…than a decade of 
Tom Hayden, Jerry Rubin and Huey P. Newton.”68 
Conservatives also objected to the make-up of the conference’s delegation.  A 
twenty-four year old Kansas City nurse criticized the conference “because it did not 
represent either moderate or conservative viewpoints.” Bill Brock, the newly elected 
Senator from Tennessee and an adult member of the Values, Ethics and Culture Task 
Force, called the group’s criticism of America’s history of slavery and expansion, 
“masochistic, negative and non-productive.”69  Brock denied young people’s radical 
reputation, “There is a silent majority on every campus,” and pointing out that the older 
generation could not be that bad when they “fought man’s grizzliest war…fought 
discrimination…built thousands of schools…and made a start, although a late one, in 
healing the scars of the earth and fighting pollution.”70 
Religious youth also vented their frustration, as one member of the United 
Methodist Church in the United States complained, “I believe our denomination was the 
only major one to send youth representatives.” Conservative students mocked the 
conference, calling it the “White House Woodstock” and deplored the radical make-up of 
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the young people attending as “unrepresentative” (it even included non-citizens!).71  
Referring to the ten Task Forces of fifteen members that generated reports such as the 
one above, the article continued, “Not one conservative served on the original Task Force 
in any area issue” while the adult delegates also leaned left when they supported the 
McGovern-Hatfield proposal to remove all troops more than young people did.
72
  Still, as 
far as this young man was concerned, “This conference was creditable.” 73 
In the end, the delegates voted on a lengthy list of recommendations for the 
President ranging from abolishing grades in school to ending the war and legalizing 
marijuana.  Putting a good face on it, Hess claimed the event a success, calling it the 
“fairest conference” ever in the White House’s long standing youth series and adding that 
Nixon “has a commitment to take these considerations very seriously indeed.”74  
Conservatives recoiled at the final document, as Pat Buchanan recommended, “get the 
President as far away as possible from this thing.” “No serious man can take this silly 
document seriously,” Buchanan jibed, “the children out at Estes Park put this together as 
great put-on for Richard Nixon.”75 In fact, Nixon waited a year to respond.   
Eventually, Nixon’s administration finally released a four hundred page 
“encyclopedia” that answered each of youth conference’s 330 recommendations. Touting 
his openness, Nixon claimed to accept sixty percent of their ideas “threaded through with 
basic human values…and noble ideals.” Furthermore, the President claimed he was 
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“soliciting views of young employees when developing policies and procedures of 
interest to them.”76  While Nixon’s administration could agree with certain principles 
concerning civil rights and contraception, it opposed the delegates’ call for an immediate 
and complete withdrawal from Vietnam, huge cuts in the defense budget and the end of 
nuclear tests that would “emasculate our present defense posture.”77  While the President 
tentatively bridged the gap and extended an olive branch to America’s youth, he made 
sure to distinguish between the types of young people he would accept and the types who 
he would not.  
Beyond the conference’s issues, one young delegate wrote: “this talking together, 
this trying to understand each other” served a higher purpose-- “a spirit of trying a little 
harder to make America still a better place in which to live.”78  The President wasted 
little time in using the event for wider political consumption, as he spoke to the rural 
youth of the 4-H Club months after the event. Speaking of the “most wide open forum 
‘of, by, and for young Americans’ ever held,” Nixon claimed that “ the time when the 
young are to be seen and not heard is gone in America—gone for good.”  The White 
House report on the conference, bragged Nixon, “will further weaken the myth of an 
unbridgeable generation gap.”79 Ultimately, this effort hoped to attract young people who 
supported Nixon’s as his message to the attendees suggested, “Your next step should be 
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to focus on a mechanism…the American political process.”80 
While these efforts met the growing anxieties over the youth generation, he saw 
the effort as a sign of weakness.  After meeting with one group of student leaders in 
1971, Nixon and Haldeman agreed on the “softness of this generation” and that the 
“quality of student body presidents has changed” for the worse.  Voicing his disgust, 
Nixon complained, “Well it’s just crap, we have to sit and talk to these little jackasses” 
and told his Chief of Staff, “scratch all this crap, really, bullshit, all these meetings, this 
therapy meeting with the little assholes.”81 By 1971, Nixon decided that co-opting his 
young enemies served little purpose, and that he would have to build his own youth 
image to counter the visual that linked McGovern with America’s future and Nixon with 
the older set. 
 The “Open Door” and Policy 
The Nixon administration’s highest ranks continued their efforts on the youth 
problem, as they implemented Bill Gavin’s repeated advice to hold more media events 
featuring Nixon and young people.  Avoiding the image of “caving in,” Nixon made it 
clear that he wanted to meet with young people “who are on our side, instead of spending 
so much time trying to pacify those who are against us.” The president clarified that he 
preferred the youth group he met “who support us in Vietnam, rather than the college 
editors we had in last week, who are opposed to us.”82 This would be a difficult task, but 
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that Nixon reached his own youthful constituency speaks to the growing ranks of 
conservative young Americans during the early 1970s.  In fact, despite the anti-war 
movement’s visibly youthful appearance, polls showed young people “less inclined than 
their elders to call the war a mistake.”83 Defending Nixon’s bombing campaign in 
Vietnam and neighboring Cambodia, Brock read into the Congressional Record letters of 
support from various young people including the presidents of the Future Business 
Leaders of America and the Vocational-Industrial Clubs of America, Miss Texas, a 
twenty-one year old state representative and the Young Republicans Chairman.
84
 
Encouraged, Nixon’s administration sought to fulfill its “open door” slogan and treat 
young people like adults. 
All of the White House and domestic Staffers under thirty-years old signed a 
“Youth Manifesto,” testifying to Nixon’s progress in ending the war, the draft and his 
revenue sharing plan that would tackle the “leviathan bureaucracy.”   Sent off to college 
newspapers, the manifesto refuted the myth that Nixon “did not speak to youth.” 
Claiming, “Because we work for the President, because we are young, and because we 
know the myths are false,” this group analyzed Nixon’s policies from a “different 
perspective.”85 
In Nixon’s State of the Union speech in 1971, he suggested, “Let us forge an 
alliance of the generations." In this speech, the President asked Americans to “work 
together to seek out those ways by which the commitment and compassion of one 
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generation can be linked to the experience of another.”86 Soon after, Nixon’s personal 
newsletter, First Monday, dedicated a section to “The President and Young Americans;” 
a glossy, colorful collage of headlines, speeches and images of Nixon meeting with 
young people.  Photographs of Nixon with smiling young boys in the Oval Office 
announcing the “Newspaper Boy Week Proclamation” or surrounded by leaders of Girls 
Nation portended a new focus on openness.
87
 Seeking to support Nixon’s claim to an 
“Alliance Among Generations,” the newsletter packed in headlines such as “Nixon’s 
Draft Plan Vast Improvement” and listed progress in youth issues such as the Vietnam 
War, the environment and funding for college.
88
  Other changes came through policy as 
the White House elevated young Americans position in politics. 
 Lowering the age of majority proved one of Nixon’s most popular policies with 
young voters.  As the eighteen year old vote became a possibility in 1969, one concerned 
voter wrote that “young people do not have a well-balanced sense of responsibility until 
they are in their twenties.”  Arguing that the country “should not be run or largely 
influenced by teenagers,” the letter predicted that “if the voting age is lowered, the whole 
legal structure concerning legal age and responsibility will have to be revised.”89  Along 
with voting rights, politicians offered young people adult status through other means as 
well. 
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 Most lauded lowering the age of majority as way to extend responsibility, in 
keeping with the amendment fever.  Expectations for adulthood had changed, as one 
argument for lowering the age of majority traced the origins of the twenty-one year old 
threshold to the Middle Ages when men had to wear heavy protective military equipment 
(“weight of arms, knee length mailshirts, shields and mail coifs which protected the neck 
and face”). Michigan Governor Williams Milliken joked, “The weight of armor in the 
11
th
 century should not govern the age at which a 20
th
 century couple can get a mortgage 
in Michigan.”90  The right to buy stocks and property, the right to marry without parental 
consent and the right to fill various occupations such as policeman and life insurance 
agent offered young people entry into adult life’s sacred institutions.   
While many states had passed laws in this effect, the results of this state by state 
approach proved uneven. In some states, men’s age of majority was lower than women’s, 
and other states the exact opposite. The controversy around this change concerned the 
other “privileges” of adulthood, the right to buy pornography, purchase alcohol and 
gamble.  Southern states and Midwestern states rejected this effort most often, citing 
concerns over a lower drinking age. In Tennessee, the conservative Lipscomb 
University’s newspaper issued an editorial denouncing its state’s vote to lower the age of 
majority to eighteen. Predicting an increase of drinking and driving, the editorial also 
blasted the state legislature for “this sudden desire to downgrade the adult maturity 
level,” claiming, “they are lowering their own standards.”91 Despite this opposition, 
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Nixon’s advisors recommended support for lowering the age of majority. One young 
staffer, Harding Jones, argued this was “a farther reaching issue than the voting age” and 
that by “ending the conflicts and hypocrisies contained in some of the laws, [Nixon] will 
be appealing to the young people.”92  Here, Nixon came across as a leader, and his 
actions shed the reactionary scrambling that marked his administration’s efforts on youth 
issues discussed in previous chapters such as the draft, the environment and lowering the 
voting age.  
Even on international issues that hardly seemed related to youth, Nixon used his 
achievements to show an openness and leadership that would encourage his own young 
supporters.  These “counterintuitives” complicated the liberal critique that painted Nixon 
as an “old encrusted type.”  Nixon’s visit to China prompted attention to his prowess and 
influence on the world stage, but young Americans also found Nixon’s Détente a 
compelling case for the President’s re-election. 
Looking at how this diplomatic success translated into domestic popularity with 
young people adds much needed context to his foreign policy decisions.  After all, the 
opening between China and the US began with a symbolic ping-pong tournament in 
Beijing that a nineteen-year old table tennis player, Glenn Cowan, initiated. As a member 
of the American Table Tennis Association, Cowan  became friendly with the Chinese 
national champions and he gave them red, white and blue T-shirts with the words “Let it 
be” across the front. This prompted the Chinese to invite the US team to “Red China.” 
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After his return, Cowan appeared before the press in purple corduroy, as “his dark locks 
hung below a yellow suede pied piper hat.”  This was the face of Ping-Pong diplomacy. 
Describing his stay, Cowan spoke glowingly of China and claimed that after meeting the 
Chinese Premier, “I believe I could mediate between him and Nixon very easily.”93  The 
Now Generation, increasingly soft on the Cold War, believed in Détente.  Nixon 
observed the potential with young voters before announcing his plans for China. 
  A campus opinion poll found that only one in twenty students looked at Nixon’s 
trip to China with disfavor. 
94
 After Nixon returned, ping pong diplomacy came to 
American campuses, as the   Chinese table tennis team toured America.  Inviting the 
President to attend the match at the University of Maryland, Alan Vista of that school’s 
College Republicans bragged that the club “is proud that the University of Maryland is 
able to take an active role in the betterment of the relations between our country and the 
People’s Republic of China.”95 Even further, Virta wrote an editorial in the university 
paper recommending Washington D.C.’s new hockey team take on the Chinese Panda as 
a mascot.  In rebuttal, one sports page laughed that this slow moving animal hardly 
captured the fast-paced hockey spirit, and jested that Nixon offered the name “the Wage 
and Price Freezers” while McGovern’s people would favor “Rink-y-Dinks.”96 
 Still, the White House public relations machine pounced on the popularity 
Nixon’s China plan enjoyed with young voters. Reviewing Nixon’s developing Youth 
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Speakers Bureau and Youth Media Services, Nixon’s adviser Fred Malek wrote the 
White House’s point man on youth that “we should be pushing the China issue much 
harder than you seem to be.”97  Nixon’s staffers soon organized speaking engagements on 
campuses to discuss China and his media campaign distributed TV and radio clips on 
Nixon’s trip to China to 496 television stations and 1,000 radio stations.98  In the summer 
of 1971, even Nixon’s most worldly accomplishments included considerations of the 
youth problem.  As Nixon’s administration moved to shape its own youth constituency by 
improving the president’s image and appear more inclusive, his Democratic challenger’s 
young liberal supporters made this effort all the more urgent.  In addition, Nixon’s aides 
realized that he needed to do work before he could compete for young voters. Nixon had 
taken concrete steps to proving he could be a “change” candidate, an image many had 
thought impossible when looking at the man.  Thus, young voters became a convenient 
vehicle for public relations and advertising techniques to enter the political process. As 
youth politics- conservative or liberal- emphasized image and cultural differences, New 
Republicans effort to revive the GOP elevated the role young people played in both 
public relations and organization. In March, 1971, Nixon’s aides felt that “the electorate 
was not getting a clear image of the President,” and Nixon met with four different 
journalists in one month after he rarely granted interviews in his first two years.  Still, 
despite this effort, the interviews seemed to affirm Nixon’s youth problem as he claimed 
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unrest among young Americans resulted from their lack of “old values.”99The attempt to 
improve Nixon’s image through the media consistently encountered the stubborn popular 
narrative that highlighted his outdated approach to youth.  While George McGovern 
hoped to build on Nixon’s youth problem, this accepted line of thinking further motivated 
Nixon to develop his own New Republican image with young supporter
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Chapter Five 
“Acid, Amnesty and Abortion”: New Politics and George McGovern’s Campaign 
 
In 1972, one year after the 26
th
 Amendment lowered the voting age to eighteen, 
Senator George McGovern’s presidential nomination offered newly enfranchised young 
liberals their long awaited idealist and “sell-out dove on Vietnam.” Reinforcing 
McGovern’s appeal to youth, the Senator himself directed a reform commission after the 
1968 election that changed the Democratic Party’s rules on delegate selection to include 
first time voters.  This approach, what the Democrats called New Politics, opened the 
nomination process through primaries and balanced delegates by race, gender and age to 
proportionately represent previously marginalized groups. These two factors drew an 
unprecedented number of first time voters to the Democratic National Convention, 
leading one labor representative to grumble, “There is too much hair and not enough 
cigars at this convention.”1 
McGovern’s campaign relied on the senator’s strong position against Vietnam 
“Right from the Start” to recruit young voters. This stance led many traditionally 
Democratic voters, such as white southerners, Catholics and labor to conflate the 
Democratic nominee’s New Politics with 1960s’ radicalism. Nixon’s administration 
pounced on this opportunity to paint the Democratic Party as “radical-liberal,” soft on 
defense and socially permissive.  As Nixon’s Chief of Staff wrote in his diary, “we need 
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savage attack lines against the McGovern positions. Get McGovern tied as an extremist.”  
Haldeman pointed out how easily this could be accomplished by “bringing in (left wing 
liberal) Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Angela Davis.”  Exaggerating the differences 
between the two candidates, the White House aimed to “get the maximum number of 
pictures of rowdy people around McGovern, while we go for the all-out-square 
America.”2  The youth revolt and student protests during this era wore out many 
Americans’ tolerance for the “hippies” on whom McGovern seemed to rely.  Democratic 
political advisor Ben Wattenberg explained McGovern’s problem when he claimed the 
election “was a referendum on the so-called cultural revolution that has been going on 
allegedly for four or five years in this country.”3 
Thus, Senator George McGovern’s campaign manager, Frank Mankiewicz, faced 
a political crisis.  Mankiewicz desperately tried to moderate McGovern’s positions as he 
infused experienced veterans into McGovern’s young leadership, used television to 
project a more presidential candidate and appealed to economic “bread and butter issues” 
such as inflation and unemployment.  McGovern’s young leaders, however, did not 
relinquish their control easily and a widely publicized generational rift developed in the 
campaign.  Despite his attempt to reshape the Democratic coalition to include both young 
liberals and “party regulars,” Mankiewicz could not shake McGovern’s reputation as the 
radical candidate of “Acid, Amnesty and Abortion.”  McGovern’s campaign increased 
Nixon’s motivation to engage in youth politics and the White House redoubled its 
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campaign for first-time voters. Quintessentially Nixon, rather than concede the youth 
vote as many suggested, the Committee to Re-Elect the President’s (CRP) organizers 
instead decided to increase its  young volunteers’ visibility to expose McGovern as the 
“fraud and super politician that he is.”4 McGovern’s original cadre of young liberals 
made his nomination possible, but this connection to the 1960s’ youth revolt prevented 
reconciliation between McGovern and the “old guard” that his New Politics threatened.    
Scholarship on youth politics during this era identifies the youth vote’s polarizing 
potential. During the early 1960s, young activist formed New Left groups such as the 
Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.  
These student-led organizations coalesced around the civil rights and anti-war 
movements to combat their sense of alienation.  Consequently, as historian Doug 
Rossinow has noted, “a fissure opened between older liberals in positions of power and 
younger activists who fixed their moral gaze on the character and actions of 
individuals.”5 McGovern’s youth-focused campaign continued this fissure, as he built his 
campaign on the commonly held assumption that youth politics would rejuvenate the 
Democratic Party with a new liberal constituency.  McGovern’s campaign, however, 
overestimated its popularity with the 1968- generation-- especially its increasingly 
independent voters--and overlooked the “sons and daughters of the silent majority.”  
McGovern’s campaign underestimated the organization necessary to run a 
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successful youth campaign. As one young McGovern volunteer at Columbia claimed 
after McGovern only set up headquarters near campus weeks before the election, “They 
assumed Columbia and Barnard were for McGovern…but they didn’t realize the 
storefront would be a source of volunteering and fundraising.” McGovern’s media 
campaign struggled recruit young supporters as well.  Though several Nixon ads featured 
his Young Voters for the President to make his campaign look young, McGovern’s 
television ads—titled, “crime and drugs,” “defense spending,” “welfare”-- targeted older 
voters. Not that it would help, as a New York University McGovernite reasoned: “You 
have to reach them [students] on a more individual basis” because “they also get turned 
off by TV commercials for candidates.”6  In contrast to the New Republican combination 
of an organized and media savvy youth campaign, McGovern’s campaign could not 
secure the anticipated turnout.   
McGovern’s campaign officials in the spring of 1972 talked about winning 
seventy percent of the youth vote, however only half of the first time voters turned out  as 
McGovern won fifty-two percent of the eighteen to twenty-four year-old vote.
7
  The 
lesson many pundits took from McGovern’s loss—beware the left—essentially accepts 
the narrative Nixon used to stigmatize Democrats as extremists and attract independent 
voters.  However, the first youth vote carried another lesson for Democrats—young 
voters required a focused organizational effort.  This chapter argues that youth politics 
elevated the candidates’ significance and that McGovern’s struggled with young voters’ 
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influence on his image.
8
 
The scholarship on McGovern’s campaign remains thin.  Two recent efforts to 
refocus attention on the losing side of this landslide election, Bruce Miroff’sThe Liberal 
Moment and the 2005 documentary, One Bright, Shining Moment, claim that McGovern’s 
may have been the first truly liberal candidacy, but also represented the last.  This 
approach emphasizes that New Politics, and the idealism it carried, could not win at the 
ballot box.  While these limits became clear in 1972, this election opened up politics to 
American voters, the campaign cemented a new sensibility in America that saw electoral 
politics, even in losing, as a process that could be changed from the bottom.    Democratic 
reforms opened up delegate selection with the primary process so young voters, and 
many other interest groups ranging from women to Latinos, could influence elections and 
candidates.  Similar to a bee sting, the McGovern campaign left its mark before meeting 
its end. In many ways, then, this was the first "liberal moment"-- but not the last.  
Youth Politics and McGovern’s New Politics  
Before Robert Kennedy’s assassination, his campaign built a powerful youth 
constituency that reignited liberals’ dreams of another Kennedy who could embody 
1960s’ idealism. Kennedy’s national campaign swept across American campuses in the 
buildup to the California primary, contributing to his surging momentum as he chased 
Hubert Humphrey for the Democratic nomination. The night Kennedy won the California 
primary and validated his strategy to use young supporters more prominently, an assassin 
shot the Senator after his acceptance speech. Hours later, Mankiewicz, as the campaign’s 
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press secretary, climbed up to a lectern at two in the morning with shoulders slumped and 
lips quivering to announce Kennedy’s death twenty hours after the shooting.9After this 
tragedy, his followers searched desperately for a new candidate that could represent their 
vision of a youthful, idealistic campaign.  
Attempting to continue RFK’s campaign, McGovern accepted Kennedy aides’ 
requests and joined the race in August.  Heading into the Democratic National 
Convention, McGovern committed himself to "the goals for which Robert Kennedy gave 
his life," inheriting about 300 leaderless delegates and the Kennedy team, including 
Mankiewicz.
10
  While his campaign earned him recognition, McGovern could not offer 
the same star power that gave Americans confidence in Kennedy’s New Politics as he 
only won 146 ½ delegates to Humphrey’s 1760 ¼. During the 1968 DNC, Chicago’s 
streets erupted in riots during the convention, pitting young protestors against Chicago’s 
police force. When Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) nominated McGovern, he shocked 
the convention by saying, "With George McGovern as President of the United States we 
wouldn't have Gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago."  McGovern spoke about this 
chilling effect when he reflected, “Many of the young people who were beaten in 
Chicago in the summer of 1968 left with the idea that their cause had been beaten as 
well.” For McGovern, “While their effort fell short, it was, in fact, only the beginning.”11  
After the 1968 debacle, McGovern chaired the Commission on Party Structure and 
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Delegate Selection to reform the Democratic Party and include more youth.  
Thinking ahead to the 1972 election, Mankiewicz imagined this political potential 
too, as he wrote in his syndicated article that the “campaign to get out the youth vote may 
turn out to be as decisive in 1972 as was his [McGovern] anti-Vietnam campaign in 
1968.”12Mankiewicz, the Latin America Peace Corps Director during John F. Kennedy’s 
presidency and an aide for Robert Kennedy’s 1968 campaign, had connections to the 
party’s old guard.  In addition to his experience, Mankiewicz’ faith in youth politics made 
him the perfect campaign manager to help McGovern’s campaign bring together the 
Democrat’s old and new constituencies.    
Mankiewicz’ version of New Politics, however, rested on his background in 
Hollywood, which shaped his emphasis on polling and image, or the Kennedy formula.  
In this approach, young supporters served more as an illustration of a candidate’s 
popularity and energy than a central component of his organization.  In fact, journalists 
widely considered Mankiewicz an honorary Kennedy, and even months after McGovern 
brought Mankiewicz into his campaign during the spring of 1971, repeated accusations 
forced him to deny his role as Ted Kennedy’s “double agent.”13  With this background, 
Mankiewicz saw the problem in relying on young voters. In Mankiewicz’ syndicated 
article with Tom Braden, their review of three youth movies including Easy Rider 
concluded that, “the establishment on the threshold-that is the people who will be running 
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this country 20 years from now- believes the country is rotten.”14  Weary of young 
voters’ apathy, Mankiewicz tempered his enthusiasm for youth politics. Thus, the Senator 
decided that his young, flamboyant and inexperienced campaign manager, Gary Hart, 
required a political veteran to complement his youth-focused campaign. 
Since McGovern began this second run for president, his campaign had relied 
heavily on young and untested campaign aides that traveled from state to state to develop 
his organization. McGovern first hired Hart, a thirty-two year old lawyer, to manage his 
campaign. In turn, Hart brought in twenty-five year old Gene Pokorny as the Midwest 
coordinator, twenty-five –year old Joe Grandmaison as the New England coordinator,  
Rick Stearns as the twenty-seven year old chief of non-primary states, and twenty one 
year-old Pat Caddell as the chief pollster and McGovern’s director of the ”blue collar 
strategy.”15 
In addition, McGovern depended on the young people’s votes more than any 
other presidential candidate in American history, as he proudly stated, “I stake my hopes 
in 1972 in large part on the energy, the wisdom and the conscience of young 
Americans.”16 Party reforms under McGovern had turned the primary elections into the 
most viable path to the nomination, displacing the old political machines’ reliance on the 
smoke filled room.  In addition, party loyalties weakened among younger voters, and the 
rise of independents augured a new political approach for increasingly fluid 
constituencies. In the Midwest, where less than a third of voters over fifty years-old 
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declared themselves independent, nearly half of the voters between twenty one and 
twenty-four years old claimed no party affiliation.
17
 Democratic loyalists watched in 
horror as many of these independents came at their expense. For McGovern, an outsider, 
this breakdown provided an opportunity.   
Defending the rise of independents, one University of Tennessee student strongly 
disagreed with critics who claimed “the only way to be really effective is to join one of 
the two major parties.”  Claiming that “independence is valid,” this student saw it as a 
better way of registering discontent than not voting at all, which confuses the non-voters 
concern with apathy.
18
  McGovern’s campaign research dating back to 1970 indicated 
that politics became more absorbed with the individual candidate.  While McGovern’s 
numbers showed Nixon faring poorly with young voters after the Kent State shootings, 
one report claimed that moderate, liberal Republicans such as the New York City Mayor 
John Lindsay would do much better. “Party allegiance therefore seems to be based on the 
popularity of individuals,” the report argued, “and not any particular preference for a 
party.”19 As McGovern offered a protest vote, he hoped this sentiment could coalesce 
into a formidable youth constituency for him. 
  Before declaring his candidacy for the 1972 election, McGovern gathered six 
loyal supporters at his farm in Cedar Points, South Dakota to discuss his own presidential 
prospects.  At this meeting McGovern predicted that the moderates such as Hubert 
Humphrey, Senator Edmund Muskie and Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson would crowd 
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each other out.   McGovern touted his unique ability to control the youthful politics that 
disrupted the 1968 convention by convincing the “party pols and organization Democrats 
that they’re not going to find me leading a Fourth Party or my candidacy producing 
pickets outside the convention hall.”20   McGovern’s initial platform attempted to co-opt 
groups on the far left such as “McCarthyites and the NDC [New Democratic Coalition] 
people.”  In addition to his firm anti-war stance, McGovern called for sharp cuts in 
military spending, support for busing and a dramatic welfare reform that promised every 
American $2,000. Thus, McGovern tried to appeal to the young supporters who had 
clamored for a voice in the 1968 DNC and the New Democratic Coalition’s white collar, 
eastern liberals to build his campaign’s foundation.  
At Cedar Points, McGovern also argued that his campaign presented Democrats 
with the best opportunity to heal the wounds from 1968’s confrontational convention. For 
example, McGovern’ pro-labor record in the Senate showed his potential to unite the 
Democratic Party’s party regulars and young voters.  Joining the campaign after it had 
begun, Frank Mankiewicz envisioned a wider constituency for McGovern than the 
idealistic, anti-war youth as he explained, “I’ve always thought the blue-collar vote had 
to be the source of his [McGovern’s] strength.”  Stressing the bread and butter issues, 
McGovern’s campaign manager explained, “It always seemed to me that McGovern- not 
as the antiwar candidate but as the ‘change’ candidate-would appeal more to Middle 
America…”21 Healing the party’s divisions motivated McGovern’s campaign; however, 
building his youthful and liberal reputation became McGovern’s first priority in winning 
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the nomination. Though he was not present at Cedar Points, McGovern’s close advisor 
Frederick Dutton provided the political strategy behind McGovern’s attempt to build a 
new Democratic coalition.   
In in his book, Changing Sources of Power:  American Politics in the 1970s,   
Dutton argued that the youth vote deserved attention because a “generation as huge, 
distinct, and assertive as the coming one still has a life and velocity of its own which 
must be fed into the calculations of a decade.” 22 According to Dutton, the emergence of 
diverse political groups “indicates a slippage of the older political order and the 
adjustments it must make sooner or later, however grudgingly.”23  This adjustment 
required the “older political order” to accept younger people’s pre-occupation with 
“culture, morality, communication theory, flux and  the interior individual” that shaped 
youth politics.  With these changes, came new expectations.  Liberal politicians such as 
McGovern and Dutton expected that young Americans would follow a leader with moral 
authority. 
In a memo to McGovern, Dutton predicted the Democrats could win up to seventy 
percent of this new voting bloc, or eight million votes, enough to make up the difference 
between Nixon and Humphrey in 1968.
24
  Fueling McGovern’s confidence in young 
voters’ liberal lean, Dutton announced that, “Nixon made two fantastic tactical 
blunders—he approved the 18-year-old vote and the new registration provisions."25 In 
many ways, Democrats hoped 1972 could serve as 1968 redux, a “do over.”  A young 
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Massachusetts’ Democrat, Barney Frank, mused, “If you reran 1968 with the young 
people voting, the Democrats would win.”26 The numbers looked good. Among the new 
voters between eighteen and twenty –years-old in California, forty-eight percent 
identified themselves as liberal, only twenty-five percent claimed they were politically 
conservative.
27
 Youth’s liberal reputation buttressed McGovern’s attempt to outflank the 
party on the left.   
After the twenty-sixth amendment passed, McGovern raised the two remaining 
questions about young voters, “whether they will participate and how they will 
participate.”28  Organizations developed to mobilize young voters, indicating that a 
youth-focused New Politics could be a successful electoral strategy. The Movement for a 
New Congress, formed at Princeton University after Kent State, spread to over four-
hundred and fifty colleges and claimed 75,000 members who volunteered for 
congressional campaigns to elect peace candidates. Reflecting on the MNC’s work in his 
1970 campaign, Representative Parren Mitchell (D-MD) claimed, “I don’t think we could 
have won this campaign without the student support.”29 Considering these examples, 
McGovern believed “they [youth] will work within the system if we open it up to them.” 
Essential to this project, McGovern clarified, “A marriage of truly democratic procedures 
to humane policies of peace and justice is the essential formula for winning the respect 
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and participation of young people in our political process.”30  This formula and faith 
motivated McGovern’s approach to liberal youth in his campaign. 
First, McGovern’s campaign immediately flaunted the Senator’s long standing 
anti-war position with the slogan “Right from the start” to build momentum with student 
voters. On top of his niche as the anti-war candidate, McGovern rallied to other youth 
causes such as the environment. Referring to his proposals for citizen review boards to 
oversee transportation and pollution issues on the local level, McGovern wrote in an 
editorial for Parents Magazine, that “Many of our young… have led the way.” 
Following, “I hope that the nation will now move in the direction of greater opportunity 
for citizen involvement.”31 
Concerning campus politics, McGovern rushed to defend students’ concerns 
about the Nixon administration’s law and order position towards unrest in American 
colleges and universities.  McGovern conducted polls of student presidents that showed 
over ninety percent opposition to the Attorney General John Mitchell’s announcement 
that FBI agents could investigate people on campus without notifying the institution or 
local police.  In response, the Senator fired off a letter to Mitchell, demanding details on 
the legal authority governing such investigations, and that they “should be conditioned on 
the approval or request of the college president or local police official.”32  To quell the 
symbolic angst that caused tension between students and cops, McGovern proposed a 
policemen’s GI Bill that would enable men and women in law enforcement to attend 
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college.  McGovern argued that policemen would gain “sociological understanding of 
community problems,” but they would also “mingle with students as equals in a way that 
could bring better communication and mutual respect.”33 
McGovern also addressed marijuana penalties to distance himself from Nixon on 
social issues. From 1968 to 1970, student support for legalizing marijuana doubled to 
thirty eight percent, as McGovern proposed relaxed regulations for smoking pot.
34
 In 
addition, McGovern’s daughter had been arrested for marijuana possession and avoided a 
mandatory five year sentence only because of a technicality. Speaking at the a drug 
counseling office in Boston, the Senator argued that “the grave costs involved in 
imposing severe sentences and prison terms on usually law-abiding young people and 
young adults suggests that a more promising route might be to regulate marijuana along 
the same lines as alcohol.”35 McGovern’s tepid defense of marijuana maintained his 
campaign’s connection to the 1960s.    
McGovern’s campaign slogan, “I make one pledge above all others…to seek and 
speak the truth,” also tapped into the 1960s youth revolt’s search for transparency. 
Pictures of McGovern’s rallies also relay the campaign’s connection to the counterculture 
as they quickly conjure images of Woodstock and the Merry Pranksters. Young 
supporters buttressed this hope, as one of McGovern’s eager, young supporters submitted 
a twenty page research proposal that included a theme song “Thunder in November” with 
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a chorus “People, People like you and me. People with problems you can’t see.”  
Optimistically, this project intended to register eighty percent of young voters, getting 
them to vote two to one for Democrats, and banked on the “tendency of youths to carry 
their parents with them.”36 The larger “Thunder in November” proposal included a 
television commercial that mimicked the quintessential 1960s Coke advertisement -- 
hundreds of young people, clasping hands, swaying to the melody and singing in chorus, 
“I’d like to teach the world to sing in perfect harmony.”  Attempting to convert this 
popularized, sanguine perception into political support, these suggestions missed the 
mark and lacked a professional touch. Even though the McGovern campaign opted not to 
employ these particular suggestions, “Thunder in November” captured the hope that this 
campaign could revive the 1960s sensibility to create a powerful political voting bloc out 
of America’s righteous youth. 
 McGovern’s campaign also carried on the 1960s’ idealism for more experienced 
political activists, as one volunteer reminisced in a letter to Mankiewicz, “I think so often 
of our younger days and all those discussions we used to have and our young idealistic 
thought.”  The “first hand report from ‘Small Town U.S.A’” continues, “ I believe 
George McGovern fills a real need for the young of today and their search for ideals.”37   
Thus, McGovern’s campaign gambled on a strategy that relied on young people to 
continue the 1960s’ liberal politics into the 1970s, a strategy that Mankiewicz himself 
described as “a sort of (hopefully) ever-expanding floating crap game.”38  With young 
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people’s involvement, McGovern hoped a grassroots effort could capitalize on the party’s 
new primary system to gain the nomination.   
In February, 1971, McGovern convened a dozen campus and youth activists to 
announce the formation of the National Students and Youth for McGovern.  While this 
appeared to copy Eugene McCarthy’s strategy to challenge LBJ with a “kiddy corps” in 
1968, McGovern targeted young voters as a constituency more than a political 
adornment.
39
  McGovern’s youth would also play leadership roles in the organization.  
By the fall of 1972, McGovern allocated campaign funds to pay thirty student-youth 
organizers a considerable fifty dollars a week.
40
  McGovern’s youth campaign framed his 
attacks on Nixon, as he spoke to students at the University of New Hampshire about the 
President’s failure to “increase the participation of our nation’s young people in the 
decision making processes of our government.”  Pointing out that Nixon’s commissions 
on campus unrest, marijuana and education only included one person under thirty (“and 
Vice President Agnew publicly called for his resignation”), McGovern argued that he had 
unsuccessfully urged Nixon “to listen to your generation, to take advantage of your 
idealism and your intelligence.”41 
Addressing a New Hampshire high school audience in the fall of 1971, McGovern 
focused on the central task in building a youth vote, registration.  Explaining that Nixon 
won New Hampshire in 1968 by only 25,000 votes while there were 100,000 potential 
first time voters, McGovern stressed that “nothing will happen, nothing will change  as 
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you want it to, and as I want it to unless you register and vote.”42 
The registration process stood as a formidable barrier to McGovern’s youth 
campaign. McGovern had attempted to reform the registration process itself to allow as 
many young people to register as possible, as he sought nothing less than the abolition of 
the process.  His attempt to win young voters motivated McGovern to push for reforming 
this electoral system as it represented the party machine’s ability to control who 
participated and where.  Even before the twenty-sixth amendment’s ratification, the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission issued a report in which the committee advocated a one 
time, life-long registration process. The political system’s credibility was at stake, as 
McGovern argued, “The purpose of registration is to add to the legitimacy of the electoral 
process.”  This legislation would provide for enrollment officers to “visit every residence 
in the land and enroll every qualified person to vote who does not refuse.”43 Most 
important, this reform would require identification cards which would allow voters to 
participate politically from anywhere in the country, or abroad for service men and 
women.  The more young voters, these activists thought, the more Democrats.  While this 
effort did not succeed, courts relaxed new registration rules that determined who could 
register, where and when. 
In October, 1971, the Senator spoke at rally in Bend, Oregon, to kick off the 
McGovern Voter Registration Week.  “If potential first time voters are willing to 
overcome registration obstacles” McGovern cheered, “they have the numbers to 
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determine the outcome of the election.”44  The drives achieved immediate success, as the 
effort yielded over four million first time voters registered by McGovern’s campaign by 
September, 1972.  This effort required money, over one million dollars, and almost a 
third of the campaign’s dwindling budget.45  To oversee the effort, McGovern 
handpicked Congressman Frank Thompson who ran the less robust, but successful 
registration effort for JFK in 1960.  Joining Thompson as the Director of Voter 
Registration, Anne Wexler easily transferred her experience advocating for youth’s 
political rights for the progressive lobby Common Cause to McGovern’s campaign.   
One flyer threatened young voters that should they shirk the responsibility they 
claimed they deserved, they would invite “the smuggest ‘I told you so’ in history from 
the cynics and skeptics.”46 Proving their elder naysayers wrong motivated young 
Americans’ to show that they had a special status in American politics. In a memo to 
McGovern’s field organizers, Wexler emphasized the tremendous expectations for new 
voter registration.  “By adding blacks, browns and young people to the registration rolls,” 
Wexler claimed “we can revitalize the coalition of working people, city dwellers, 
intellectuals and small businessmen which has been the backbone of Democratic support 
since the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt.”47  They held the entire New Deal coalition 
in their hands. Observers agreed that McGovern would need a huge youth turnout to 
compete with Nixon and remake the unraveling Democratic coalition.  
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Organizationally, the registration effort drew personnel from young volunteers or 
tapped into student government groups such as the Association of Students for Voter 
Registration.  McGovern’s campaign leaders provided these groups with area by area 
registration targets, radio and television spots, along with literature and manuals to guide 
their drives.  The campaign even targeted high schoolers, as they possessed a naïve 
enthusiasm for voting unlike their college aged, apathetic elders.  The registration effort 
left no stone unturned, as registration officers received orders to set up a centrally located 
booth on High School campuses with a list of students eighteen years or older, and “those 
students who were not reached by booth would be contacted in their homeroom class.”48 
As liberal youth groups sprouted around the ratification and legislative process, 
they soon joined the registration effort.  On the face of it, these groups such as the Youth 
Citizenship Fund sought to enfranchise as many Americans as possible to encourage 
voting after forty-seven million Americans did not vote in 1968. The YCF directors’ 
political motivations, however, became clear in their internal communications, as one 
report hopefully predicted, “I think youth, if motivated… will vote consistently liberal.”49  
For the picture on the YCF poster encouraging young voters to register under the slogan 
“register your discontent, Vote,” the image shows a voter’s bare feet and a guitar under 
the curtain of a voting booth.
50
  Reaching young people in groups proved the most 
effective approach and contributed to the herd mentality that campaigns hoped would 
make voting and the candidates “in.”  Other efforts attempted to make voting hip, as 
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radicals Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin wrote a book they entitled Vote and John 
Lennon planned a series of concerts leading up to the Democratic Convention with the 
sole purpose of registering young people.
51
  Relying on college students who often lived 
far from their residences, McGovern’s campus registration effort still struggled because 
students had to vote in their parents’ home district. 
The ensuing registration effort motivated young liberals to bring young minorities 
in American cities into the political process.  Youth Citizenship Fund members lent 
support to local youth organizations that trained street gangs to use registration as a “tool 
for extending community control.”52  This optimistic outlook motivated an all-out 
registration blitz during the summer and fall campaign.  A project titled Registration 
Summer created a collaborative effort between disparate groups including Countdown’72 
and Register for a New America.  This effort planned eighteen events in swing states as 
either three day conferences or rallies that attracted as many as 15,000 potential first time 
voters.
53
 Young volunteers scoured the nation’s beaches and movie theaters to recruit 
first time voters, as Ted Kennedy and Jesse Jackson taped public service messages to air 
on stations that catered to a youthful audience. 
McGovern utilized his young supporters to exploit the new political procedures 
and win the nomination.  In the primary states, McGovern’s youth cadre swarmed 
contested states with a massive door to door campaign. McGovern’s twenty four year-old 
point man in New Hampshire, Joseph Grandmaison organized these young volunteers to 
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build McGovern’s impressive following in the country’s first and crucial primary. The 
campaign made use of “beard and ‘fuzzies’” that would have been “banished to 
McCarthy backrooms,” and sent them out to knock on doors.54  Although Muskie was 
supposed to dominate the Granite State because he came from neighboring Maine, 
McGovern finished with a respectable thirty-seven percent of the vote and launched his 
national campaign.   
After the New Hampshire primary, under McGovern’s twenty-three-year-old 
national youth director, Ed O’Donnell, Students for McGovern groups popped up in 
campuses across the nation (although they concentrated on the regions in the East, North 
and West that they predicted as McGovern friendly).  Along with the mundane election 
focused activities that these volunteers performed such as lining up campus leaders’ 
endorsements and distributing literature the campaign also included a participatory 
component under James K. Galbraith, a twenty-one year old Harvard student and son of 
Kennedy advisor John Galbraith.  Called the McGovern Action Corps, O’Donnell 
claimed this wing of each campus group raised “politics above politics” by engaging 
activities that included “anti-hunger work, ecology or lobbying” which were not directly 
connected to the campaign.
55
  Thus, the student campaign offered a way to meld the 
1960s’ emphasis on social action with a grassroots presidential campaign. 
The key to the campaign, in Hart’s words, was “decentralization,” with a small 
national headquarters that empowered youthful local leaders to make decisions.
56
 In 
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comparison to the forty people Nixon employed to work on his youth campaign in 
Washington D.C. alone, the McGovern young voter program counted only four people in 
Washington and forty out in the field.
57
 
One storefront headquarters manager wrote Mankiewicz to describe the grassroots 
movement’s success, “The building was given free, young men painted it at night, after a 
full day’s work, free.”58 In non-primary states, such as Vermont, McGovern’s young 
supporters manipulated the Democrat’s election reforms that “urged” equal 
representation and gained control of state caucuses to secure delegates.  During the 
caucus in Burlington, Vermont, two Middlebury College sophomores led the McGovern 
forces to beat Muskie 331 to 138.  In contrast, Muskie only managed to drum up support 
from prominent Democrats. One ward chairman admitted McGovern’s success, “I tried, 
but we turned out zilch for Muskie.”59 O’Donnell developed the youth ranks to include 
over 150,000 young voters comprised mostly of students and targeting “youth density 
areas” such California, New York and Michigan.60 Unlike Nixon, McGovern never 
developed a separate campaign branch or headquarters for young voters, as they became 
central players in the coordination and planning process.  
Many young liberals saw McGovern as a path back into the establishment.  In 
Wisconsin, the president for the Young Democrats endorsed McGovern, claiming he 
“spoke out against the war long before the other Democratic candidate. He said that he 
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would grant amnesty….and he has said that no one should be imprisoned for the use of 
marijuana.” Applauding the Senator’s “honesty, integrity and concern for all,” Young 
Democrats felt “there is a man worth working for and doing so by working ‘within the 
system.’”61  McGovern attempted to soothe American anxiety about a lost generation 
while harnessing young people’s cynicism.  This phase can best be understood through 
McGovern’s mantra, “Identify with young people, but lead them….don’t capitulate to 
them as [Gene McCarthy] did.”62 
The Harris polls predicted a ten percent advantage for McGovern that could still 
grow to yield a four million voter surplus, noting that “young people are likely to be 
voting differently than their elders.”63  Urging all young voters to register, many 
McGovern insiders assumed they would vote for McGovern as his chief pollster Pat 
Caddell recommended that they “register all the young people, we shouldn’t worry about 
them.”64  As registration progressed, however, this approach required rethinking. 
Surprising to many liberal politicians, one local official in Baltimore complained that 
conservative, working class students attending the districts’ two junior colleges could 
influence local school boards.  Still, if the relaxed registration requirements meant 
“locally undesirable results of students’ voting,” Common Cause leaders felt “that would 
be an acceptable bargain” as the “price paid for influence at the congressional district 
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level.”65 Young voters proved harder to lead than McGovern had hoped. 
McGovern‘s foray into youth politics required tremendous discipline as these 
rallies could invite a “circus” environment. One rally that “jammed” over 2,000 students 
into an auditorium at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, developed the ambiguous 
relationship between McGovern’s campaign and his young supporters.  After a “raucous 
band” created an air of “electricity and madness,” Hart recalled how a “belligerent 
claque” heckled Beatty when he “tried to direct the crowd’s thoughts to politics and to 
introduce the Senator.”66  McGovern came to Beatty’s defense, “challenging the ring 
leader to come up on the stage or shut up.”   
To be sure, McGovern had his critics among young voters.  Underground 
newspaper writer Rex Weiner, scoffed at McGovern’s endorsements from radical leader 
Abbie Hoffman and the countercultural Rolling Stone Magazine, as he maintained that 
they now fell within the establishment.
67
  Radicals saw McGovern as just another 
politician, and their contempt for the system or apathy prevented them from voting at all.  
Most troubling for McGovern, the same divisions between the Democratic Party regulars 
and McGovern’s New Politics also divided young voters.  One organization on the 
Cornell University campus called itself “Yammies” (Youth Against McGovern), claiming 
that though they were not for Nixon, McGovern “has lost touch with reality.”68 Far from 
monolithic, young voters presented an elusive and fluid constituency. 
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Richard Scammon, whose book identified the “forty-seven year old housewife” as 
the target voter for each party, dismissed the 1968-generation’s liberal political leaning 
when he responded, “The idea that the youth group is a solid monolith is sheer 
nonsense.”69  Even if Scammon was right and young people voted with their parents, 
hopeful liberals argued, “Democrats have more children.”70 Although McGovern’s 
campaign built its strategy on winning a two to one majority of young voters, the 
Students for McGovern director admitted that “there should be a drastic increase in junior 
colleges” where “Nixon has a lot of strength,” and only briefly suggested that they may 
want to reach non-student youth outside factories and in “entertainment spots.”71 As the 
campaign entered its final phase in the fall, and hopes dimmed for Democratic monopoly 
on young voters, the registration process did become more selective, as campaign advisor 
Anne Wexler pointed out, “We’d be out of our minds doing a blanket canvass in a place 
like Westport, Conn.”72  Wexler’s practical approach also addressed McGovern’s 
financial limitations that hindered his organization and forced a more economical reach 
for young voters.    
Ultimately, this effort to capture the youth vote fell well short of its goal, as 
students did not register at the rate McGovern’s campaigners had anticipated.  In New 
Hampshire, only one third of the eligible college students registered to vote in the 
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primary, pushing O’Donnell to admit that “the apathy is terrible.” As McGovern built his 
campaign on his anti-war image, his campaign overlooked the organizational 
opportunities to mobilize young people for the election. For Democrats hoping to capture 
the youth revolt and convince young liberals that “their generation was on trial,” 
McGovern’s camp could not deliver due to young voters’ tenuous loyalties to his 
candidacy.
73
  In the end, the campaign registered only half of the intended first time 
voters and spent only one-fifth of the intended funds due to budget constraints.  While 
Nixon’s war chest increased over the summer, McGovern’s campaign had to send out 
young workers with paper buckets to collect donations at his own rallies.
74
  Worse, the 
registration project drained huge resources from the campaign, as the program’s director 
Frank Thompson resigned when Gary Hart diverted campaign money away from the 
underfunded registration effort to fund star-studded rallies. Hart, reportedly in tears, 
begged Thompson to stay on board to no avail. While the campaign shrugged off 
Thompson’s departure, it appeared to crumble from the top as the youth strategy strained 
its leadership.
75
 
 Even as Hart attempted to moderate McGovern’s image, he continued to channel 
resources towards these events. Hart’s friendship with celebrities such as Warren Beatty 
proved a valuable resource in organizing youth rallies that attracted young voters to the 
campaign with musical, star studded rallies. In one string of “fundraising galas,” the 
candidate sandwiched his political stump speech between live performances by Peter, 
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Paul and Mary as well as Simon and Garfunkel and Dionne Warwick. For five dollars, 
McGovern’s “children of paradise” got to hand their tickets to celebrity ushers such as 
Paul Newman, and after some “tried and true 60’s satire, 60’s protest and 60’s idealism,” 
McGovern addressed the young crowd with an anti-climactic, traditional political speech. 
Defying his reputation, McGovern’s “mellow” show created an “image of a McGovern 
who’s not a dangerous radical, a pusher of pot a promoter of abortions or even a fancier 
of hard rock.”76 
While the advantages to Hart’s decentralized approach became clear as 
McGovern’s grassroots campaign succeeded in the early primaries, it also had 
drawbacks.  Rather than shaping his young supporters’ image to appeal to a wider 
Democratic electorate, McGovern’s commitment to play the liberal youth’s “pied piper” 
allowed the youth to shape his own image. In one memo, O’Donnell pointed out that Hart 
lacked the ground level control.  Complaining about leadership in Delaware, O’Donnell 
documented problematic personnel, labeling one young female staffer “the most abrasive 
and immature person in Delaware” and identifying “the other lulu” as “a 19 year old dope 
freak who has been writing nasty letters to the newspaper…and now incredibly is 
assistant press secretary.”77  Considering these young leaders contributed to, or detracted 
from, McGovern’s image as they spoke for the campaign in Delaware, the decentralized 
approach amidst the increasingly media focused political environment proved 
problematic.   
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In many ways, McGovern’s campaign deserved its radical reputation.  Hunter 
Thompson, though he exaggerated McGovern’s radicalism for his own reasons, painted a 
picture of pure debauchery on the “Zoo plane” devoted to McGovern’s press following.   
In his description, Thompson imagined how the “older and straighter press people must 
have felt when they saw five or six freaks reeling around the cockpit on takeoff and 
landing, passing joints around.”  For McGovern, his reluctance to take a tough line on 
marijuana considered his liberal constituency, as an anonymous supporter donated one 
dollar to his campaign, writing, “Dear George, find $1 (one dollar)  which would have 
gone for 2 joints. We’re going straight for peace. Please stop Nixon now.”78 
His young supporters’ language made this radical image believable, as one 
campus flyer asked “can we stand FOUR MORE YEARS?”  that offered “War, Inflation, 
Repression” not to mention the “murderous racism of Vietnamization.”79 McGovern’s 
strident tone and rhetoric, as he claimed that Nixon’s presidency was the "the most 
corrupt in the history of American politics,” along with McGovern’s populist focus on 
economic reform rather than crime control did little to distance his campaign from its 
radical image.
80
 In combination, the McGovern campaign’s rhetoric, permissive 
campaign culture, and vague stance on abortion, amnesty and legalization of marijuana 
invited criticism as he became the frontrunner. 
 “Middle America” had already lost its patience with the youth revolt, most 
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evident when polls indicated wide support for the National Guard who shot at students, 
killing four, during Kent State’s infamous demonstration. “The Hard Hat Riot” in New 
York City followed this tragedy when hundreds of construction workers attacked young 
protestors, targeting the male demonstrators with the longest hair. Worse, the fact that 
McGovern depended on youth politics opened his campaign to criticism that it lacked the 
maturity to soothe the generational tensions in America.  
This job-- shaping McGovern’s image as a moderate “healer”-- appealed more to 
his other manager, Frank Mankiewicz. As Hunter S. Thompson admitted that even 
though he wanted to “cut off both of his big toes,” he would hire Mankiewicz to handle 
the press if Thompson ever ran his own presidential campaign.
81
  Though McGovern 
made Mankiewicz his highest paid advisor, the job appealed more to the forty-seven 
year-old journalist as an adventure.  As a journalist, Mankiewicz’ decision to take a pay 
cut and join the incipient campaign indicated the opportunities he saw for the Democratic 
Party to connect the dots between politics and culture. Mankiewicz contended that the 
Democrats could mine this anti-establishment sentiment for votes with which they could 
reshape their fractured coalition.  Even for Mankiewicz, however, healing the rift 
between youth and the old guard became increasingly difficult.   
Mankiewicz and “Acid, Amnesty and Abortion” 
When McGovern gained the nation’s attention as a legitimate contender in the 
winter of 1972, he hired former Kennedy loyalists such as Ted Van Dyke and John 
Kenneth Galbraith who could help build the national campaign.  Throughout the 
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primaries, this change developed an underlying tension between this new leadership and 
McGovern’s young loyalists. This tension became more pronounced as McGovern 
became the frontrunner and his campaign re-focused on healing the party’s divisions.  
McGovern’s youth constituency soon became a youth problem, as his campaign could 
not shed the radical image that its opponents labeled “Acid, Amnesty and Abortion.” 
McGovern’s opponents began the barrage to bolster his radical image in April, 
1972, as the campaigns focused on the Ohio primary.  In a speech in Youngstown, the 
moderate Democratic candidate, Henry “Scoop” Jackson appealed to the blue collar 
voter’s “middle America” concerns over drugs, arguing that McGovern’s position on 
marijuana was “virtually to legalize it for the rich.”  Jackson linked McGovern’s 
permissive approach to marijuana with liberal radicals, claiming that “is a great relief to 
those who, like the Rubin-Hoffman types, like to mix their politics with pot.”82 The three 
A’s smear gained considerable traction, cutting McGovern’s lead in half from a twelve to 
six point margin in Ohio.
83
  Even those in favor of McGovern’s anti-war stance feared his 
radical reputation, as a Chicago lawyer complained that “he [McGovern] had no right to 
espouse busing, quotas, marijuana.”84 In addition, Senator Hugh Scott, the Republican 
Minority Leader brought the “three A’s” attack into the GOP’s rhetoric to exaggerate 
McGovern’s permissive politics.    
Well before Nixon unleashed his culture war in the 1972 election, the campaign 
leading up to the California primary revealed McGovern’s “three A’s” problem.  This 
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stretch of the race for the nomination offered Humphrey his last chance to get back into 
contention.  As he battled “Scoop” Jackson for moderate Democrat’s support, 
Humphrey’s campaign trailed McGovern by over two-hundred delegates.  For Hunter 
Thompson, “Hubert’s only hope in California is a savage, all-out attack on McGovern--a 
desperate smear campaign focused on Grass, Amnesty, Abortion.”85 Though McGovern 
later claimed to oppose legalization, he had argued that pot should be treated like alcohol 
as late as February, 1972.  Desperate for an angle to exaggerate McGovern’s radicalism, 
Humphrey intensified the attack on McGovern as a “Marijuana Sympathizer” that began 
during the Ohio and Nebraska primaries.
86
  Gary Hart recalled that Humphrey hammered 
the “three A’s” through newspapers and brochures to portray McGovern as radical on 
“these deeply felt social issues and, by implication, a radical on practically everything 
else.”   
As for young voters, Humphrey’s Northern California youth coordinator 
dismissed McGovern’s youth support when he attributed it to “an image that can not be 
backed up by facts.”87  Some young voters agreed, as a twenty-one –year-old student at 
San Fernando Valley State felt that “McGovern’s trying to be Mr. Cool; he’s just trying 
to fit into the young people’s needs.” More common, a twenty-one year-old woman 
rejected Humphrey, claiming “I feel like I’m important too” and that “he’s not reaching 
the right people.”88 Still, when McGovern’s campaign gained momentum, his 
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competitors increasingly exploited his tenuous coalition of young Americans and party 
regulars. McGovern’s defensive reaction against these attacks proved their cumulative 
effect.  The night before the California primary, McGovern flew to the National 
Governor’s Conference in Houston to calm Democrat’s concerns about his electability.  
According to journalist David Broder, the governors pledged their support if McGovern 
could “restrain the ‘disruptive tactics’ of his youthful supporters.”89 
 Though he lost the primary by six percentage points, Humphrey’s “three A” 
attack cut McGovern’s lead in half and cemented popular perceptions of McGovern as “a 
sell-out dove on Vietnam whose basic constituency is the radical left.”90  Apparently, 
McGovern’s demand for immediate withdrawal linked him too closely to 1960s’ protest 
politics.  The final vote reflected this trend, as McGovern won 425, 000 of an estimated 
580,000 youth votes while he lost older voters by 20 percentage points.
91
  McGovern’s 
young volunteers also made his victory in California possible, totaling 50,000 and 
establishing one hundred and eighty storefront offices compared to Humphrey’s paltry 
sixty headquarters and fewer than ten thousand volunteers.
92
 So, even as McGovern came 
to appreciate his youth campaign’s electoral benefits, he became increasingly sensitive to 
its stigma. According to Nixon’s personal pollster, Robert Teeter, Humphrey’s attack on 
McGovern in California increased Nixon’s favorability overnight.  
While the generation gap created a leadership problem for McGovern, the 
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confused image fractured the campaign. Some McGovern campaign aides relished the 
youth’s central role. Edward O’Donnell, director of Students for McGovern, emphasized 
the campaign’s reliance on the youth vote when he suggested in a memo that McGovern 
“say he will defeat Nixon because of it” and that “the reason he is behind in the polls is 
that students are not polled.” Finally, O’Donnell’s proposal outlined McGovern’s young 
supporters’ symbolic significance, as they would communicate a “message of 
reconciliation between American young people and others.” With his nomination in sight, 
McGovern moved towards the healing aspect of his Cedar Point plan. This meant that 
McGovern came to rely more heavily on his campaign’s political veteran, Frank 
Mankiewicz.  Mankiewicz always acknowledged the need to reel in McGovern’s 
youthful image, reminding himself on a memo pad to “avoid ideology” and maintain 
“discipline among troops.”93 Accordingly, Mankiewicz strayed from McGovern’s 
previous strategy and advised a rapprochement with party regulars and mass media 
appearances to undo the “three A” image.  
The dual leadership structure under McGovern became outmoded as Mankiewicz’ 
strengths seemed better suited to execute the campaigns’ move for reconciliation with the 
party regulars.  The differences between the Senator’s campaign managers motivated Van 
Dyke to repeatedly suggest that McGovern replace Hart with Mankiewicz, claiming, 
“Gary has been, and will continue to be, destructive and divisive so long as he continues 
to play any important role in your effort.”94 McGovern even went further as he appointed 
the former party chairman and archetypal Old Guard Democrat, Lawrence O’Brien, as 
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the campaign chairman and the “foremost consultant on…overall policy and strategy.” 
This move threatened both Mankiewicz’ and Hart’s authority, however, it leaned in 
Mankiewicz’ political direction.95 In the end, McGovern kept both men on his campaign, 
as Hart “persuaded McGovern that his retention was essential if the nominee was not to 
lose the backing of the young people who aided his nomination.”96 Even in personnel 
decisions, McGovern’s own youth problem limited his campaign.  
McGovern’s campaign, largely divided by generation, bifurcated in support of 
either Hart or Mankiewicz who personified the cultural divisions that plagued 
McGovern’s campaign.  While a witty, jovial personality, Mankiewicz did not drink and 
often appeared rumpled in traditional attire.  In contradiction, Hart embraced a more 
colorful lifestyle as he ingratiated himself into Hollywood star and McGovern supporter 
Warren Beatty’s permissive social circles.  As for his attire, Theodore White described 
Hart as wearing “gray denim pants, high cowboy boots,” and the quintessential “flower-
blue open necked shirt.”97 
The fundamental difference between the two became apparent when Mankiewicz 
shifted the campaign away from the large, young, enthusiastic rallies and towards smaller 
televised, events that could target “issues.” Although McGovern’s constituency 
ultimately failed to enlist enough traditional Democratic voters, Mankiewicz’ attempt to 
reach ethnics, Catholics and labor did not lack in effort.  For example, McGovern’s more 
experienced advisors emphasized the rising price of food as they promoted the “bread 
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and butter” concerns, such as inflation and unemployment, which they hoped would 
resonate with the average American voter, or the forty-seven year old housewife in Ohio.  
Van Dyke even suggested that McGovern tone down his anti-war rhetoric, claiming that 
the mainstream voter associated McGovern’s central issue, Vietnam, with “long haired 
kids” and “amnesty, which do not attract them.”98  McGovern campaign aide Gordon 
Weil outlined the basis of this strategy, as campaign strategies increasingly attempted to 
balance out their candidate’s image to ward off stereotypes.  Weil asked McGovern to 
consider the “‘consumers’ of politicians’ public images” in the emerging living room 
politics and a “public that seems to want its news and opinions spoon fed.”  Weil pointed 
out to McGovern that “because of your strong stand on Vietnam and some apparent 
associations with self-styled radicals, you are classified as a radical. Any stereotype can 
too easily become a burden and should be counteracted.”99  As young voters became 
more important, so did the politics of image. 
Even younger Democrats understood the need to tone down their rhetoric and 
broaden their base.  In 1971, the Florida Young Democrats received their elders’ scorn 
when their platform urged an end to “restrictive laws” on abortion, divorce, 
homosexuality, marijuana and cohabitation.  In 1972, they opted for a self-described “all 
very apple pie and moderate” platform, with the relatively tame calls for the 
decriminalization of marihuana and a national health insurance plan as its most 
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controversial proposals.
100
 
To help rein in the Senator’s campaign, Mankiewicz pushed McGovern to build a 
more media savvy approach rather than continue the large, raucous rallies. This approach 
stood in direct contrast with Gary Hart’s, who placed complete faith in New Politics style 
grassroots organization. Rather than consider a more tightly controlled media campaign 
to moderate McGovern’s radical reputation, Hart suggested that the campaign workers 
call themselves “Paul Reveres” to turn a “liability into an asset.”  Putting a revolutionary 
spin on McGovern’s firebrand image, this moniker framed McGovern’s campaigners’ 
purpose “to arouse the working majority to legitimate action against their despoilers.”101  
When Ed O’Donnell reported angrily to Hart that nobody printed the press release 
announcing five hundred college editor’s endorsements, Hart cheered him, claiming “It 
doesn’t matter if they print it or not. What matters is that we’ve got the people.  We’re 
going to win.”102 Annoyed with McGovern’s limited exposure early in the campaign, 
Hart stubbornly confronted members of the press, “To hell with you! If we have to, we’ll 
go to Miami Beach still at 6 percent…and we’ll win the nomination.”103As the son of 
Hollywood screenwriter, Mankiewicz carried a higher appreciation for the media’s role in 
politics.   
At first, McGovern’s inexperienced youth cadre played an especially important 
role in producing his image. Using new techniques to disseminate speeches directly to 
radio stations, Joe Walker, a recent graduate of Georgetown University could send out 
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each clip of McGovern’s speeches to 7,000 stations a day, dwarfing the 1,000 or so who 
Humphrey and Nixon had reached in 1968.  As for television, a Harvard dropout 
provided the technical support and ensured that McGovern’s appearances would be on 
the news, bragging that there was “not one rally …where any television camera failed to 
get usable footage.”104 
As they moved away from this focus on rallies McGovern’s image makers began 
to belie this youth effort. Mankiewicz managed the campaign’s telegenic effort under 
more controlled conditions when McGovern met a small labor group where he briefly 
outlined his economic position. He then met one-hundred and fifty Italian-American 
labor and political leaders, followed by radio and television interviews and a 6:30 rally 
with Ted Kennedy.  All in time to get coverage on the eleven-o’clock news.  While 
McGovern made an all media blitz in the final months, his techniques did not adapt to the 
changing political environment that emphasized image over issues.
105
 
McGovern’s commercials lacked the condensed political message that Americans 
could swallow in 1972.  Produced as five minute “man on the street” question and answer 
sessions, Charles Guggenheim’s advertisements did not capture the sense of energy, 
optimism and stability which the nation desired.  These stodgy relics of the 1960s 
overlooked advertising’s central role in the politics of image after 1968. Proving the 
point, Guggenheim later exaggerated this problem when, partly out of economic 
necessity, he produced television advertisements that consisted only of text as McGovern 
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spoke the words.  Still, a memo to McGovern’s Press Secretary, Kirby Jones, described 
the press coverage of McGovern’s appearance in Portland Maine as “not so good,” as it 
“emphasized young crowds, interviewing teenage girl”  even though the press officer at 
the small rally insisted that the “crowd was not young.”106 As Mankiewicz attempted to 
mature McGovern’s campaign, its young supporters and popular perceptions of his 
extremist image undermined this effort.  
The Convention and the Aftermath:  Failure to Reconcile 
The Democratic Convention in Miami provided the forum in which the 
Democrats’ internal tensions came to a head. Perhaps the party’s moderate platform and 
the relative tranquility that surrounded the convention offered the nation a reassuring 
picture of McGovern’s politics. Even the thousands of anti-war protesters outside the 
convention were responsible. Only two arrests took place the entire week. One woman 
demonstrator left her three-old daughter at the Miami Headstart Program care center with 
the words “Please don’t feed me-I only eat organic food”  in red pen on the child’s 
back.
107
 These demonstrators were clearly different from the ones who besieged 
Chicago’s streets in 1968. While technically a success, the convention still exacerbated 
the “three A’s” problem and began McGovern’s downward slide in the polls. 
McGovern’s struggles with the liberal and conservative forces in the Democratic Party 
dramatically colored observers interpretation of the convention. 
Most notably, hundreds of young protestors occupied the Doral hotel lobby and 
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demanded that McGovern come down from his room and clarify his position on the war 
after he tempered his anti-war rhetoric.
108
  McGovern’s advisors debated his alternatives, 
as they feared both the “undignified” image of McGovern “rapping” with hippies as well 
as a violent resolution to the protest.
109
 
Gordon Weil, McGovern’s political advisor, and Eleanor McGovern urged the 
Senator to speak with the protestors and stress his “points of differences with them” to 
avoid appearing “too much of a radical.”110   First, Mankiewicz met with the protestors 
and tried to end the confrontation. When the protestors jeered, demanding to speak with 
McGovern, he eventually came down. Weil saw the protest as an opportunity to show 
McGovern “handling a group of demonstrators with firmness and coolness.”  On the 
contrary, the meeting confirmed Mankiewicz’ fears about McGovern’s “pied piper” 
image problem.
111
   In reference to the “showdown at the Hotel Doral,” a Richmond 
journalist claimed that McGovern “may be trapped by the fanaticism of his own 
supporters,” describing “McGovern’s children’s crusade” as an “energetic, over-educated 
minority.”112  This interpretation melded McGovern’s youth image with the lingering 
bitterness towards privileged campus protesters.  The “over educated” claim also touched 
on the criticism concerning New Politics’ influence on delegates, as thirty nine percent 
held postgraduate degrees while only four percent of Americans had done graduate work.  
Aggravating the working class voters’ resentment of New Politics, one reporter quipped, 
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“The old ingredients of money, and education and class still dominate the process.”113 
 After this face off, McGovern returned to his room and his staff set to finding a 
vice-presidential candidate.  That they had not already established a running mate speaks 
to both the uncertainty surrounding McGovern’s nomination and also the lack of traction 
McGovern gained within the party.  The list of possibles, ranging from Southerners such 
as Congressman Wilbur Mills to the Northern liberal Ted Kennedy, all brought 
something different to the ticket.  After Kennedy declined the offer, McGovern’s people 
could not decide on a name.  After the lobby incident tested McGovern’s position on the 
war and his hold on the youth constituency, McGovern went with Thomas Eagleton, a 
freshman Senator who campaigned on an anti-war platform in 1968. Eagleton fashioned 
his own New Politics in Missouri during his 1968 campaign against party favorites, 
managing to build a constituency of students, labor, rural whites and urban blacks. While 
he opposed the war, favored environmental regulation and a lower voting age, Eagleton 
still chastised “Misguided young radicals who measure their political victories in the 
number of heads split open in violent confrontation with police.”114  Eagleton revealed 
his social conservatism when journalist Robert Novak quoted his claim, anonymously, 
that “The people don't know McGovern is for amnesty, abortion and legalization of 
pot.”115Eagleton still offered little for Southern Democrats and labor to bridge the gap 
with McGovern. While McGovern’s aides argued for a “candidate from the camp of party 
regulars,” one journalist observed that “McGovern was boxed in. He had a scare…” after 
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“a noisy demonstration by young anti-war militants at his hotel.”116  McGovern could not 
fulfill his mantra, “lead them….don’t capitulate to them” as his attempt to heal the party 
showed cracks before McGovern even accepted the nomination.  Weeks after the 
convention, Eagleton admitted to suffering from a mental illness that required electric 
shock therapy.  Hesitantly, McGovern dropped Eagleton from the ticket and replaced him 
with the Kennedy’s brother in law, Sargent Shriver. 
While, by convention standards before 1972, the DNC ran according to plan, the 
vast expansion of media and coverage after the 1968 convention spectacle brought the 
proceedings under a microspore.  The process seemed untidy, as McGovern’s campaign 
leaders intentionally lost a challenge to avoid a parliamentary move that could have 
awarded hundreds of California delegates to Humphrey. This wrangling pushed the 
acceptance speech to past midnight, hardly capitalizing on the national exposure.  
Essentially, New Politics messy details laid bare for all to see, and it looked rather old.  
Shouting matches and arcane backroom strategy dominated, and the outcome lacked the 
polish one came to expect in the increasingly image conscious political environment.  
McGovern finished his speech, quoting the campaign’s theme song (lifted from Robert 
Kennedy’s campaign), Woody Guthrie’s “This Land is Your Land.” As the nominee 
recited, “This land was made for you and me,” one experienced party leader, Joseph 
Califano, recalled that Jerry Rubin (who actually won a delegate) and his youthful 
cohorts, “many in hippie garb,” clapped and swayed as they smoked marijuana.117  
Through the wafting smoke that surrounded McGovern on the podium at three in the 
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morning, if Americans saw the Senator at all, they found the Democratic nominee hard to 
recognize. Even though the final platform distanced itself from the controversial planks 
that supported legalized abortion and legal protections for homosexuals, McGovern’s 
inexperienced delegates, such as a young Alaskan woman who claimed she was elected 
by “youths and Eskimos,” perpetuated his “three A’s” reputation.118 
The convention demonstrated that the McGovern’s New Politics of inclusion 
threatened the other end of New Politics that emphasized image. Greeting McGovern in 
Miami, an ABM (Anybody But McGovern) campaign briefly emerged around a potential 
Humphrey/Wallace ticket, setting aside regional politics to consolidate Democratic 
moderates and conservatives.  While they lacked parliamentary legitimacy, this 
opposition points out a fundamental issue that prevented Democratic unity. “The problem 
George,” George Wallace admitted to McGovern, “is that our people, even if I was to 
endorse you, I couldn’t get them to support you.”119 Predictably, the party bosses who 
McGovern sought to push out lacked the political influence and will to help his 
campaign.  While McGovern’s success motivated the AFL-CIO leader George Meany’s 
disdain for the Senator, he voiced their differences in cultural terms.  Describing the DNC 
to a convention of the United Steelworkers, Meany claimed that in Miami “we heard 
from the people who look like Jacks, acted like Jills, and had the odors of Johns about 
them.”120  McGovern’s labor record scored highly with unions, but his image needed 
revision.  While Mankiewicz employed gimmicky tactics such as calling McGovern’s 
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campaign “‘Project GM’” when referring to McGovern’s campaign with “UAW types,” 
the reconciliation attempted to downplay McGovern’s youthful, radical reputation.121 
McGovern’s campaign for the young labor vote received outside help as well 
when a young labor organizer, Kemble Penn, headed the AFL-CIO organization named 
“Frontlash’72” to recruit the blue collar youth vote.  Hoping to counter “the elitists who 
come from mostly prestigious universities,” Penn claimed that Frontlash’72 worked in 
fifty communities based on the “the New Youth Politics” which he defined as, “Not the 
intellectual gambit of the financially secure…but of the insecure.” Looking away from 
campuses, the labor’s youth organizers “hit the beaches, the bowling alleys and the lunch 
wagons where the ‘millions of non-elitist working-class-youth’ are.”122   While Frontlash 
also sent off its volunteers to comb bars, unemployment centers and office parks for the 
elusive “working youth,” its director in San Francisco explained, “Many non-students 
just feel lost and useless.” Less non-college youth registered than students, though this 
could also be attributed to the difficulty in finding them.
123
 
Following Mankiewicz’ dictate to refocus on labor, Governor Patrick Lucey from 
Wisconsin spoke to the Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine 
Organization on McGovern’s behalf (not exactly the AFL-CIO).  Lucey took the “three 
A” issue head on, arguing that “the Media has emphasized, especially during the recent 
Democratic Convention in Miami, the visibility of youth and other groups as forces in 
this revolution.”  Lucey challenged this popular perception, arguing, “The new politics 
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could not have achieved its success without the full support of the working men and 
women of America.”124   Still, despite this effort, Meany engineered the AFL-CIO’s 
neutrality vote that denied the Democrats a huge swath of its traditional voting base. 
Even if McGovern earned Meany’s endorsement, blue collar workers may not have 
supported him as only one third of the representatives at the union’s vote wore McGovern 
pins.
125
  While Meany detested McGovern’s anti-war stance, McGovern’s young 
supporters clearly alienated the “party bosses” as well as their constituency.  New Politics 
had its limits, as party bosses and organizations still held sway over many voters.  In 
addition, the generation gap became more divisive within McGovern’s campaign when 
Mankiewicz added more seasoned veterans to leadership ranks. These members of the 
old guard became especially assertive after McGovern became the Democratic nominee 
at the convention.  
In an internal memo to Galbraith, John B. Martin joked, “Single- handed I have 
raised the average age of the staff to 10 1/2.”  Martin sarcastically continued, “Most of 
the betting is being done by 9-year-old experts on National Defense, small barefoot black 
girls in blue jeans, and boys in long hair and beads.”126 In addition, McGovern’s original 
staffers resented the political veterans and often resisted their directives.  Mankiewicz 
learned about this obstacle when he sent party regular Mickey Wapner to help organize 
the McGovern headquarters in California. Wapner, a Kennedy loyalist and the wife of 
future celebrity Judge Joe Wapner, immediately reported younger leaders’ resistance to 
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her as an “outsider,” forcing Mankiewicz to admit that “the complaints we hear 
constantly about ‘exclusivity’ and hostility to outsiders are probably all true.”127  This 
generational rift spread throughout the organization and increased McGovern’s struggle 
to overcome his image as the candidate of “Acid, Amnesty and Abortion." 
McGovern’s youth-oriented image inspired many Americans to condemn his 
entire platform as “radical.” For example, affluent conservatives feared the Senator’s plan 
to increase taxes on nation’s highest incomes, as Eli Sagan wrote to Mankiewicz that 
wealthy people “are convinced that George McGovern is going to send some blue jeaned, 
long-haired young men to confiscate that Mercedes-Benz right out of the garage.”128  
While the thought of hippie repo-men working for the government heightened affluent 
Americans’ anxiety over McGovern’s tax proposals, McGovern’s connection with liberal 
students and the counterculture allowed economic conservatives to find radicalism in 
each of his proposals.   
In addition, the steps taken to moderate McGovern’s image after the convention 
alienated his youthful voting base. After Eagleton’s revelation, McGovern’s campaign 
conducted an informal poll that showed the Senator’s office strongly in favor of keeping 
the Missouri Senator on the ticket.  In contrast, Mankiewicz’ office opposed Eagleton, 
twenty seven votes to twelve.  This tally correlated more closely to the phone calls that 
flooded McGovern’s headquarters and urged him to “drop Eagleton.”129  Ironically, 
Mankiewicz contributed to the disaster when he hastily vetted Eagleton after McGovern 
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decided on him as the vice-presidential candidate at the eleventh hour. Though historians 
and actors in this decision dispute the conversation, one could attribute the shoddy 
investigation into Eagleton to two possible causes. First, Mankiewicz failed out of 
negligence, ironically overlooking the political albatross a vice presidential candidate 
with “skeletons” would make in the age of image politics.  In addition, Mankiewicz 
thought Eagleton could improve McGovern’s relationship with labor as he had included 
unions in his wide constituency to win in 1968.  Plus, Mankiewicz wanted to seal the deal 
as the deadline to announce the ticket approached only minutes away. 
  Despite the favor he originally held with Mankiewicz as a balance to 
McGovern’s radical image, Mankiewicz understood the grave reality the Eagleton 
problem presented to McGovern’s campaign, as he wrote in a confidential memo, “many, 
many people are deeply afraid of craziness.”130  Despite this effort to undo the political 
catastrophe, the Eagleton affair contributed to McGovern’s plummeting reputation and 
also pushed out many young idealists who believed McGovern had become just another 
politician. One message from a campaign worker in California bluntly stated, “she has 
hard evidence that McG has lost youth vote in Cal. over Eagleton affair. They believe 
that McG has no integrity and they will sit out election.”131 
Landslide 
On November 7, 1972, the election results showed George McGovern his 
campaign’s limitations when he managed to win just one state and the District of 
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Columbia.  In this landslide defeat, McGovern won 46 percent of the “blue collar” vote.  
This statistic’s significance becomes more apparent when considering that Democratic 
candidates garnered at least fifty-six percent of this constituency (and as much as 
seventy-three in 1964) since the 1930s.  Unfortunately for McGovern, he did not 
understand the central role that social issues played in this election and the way his young 
supporters thrust enhanced his radical image. 
After the DNC, Nixon’s campaign targeted McGovern’s with the term, “radical 
elite,” which suited Nixon’s co-optation of the “three A’s” attack perfectly.  Pat 
Buchanan revealed how hard it would be for McGovern to reverse course.  While the 
President’s speechwriter acknowledged that McGovern no longer advocated the 
legalization of marijuana, he stressed that in February, 1972, “he favored treating pot like 
alcohol.”  Buchanan fumed that “McGovern’s catering to young people… is the essence 
of political irresponsibility,” warning that his proposal “to remove all criminal penalties 
amount to a prescription for legalizing marijuana for the rich…and giving young 
Americans easy access into the drug culture.”132 This accusation blamed the elite eastern 
establishment for spreading the 1960s’ cultural excesses to young people in the 1970s.133    
While Humphrey fumbled around with his attack on McGovern’s positions, Nixon’s 
campaign bluntly labeled McGovern’s as radical and dictated his Democratic 
competitor’s image. For Catholics, southern whites and blue collar defectors to Nixon’s 
“new majority,” the young voters catalyzed their motivation to break away from their 
traditional party loyalties.  The late George Meany of the AFL-CIO is reputed to have 
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said of the Democratic Party "The party of blood, sweat and tears has become the party of 
dope, sex and queers." Referring to the “‘dope, sex and queers’ thing,” Nixon’s major 
source on McGovern, Ken Khachigian, pointed out to Buchanan that “the time is 
right…to see whether or not we can begin making inroads into these party regulars.”134 
Thus the youth image, and the permissive tag it brought, increased the White 
House’s emphasis on other innovations of the new political environment such as John 
Connally’s Democrats for Nixon. Because of his opposition to McGovern’s “dovish” 
foreign policy, Connally, the former Secretary of the Treasury under LBJ, broke ranks 
with his party in 1972 to head the Democrats for Nixon division of CRP.  While 
McGovern’s radical image divided his party, Connally attributed his organization’s 
growing ranks to Democrats’ repudiation of McGovern’s proposed cuts in defense 
spending. Claiming Democrats "are afraid of George McGovern,” Connally insisted that 
"it is in the best interests of this country that the president be re-elected this year."
135
  
Even as McGovern built his New Politics on changing the process and building a youth 
following by going over the heads of the traditional party organization, his image 
mattered tremendously to young Americans’ increasingly independent politics.   
Nixon’s campaign managers balanced this attack by building a well-heeled, 
Young Voters for the President organization. Nixon contrasted his version of America’s 
youth with the irreverent, radical liberals that he targeted during his campaign for re-
election. The President thanked the YVP at his own convention for, “letting us see Young 
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America at its best at our convention.”136  This showing stirred McGovern’s supporters to 
call into question the YVP members’ legitimacy and authenticity, as Nixon’s record did 
not hold up to the liberal youth’s sniff test.  McGovern’s youth director, Ed O’Donnell, 
called Nixon “unworthy of the youth support he fantasized about” during the RNC. 137 
Pointing out his policy stance, O’Donnell argued that Nixon failed to include young 
people on commissions investigating important youth issues such as the all-voluntary 
army and campus unrest.  In September, McGovern claimed that “Any young person or 
worker who supports President Nixon is too confused to know which end is up.”  This 
approach backfired, as polls showed this comment hurt McGovern badly, and Buchanan 
directed the YVP speakers director to “keep it in the youth public domain…and move it 
out to campus newspapers.”138  This dismissal of the moderate, independent young voter 
who even considered Nixon hit a nerve that hurt McGovern’s image. Nixon’s youth cadre 
followed orders, as one article written for Calvin College’s Chimes, titled “Why I’m 
Voting for Nixon,” displayed the McGovern “which end is up” quotation as the 
epigraph.
139
 
Mankiewicz tried in vain to balance the New Politics’ constituency with a 
moderate appeal to the traditional, Democratic voting base.  Mankiewicz’ papers reveal a 
wide and varied constituency of interest groups that included middle class, liberal 
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reformers of the New Democratic Coalition, migrant workers in Caesar Chavez’ Farm 
Workers Union, and, of course, students.  Nixon’s overwhelming victory showed future 
Democratic candidates the difficulty of building a new Democratic coalition that 
embraced diverse ethnic groups, racial and gender equality, organized labor, and the 
liberal youth while fending off the Republican Party’s increasingly successful appeal to 
social conservatives.  
Because of young voters’ divisive role in this campaign, Mankiewicz could not 
convince Americans to overlook McGovern’s original proposals for welfare reform, 
marijuana leniency, huge military budget reductions and busing that offered controversial 
solutions to Americans’ problems.  After securing the nomination, McGovern’s campaign 
significantly changed to court the party regulars.  By the time the party gathered in Miami 
for the Democratic Convention in July, the platform differed only slightly from the 1968 
convention’s.  In the end, however, McGovern’s attempt at reconciliation could not 
overcome his radical stigma; in addition, his personnel changes to bring back 
conservative Democrats alienated his original supporters that aided his nomination.  
Consequently, McGovern even fared poorly with his young constituency as only forty-
eight percent of the youth voted, fifty three percent of which voted for McGovern.  
McGovern’s youth did not show up for many reasons.  First, the Eagleton episode 
and other policy shifts to the center led many young voters, such as one Columbia student 
to wonder “if someone who acts irrationally and impulsively like McGovern isn’t just 
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another politician.”140 One of McGovern’s student supporters at Boston University 
confessed, “McGovern seemed to have an aura of honesty…I just can’t get fired up about 
him now.”141  Reflecting this splintering, weeks before the election, Youth for New 
Politics formed in October to protest McGovern’s “sell-out,” and objecting to the idea 
that “you can fool some of the people some of the time, and all of the young people all of 
the time.”  Recalling that “we trooped through the snow in New Hampshire” for the 
Prairie Populist, these disgruntled young liberals argued that “McGovern had dumped 
those who helped him get nominated” when he met with the butcher of 1968, Mayor 
Daley.  “Dick Daley!” cried the Youth for New Politics chair, “He’s the guy who kicked 
the anti-war movement in submission. He’s the guy whose expulsion from the 
Democratic Convention was the breath of fresh air we were all looking for.”142  As one 
journalist observed, McGovern found his image had become “blurred”: “He’s caught 
between the old politics he scorned and now reaches for, and the new politics he 
championed and now leaves.”143 
Second, McGovern’s campaign focused only on campuses where politicians and 
pundits exaggerated both students’ liberalism and their political enthusiasm.  In fact, the 
anti-war movement on which McGovern relied took pride in its independence, as one 
underground newspaper journalist pointed out, “Not every longhaired troublemaker has 
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returned to the system through McGovern.”144  New Democrats such as George 
McGovern failed to appreciate that young voters had an alternative for the 1972 election.  
The challenge could not survive, as Nixon’s popular position on the environment, the 
war, China and his campaign’s coordinated effort developed a solid youth constituency 
that seemed believable to Middle America.   
  Finally, politics in 1972 involved more than voting.  Young liberals could not 
provide a reliable constituency, as their anti-war and countercultural cohort lacked a clear 
stake in the election.  A political discussion scrawled in a bathroom stall at the University 
of Tennessee tells the story well.  Many of the comments written on the door played out 
the popular debate over Vietnam and the candidates, one person claimed “McGovern is 
stupid…stupid enough to be honest” while another argued Nixon’s Vietnam policy 
“worked better than Kennedy’s or Johnson’s.” Framing the debate, three comments stand 
on their own, “Smoke, Dope,” “Marijuana Kills,” and “Dick is good… (signed) Pat 
Nixon.”145   Alienated students dragged the election into the toilet, as McGovern’s 
divided, decentralized and inefficient organization could not harness their political 
culture. This irreverence and profanity marked the counterculture’s cynical influence on 
the political dialogue.  The two, politics and the counterculture, often appeared 
antithetical, explaining young liberals’ apathy. Fred Faust, the twenty-four year old editor 
of an underground newspaper (The Outlaw) in St. Louis, explained that his readers 
"would rather light up a joint and forget it all."
146
  McGovern’s anti-war campaign did not 
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offer young voters a forward thinking campaign.  As Bill Brock explained, “you can’t 
just run against something and win, you need to offer something positive.”147 
In the post-mortem, McGovern’s young voters still split his campaign leaders’ 
interpretation of the election.  Frederick Dutton, a key influence on McGovern’s youthful 
approach, pushed Democrats to try harder for the youth vote because “in ’76 the younger 
vote will be four times larger than the likely black vote” and “over twice as large as the 
so-called ‘ethnic vote.’”148 Less sanguine, Mankiewicz admitted, “If I had to do it all over 
again, I’d learn when to tell them to go to hell.”149  As the Democrats looked out across 
the shifting political and cultural terrain, their search for a new coalition in 1972 offered 
many lessons.  The Democratic Party’s leaders now faced the daunting task of 
moderating its image and redoubling its organizational efforts while building a big tent.  
To this end, McGovern underestimated the damaging role young liberals would play in 
his defeat. For college students, they punished McGovern for his attempt to shed this 
youthful image, exposing an “illusion of sincerity, righteousness and honesty.”150 
 New Politics in 1972 did have some success.  A University of Nebraska student 
won the seat as the chairman of the state legislature’s executive board, a twenty-six year 
old veteran replaced Hawaii’s oldest state representative and an “anti-war farmer” took 
over as the Athens, Ohio county commissioner. In addition, congressmen such as the 
Reverend Andrew Young, the first black to win that post in Georgia since reconstruction, 
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claimed that he owed his victory to “the younger, more moderate voters in Atlanta.”151 
Young voters’ politics could not achieve consensus, but they did enter the system and 
influenced the shifting political terrain that challenged traditional party politics.  Despite 
the Democrats’ organizational woes and New Politics’ limitations in 1972, this broadened 
coalition showed that the party needed to redefine itself to last in modern American 
politics.   
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Chapter Six 
YVP 
 
Reporting on a Washington D.C. demonstration against Richard Nixon’s Vietnam 
policy in the spring of 1972, the President’s twenty-three-year old Young Celebrities 
Committee director, Robert Podesta, dismissed the idea that this represented “an outraged 
gathering of the sons and daughters of the middle class to protest the war.”  Rather, the 
protest only included “a smattering of fringe type radicals,” consisting of “an equal 
number of McGovern people and communists (they’re not the same).”  When Podesta 
asked one high school student at the demonstration about the event after tear gas 
dispersed the unruly crowd, he replied, “speakers and gas, same old bullshit.” Podesta 
concluded optimistically, “this was not the youth of the country.”1 
Scholarship on youth politics during the 1960s and 1970s highlight raucous 
students and the ones who “dropped out.”  Nixon’s youth campaign organizers thought 
differently, as they emphasized that ninety percent of the new voters lived with families--
sixty-one percent with their parents.  In addition, only twenty six percent of the new 
voters attended college.
2
  This chapter examines the moderate and conservative youth 
who came into the political system for Richard Nixon, how political elites reacted to this 
new bloc, and the new political trends that sprang from increasingly independent young 
Americans’ own political organization. Balancing a moderate and “square” political 
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sensibility to develop organizational loyalty, the 400,000 Young Voters for the President 
who supported Richard Nixon played an instrumental role in the GOP’s ability to win 
over his ‘silent majority’ in the Sunbelt, the suburbs and ethnic urban enclaves after the 
1960s. 
In the early stages of Nixon’s re-election campaign, his advisors appreciated that 
new voters themselves comprised seventeen percent of the electorate and agreed that the 
youth generation stood as a “vocal opponent that needed to be neutralized.”  In March, 
1972, while thirty percent of Americans declared themselves as Republicans, only 
twenty-two percent of young voters between eighteen and twenty-four-years old pledged 
political allegiance to the GOP.
3
  Thus, George McGovern’s “pied piper” image as the 
college student candidate challenged Nixon in a vulnerable area. Concerning young 
voters, Nixon supported the YVP, not because he wanted youth votes, but rather “to 
avoid the effect on older voters of our conceding the youth vote to McGovern.”4 Nixon’s 
constituency, the silent majority, demanded that he at least appear to be making an effort.  
According to Nixon’s early point man on the youth problem, Secretary of HEW Robert 
Finch, “most people do not object to youth participation in ‘legitimate’ activities,” and 
“want to feel they are ‘coming into the establishment.’”5  Nixon’s Committee to Re-Elect 
the President (CRP) tread lightly here as they feared a visible reach out to young voters, 
especially students, would invite conservatives’ ridicule fort pandering to the “shouters.” 
Thus, the YVP leadership made sure they went after the “sons and daughters of the silent 
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majority.” 
Nixon’s campaign exerted tight control over the Young Voters for the President 
organization to ensure a top down, carefully managed operation. As YVP Director Ken 
Rietz claimed, “Originally, the folks in the White House felt that they had to do 
something, without confidence that they could do much.” 6  This lack of confidence in a 
youth constituency tested the CRP organizers’ new election techniques to look beyond 
campus politics and find young Nixon supporters.  
In a meeting two weeks before the twenty-sixth amendment lowered the voting 
age, only one week after Rietz started as the YVP director, Robert Finch told Rietz to 
keep the youth campaign focused.  Calculating that half of the young voters did not 
identify with either party, and that they should avoid mock conventions that usually 
attract a Democratic leaning crowd, Finch outlined the obvious groups to register such as 
the Teenage Republicans, College Republicans and Young Republicans.  In addition, 
Finch suggested that the RNC gather Voter Identity Profiles from the 1970 census to 
inform the YVP’s canvassers.7  While McGovern’s campaign developed a stigma that he 
sucked up to any and all young voters, Nixon’s shaky relationship with the Now 
Generation forced his campaign managers to appeal to only those young voters that 
accepted, and thus reinforced his “square chic” celebrity.  
Nixon’s in-house public relations team of Madison Avenue’s finest admen, the 
November Group, feared Nixon’s problem with the young voters.  One BBDO executive 
volunteering for the Nixon campaign, Bill Novelli, outlined a youth strategy explicitly 
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suggesting that YVP organizers first “maximize the President’s vote among the segment 
of new voters who have not attended college and who are employed,” avoiding “general 
encouragement to vote among 18-24 year olds, especially among college students.”8  This 
solution to Nixon’s youth problem created a new challenge.  Reaching the non-college 
youth required a targeted and grassroots effort that utilized the most modern elements of 
Nixon’s futuristic campaign.  Rietz incorporated CRP’s various methods to complement 
the strategy he employed in Senator Brock’s victory, making the YVP a perfect case to 
study how segmentation took over American elections.  Theodore White, author of The 
Making of the President (1972), marveled at the CRP organizers’ innovation in polling, 
communication, advertising and voting bloc categorization into ethnicity, race and even 
occupation when he called Nixon’s campaign a “science-fiction preview of future 
politics.”9 
 Nixon’s YVP leaders identified and mobilized different youth to expand his 
Sunbelt and urban constituency that had traditionally sided with Democrats. Thus, 
Nixon’s young voters played a key role in his ability to end the American liberal 
consensus. While Watergate understandably stigmatized CRP’s legacy, Nixon’s re-
election effort pioneered many important innovations in presidential politics. Beyond 
organization, the YVP leaders relied on a growing youth movement that supported the 
President.  This potential source of Nixon supporters included the rising independent 
segment of young voters. 
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Nixon’s youth strategy tapped into the 1968-generation’s increasingly 
independent voters and discovered a ‘silent majority’ for the future.  As one University of 
Virginia student wrote in “Truth: An American Political Anachronism,” the “devious” 
voted for Nixon and the “overbearing” voted for McGovern, “leaving the sensitive and 
the rational in the undecided, disenchanted category.”10 These voters looked for an 
alternative to the party politics controlled by Democrats and New Republicans believed 
they could provide that choice. Pursuing the independent youth who made up almost half 
of this voting bloc, YVP leaders pushed the New Republican brand to soothe the 
transition into a new conservative era. This moderate, square and youthful movement 
attracted young voters who opposed one party rule.  As the YVP Chairman and native of 
Chattanooga, Senator Bill Brock (R-TN) explained that if it were not for the Democratic 
Party’s stranglehold on his home city’s politics young people may not have joined the 
GOP, claiming: “If my hometown was Republican, it would have been harder.”11  Just as 
the Democratic Party fractured and lost traditional constituencies in the South and urban 
ethnic enclaves, the YVP offered independent young Americans an option. 
Research on the 1960s’ “non-shouters,” such as John Andrew’s The Other Side of 
the Sixties, documents the rise of the devout conservative group, Young Americans for 
Freedom (YAF) to debunk the 1960s’ mythology that emphasizes “the causes on the New 
Left to the exclusion of almost anything else.” 12  That narrative, however, ends with the 
1960s and focuses on young ideologues; the YVP complicated youth politics after 1968, 
                                                          
10
 Drew Gardner, “Truth: An American Political Anachronism,” The Cavalier Daily, University of 
Virginia, Friday, October 20, 1972. 
11
Brock interview. 
12
 John Andrews, The Other Side of the Sixties (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press,1997). 
 
241 
 
 
 
and expanded the lens to include the increasingly important role young independents 
played during this period. Charles Colson wrote H.R. Haldeman, “While there are scores 
of theories on the subject, there is unanimity on only one thing: that each age bracket is 
very different.”13 Furthermore, this generation presented a fluid range of concerns and 
attitudes as Colson admitted, “it is very difficult to draw conclusions on last year’s 
experience and even riskier to project what may lie ahead a year hence.”14  With a 
targeted approach, Nixon’s advisers hoped, the youth vote could even become 
Republican! 
Nixon’s campaign staff cautiously, but with great resources, built the Young 
Voters for the President.  Segmenting young voters while shielding Nixon from any 
direct campaigning fit perfectly with the CRP leadership’s strategy to highlight Nixon’s 
expanding constituency, the ‘silent majority.’ This effort planted seeds in the fresh and 
fertile soil of conservative youth politics. Looking at this top down organization, the 
YVP’s success in building its own ‘silent majority’ reveals the Nixon administration’s 
role in shaping a new GOP that challenged the Democrats dominance in national politics. 
Examining the YVP forces us to heed Podesta’s warning not to pay too much attention to 
this generation’s “speakers and gas.” YVP leadership earned the organization’s autonomy 
during the campaign as it became a vehicle for this unheralded youth movement to enter 
the system and form a network essential to for the party’s future success. This 
organization also gave GOP elites confidence that Republicans could forge new party 
loyalties and thus became the template for both future youth campaigns and other efforts 
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to target independents. 
The YVP: Structure and Strategy 
After taking his seat in the Senate, Brock went to Nixon to dispute claims that the 
Democrats could count on the youth vote. Brock recalled: “We had just won, we knew 
better.” Arguing for an autonomous and well-funded effort, Brock claimed, “It is 
ridiculous to concede the youth vote.” He convinced Nixon that most young voters “have 
a whole different set of values,” as Brock promised, “they are the majority.”15  The 
President saw merit in the idea, as some polls showed him trailing the youth friendly 
Democratic frontrunner, Senator Ed Muskie, by only eight percent.
16
  Nixon invited 
Brock and Rietz down to Key Biscayne for a private meeting with the “the Don,” Nixon, 
and his “strong man” campaign manager, former Attorney General John Mitchell. Brock 
and Rietz made an offer they could not refuse. If Mitchell could cut them a few million, 
they promised to deliver the youth vote, emphasizing how the archetypal stereotypes that 
defined all young people as both liberal and students thrived only due to the bias of 
media, Nixon’s enemy.   
As the Chairman of the Young Voters for the President Congressional Advisory 
Committee, Bill Brock presided over the group’s first meeting in June, 1971 and opened 
the proceedings by screening a film on America’s youth for the assembled Republican 
Party representatives.  That they would need a primer seems odd, since these were the 
party’s “youth specialists,” but Brock emphasized something besides the worn-out “wild 
                                                          
15
 Brock interview, 12/12/12 
16Jeffrey Bell, “The Ordeal of the President or Will Richard Nixon Find True Happiness in 1972,” New 
Guard, May 1971, p.5. 
243 
 
 
 
in the streets” motif.17  Conservative journalist James J. Kilpatrick criticized this 
archetypal image of young people as “long-haired, beaded and bearded, anti-pollution, 
pro-pot, he despises Nixon and loves McGovern…”  Popular films and television 
exaggerated the influence and popularity held by radical youth, Kilpatrick argued, 
mocking the stereotype that every youth “wants only to get out of college so he can live 
on food stamps, free love and father’s allowance.”18 In contrast, Brock highlighted the 
majority of young Americans who did not attend American colleges and universities.
19
 
As the YVP set its targets for new voters, this group offered the most likely prospects. 
These young people, the “sons and daughters of the silent majority,” pushed 
Brock and the Advisory Board to treat Nixon’s young supporters as a voting bloc, more 
than a symbolic window dressing. To oversee Nixon’s youth campaign, the Advisory 
Board selected Kenneth Rietz, campaign advisor for Brock’s 1970 Senate victory which 
included a majority of Tennessee’s youth vote.  Rietz agreed to leave his position as 
senior partner in the advertising firm that he ran with Harry Treleavan, and assumed 
control on July 1.  Immediately, Rietz set out to create a YVP office in each state, 
burdened with Brock’s prediction that he could recruit 500,000 first-time voters to 
volunteer for the Nixon campaign.    
Ken Rietz perfectly fit the role of Nixon’s youth vote coordinator.  His 
background in public relations, advertising and conservative politics propelled him onto 
the Washington D.C. Republican Party radar. Only thirty years-old (and he looked 
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younger), when he took the position,  Rietz’ experience as a public relations expert 
colored his overall view of the youth’s significance, as he revealed the project’s ultimate 
goal in getting youth actively involved “so the overall campaign takes on a young 
flavor.”20   In planning the organizational outline in September, 1971, Rietz stuck to the 
argument that young people would not simply change tune and buy Nixon. Thus, the task 
was not to just simply sell him. Rietz’ path to “peer group pressure” required a robust 
organization, as he rejected any strategy that simply used “an expenditure of millions of 
dollars on mass media.” Rietz argued: “That would have been a waste.” 21 This meant 
that young people, not superficial image makers, would make the campaign effective.   
One month after becoming the director of the Youth Division of the Committee to 
Re-Elect the President (CRP), Rietz spurned the November Group’s wait-and-see 
approach. By the fall of 1971, Rietz had wrestled the role of youth guru from the 
administration’s point man, Jamie McLane.  After Rietz convened meetings and 
produced memos over the summer that impressed all, White House aide Gordon Strachan 
found that McLane’s unimpressive monthly report for September largely plagiarized 
Rietz’ recommendations which “are specific with careful attention giving to timing, 
expenses and keys states.”22Rietz’ approach earned wide praise from the Campaign 
Strategy Group, eight of Nixon’s most trusted advisors who met throughout the fall of 
1971 to map out the re-election campaign.  While welcoming Rietz’ recommendation for 
“maximum involvement of youth as a means of gaining a fair share of their support,” 
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something he would label “group pressure,” the Strategy Group warned that the 
campaign must avoid “the image of making an all-out effort toward youth and meeting 
failure,” clarifying the youth campaign’s goals as “high visibility of youth in the 
campaign organization, but low publicity on our efforts toward their votes.”23 Fearing the 
polls would remind people that Nixon had a youth problem, Rietz’ superiors suggested 
the cautious approach. 
Fundamental to this effort, the YVP structure carefully maintained a hierarchy 
that assured the CRP’s centralized control.  As for the YVP national headquarters, the 
original twelve “professional political workers” occupied a quintessentially Nixonian 
operation run out of a posh office one block from the White House.  First, the YVP 
office’s location on the third floor of the city’s “lush” First National Bank building, 
protected by a security man at the elevator and receptionist who allowed entrance with a 
buzz lock system.
24
 Second, as one reporter described the YVP workers with varying hair 
length, “nobody needs a bath.” Third, it housed the most advanced technology that 
produced computerized analysis of locations that attracted the elusive non-college 
youth.
25
  The YVP’s tripped out logo, crisscrossing the words “young” and “voters” to 
overlap on the letter “o,” came on all the stationery that the state action plan mandated.26  
Each state’s Young Voters Chairman and executive director answered directly to that 
state’s Nixon chairman and met with Fieldmen, a select group of paid Nixon operatives 
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who trained YVP volunteers in Fieldman Schools, to maintain a direct connection to the 
central office in Washington D.C.  Informing the YVP director in monthly meetings, a 
steering committee consisted of preexisting youth organizations such as the College 
Republicans and Teenage Republicans joined by YVP directors and YVP regional 
chairmen.  Revealing the emphasis on a streamlined, efficient campaign, the plan 
reminded young voters that “this should be a working committee, not a forum: and that 
“A big committee gets nothing done.”27 In addition, the state chairman appointed leaders 
for each of the eight divisions including the Nixonettes, publicity and registration.  Like 
any successful national franchise, each county or city with a YVP office emulated this 
same structure with McDonald’s like precision.  
The relationship between the local election headquarters, the state youth director 
and the national office showed the campaign’s organizational strength.  Rietz accredited 
this set up, which he called “Cooperatively autonomous,” for smooth operations with the 
White House and the November Group.
28
 At the top of CRP’s organization stood the 
strong man and Nixon’s former Attorney General, John Mitchell.  Mitchell, however, 
rarely contributed to the day-to-day operations and he resigned his post before the 
convention.  This meant that CRP’s Deputy Director, Jeb Magruder, assumed control of 
Nixon’s in house re-election effort.  Reporting to Magruder, Fred Malek headed the 
campaign’s citizens group that oversaw the targeted campaigns to voter groups such as 
Lithuanians, women and youth. In addition, the White House maintained its control with 
its own children as Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Gerald Ford each had a kid involved in 
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leadership roles within the YVP. 
 For example, a memo from Rietz to the Texas YVP coordinator, Bill Lamont, 
indicated the tight leash.  “You will put together a list of 25 celebrities…You will appoint 
a YVP steering committee from all 10 of the counties…You will appoint  a Nixonette-
Nixonaire chairman…by May 1.”29  Determined and focused, the directors built the YVP 
membership to meet the directives from DC.  In return, the YVP’s local offices received 
tons of swag; one state office received 5,000 “Give a Damn” flyers, 50,000 “Re-elect the 
President-Vietnam” flyers, and thousands of other bumper stickers and flyers on youth 
issues such as the draft and drugs. Young people flush with YVP regalia made good 
press, and the national youth coordinator Angela Harris orchestrated the television 
coverage for “literature distribution day.”30   Still, the YVP gave its volunteers a chance 
to participate. While the Nixon campaign’s national office held a tight grip on how they 
appeared on air, YVP volunteers often had autonomy on the ground.  
Out of over twenty divisions of CRP, the YVP also received far and away more 
funding from Nixon’s coffers and the Republican Party than the other efforts including 
“Democrats for Nixon” and the various ethnic divisions (Lithuanians for Nixon!).31Rietz 
boasted, “This is no back-of-the-bus thing.”32  Young ambitious Americans followed this 
opportunity, as the YVP gave them a way into politics. This approach encouraged local 
YVP, storefront offices that built Nixon’s youthful image by removing his presence from 
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the campaign, as Rietz continued that the YVP should have “separate headquarters where 
appropriate.”33 Even the name, Young Voters for the President, avoided a direct reference 
to Nixon and emphasized the organization over the candidate.  In addition, as one YVP 
director said, “One of our campaign slogans is ‘Get Involved!’ That’s why we have a 
separate youth headquarters.”34  Creating Youth Headquarters provided young people 
with the space to play different leadership roles, and offered Nixon supporters access to 
political organization through the “campaign within a campaign.”35 For example, the 
directors also contributed to the overall campaign as they each held a position on the state 
committee staff.  Including the youth directors proved a master stroke.  It allowed the 
campaign to tout its “youth atmosphere,” provide young supporters with valuable 
experience, and kept the young directors under CRP’s thumb.   
Within weeks, Rietz established the model storefront YVP office in D.C. on 17
th
 
and Pennsylvania that quickly employed two young organizers who recruited fifteen 
willing and able volunteers.
36
  These offices felt young, with hand-made, colorful, 
psychedelic posters pasted on the front windows; the slogans “Nixon Now” and “Right 
on Mr. President” seemed less Nixon, and more 70s.  YVP offices performed multiple 
functions in the campaign.  First, they helped YBP leaders recruit young people face to 
face.  When the University of Tennessee YVP office first opened in September, National 
Chairman Pamela Powell visited forty volunteers who ran the headquarters and urged 
them to be “spokesmen” for the President, claiming, “We need a campaign based on 
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personal relationships.” Second, the offices offered valuable manpower as the YVP at UT 
claimed 800 members after its first week in operation, pledging to focus on registration 
and “Bumper Sticker Days.”37 
Loyalty served as the glue here. While Nixon’s campaign ensured a well-
disciplined crew by dangling jobs as tantalizing carrots, it also carefully selected its eager 
young organizers.  Recommending a young man to serve as one of Rietz’ “shock troops,” 
Jamie McLane vouched that the candidate “in spite of his work for Humphrey in 1968, is 
with us.”38  In the discerning stocking process of the YVP, a former Humphrey man who 
proved he could help Nixon’s youth vote seemed just fine with a campaign that cared less 
about ideological purity than about dependability.  Nixon’s YVP leadership acted in 
complete loyalty to their cause, as the YVP Southeast regional director donated his entire 
month’s pay to the YVP claiming that “all members of a campaign staff should make a 
sacrifice to their candidate.” 39 
With this loyalty, came a distinct appreciation for discipline. Even when the YVP 
staffers let their hair down, big brother was watching.  On one occasion Rietz invited 
eleven YVP volunteers to join him in the president’s reserved box during the YVP 
organized “Rock Revival” concert at the Kennedy Center.  Apparently, these youngsters 
pushed the envelope for CRP’s square sensibility.  Rietz rejected Magruder’s 
overreaction that they appeared drunk and obnoxious or that they left the box “in an 
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untidy condition.” Though they drank champagne, Rietz argued, “we didn’t spill it, throw 
it, or waste it,” and “clapped, cheered and danced along with rest of the audience.”40 
During the election campaign, CRP organizers did not take any risks, as they brought in 
each of the YVP state directors to Washington for a “thorough indoctrination into the 
program.”41  Though the YVP leadership clearly took on a top-down model, it allowed 
young people new, unprecedented access to the political system.   
Youth Politics and the Rise of Independents 
First, Rietz scoured the administration and Republican congressional staffs for 
young leaders.  Starting with interns, the initial reach to young people did not look good.  
After one meeting with twenty five young interns from different agencies ranging from 
the Central Intelligence Agency to the Office of Educational Opportunity, the White 
House staff agreed with the group’s consensus that “the secret to young people was 
asking them to become involved.”  Nixon faced a tough crowd here, as they pointed out 
their concerns about the war along with the President’s credibility and authenticity gap. 
Dismissing the troubling reaction to Nixon, one of his field-men, Tom Bell, labeled the 
interns as “intellectual elite,” claiming, “They wouldn’t vote for us, but they wouldn’t 
work against us either.”  Initially, the White House accepted the staffers “Let’s wait and 
see what he does” attitude that would “minimize their activity.”42Rietz’ early attempts to 
recruit YVP’s leaders within the beltway proved discouraging.  Rietz understood that he 
could not fabricate Nixon’s youth position, and that the YVP’s success depended on the 
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legitimate effort to include young people in practice and in policy. After touting Nixon’s 
inclusion of young people into his administration, Rietz realized the “paucity of real 
(under 30) youth advisors we have.”  Recommending that “under 30 and very loyal 
replacements be made,” Rietz hoped to “insure the President has in fact, as well as name, 
appointed youth advisors.”43 
To fill the YVP ranks, Nixon’s youth campaign searched any organization that 
fostered sympathy for the President and could offer young supporters to staff YVP 
offices. While traditional youth organizations such as the 4-H fostered a Nixon friendly, 
‘silent majority’ sensibility, young conservatives and Republicans more focused on 
politics stood poised to take advantage of new opportunities in 1972.  The Young 
Americans for Freedom established in 1960 at William F. Buckley Jr.’s home in Sharon, 
Connecticut, gathered America’s young conservatives to counter “liberal educationism” 
on campuses which turned “the college into an impersonal daycare for the offspring of all 
carnivorous animals…which primarily serve ideological purposes.”44 
In 1964, the YAF played a crucial role in drafting the ideological purist, Barry 
Goldwater, as the Republican candidate for president.  By 1970, the YAF included over 
20,000 members, as YAF Chairman Ronald Docksai explained in 1971, “YAF is a young 
people’s corporation and leadership is our most important product.”45 However, as the 
YAF’s success buoyed its conservative principles, it lost prominence within the 
Republican Party.  Though two former YAF presidents, David Keane and Tom Huston, 
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earned positions as White House aides, Nixon did not actively pursue them to fill his 
ranks with YAF staffers. While the YAF leadership gained strength and numbers, their 
libertarian agenda did not lend itself to Nixon’s campaign for “middle America.”  
Nixon’s first term exacerbated the YAF members’ suspicions about Nixon’s 
agenda. While Huston spoke on Nixon’s behalf during the 1968 campaign, the 
president’s first term fell short of YAF members’ expectations in staffing and in policy. 
At the same time, YAF members “violently opposed” Nixon’s decision to institute wage 
and price controls.  Nixon’s moderation did not resonate with this youth group.  Even as 
Buchanan, a former YAFer himself, wrote Nixon to “suggest strongly that before any 
youth organization is decided upon, you consult ….Dave Keane and Tom Huston,” 
Nixon’s youth campaign leadership bypassed the YAF and its ideological purists.46 
As young liberal voters challenged Nixon, conservative youth also contested the 
President’s re-election as the 1971 YAF Convention title boasted, “We are the New 
Politics.” Offering a competing claim to the New Left politics, a New Guard editorial 
argued that young conservatives “are calling for, and participating in, a new politics of 
conservative principle based on ending government bureaucracy, protecting individual 
rights, and preserving the national security.”47 Speaking to the anti-Nixon tone in 
Houston, Keene clarified, “The emotionalism of the evening can be explained by the fact 
that many of the kids participating worked in the ’68 campaign and now feel betrayed.”48   
Keene reported that the Goldwaterite conservative leader, Phyllis Schlafly, threatened to 
                                                          
46
Buchanaan  toGrassmuck, PRF, Box #45, Folder: Attitude Study, [CFOA 336]. 
47
 Wayne Thorburn,“Agenda for New Politics,” New Guard, October, 1971, p. 12. 
48
 Keene to Magruder, “YAF Convention,” September 8, 1971. PJM Box 27, Folder: Subject Files, 
Alphabetical, (JSM) Young Americans for Freedom. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA. 
253 
 
 
 
conduct a “high level conservative meeting in Houston during the YAF convention to 
plot an extensive anti-Nixon campaign,” as Nixon’s advisors decided against sending an 
administration representative.
49
 Nixon divided the New Right, as the White House’s 
resident YAFer explained the larger problem: “they reflect, admittedly in exaggerated 
form, the feelings of many other conservatives.” Keene finished, “There are few 
identifiable ‘movement’ conservatives in the administration.”50 
By 1972, internal divisions in the YAF became more visible over Nixon’s re-
election. His visit to China and Moscow, as well as the Family Assistance Plan that only 
reformed the welfare system and did not obliterate it as hoped, offended YAF members’ 
principles. One letter to the YAF’s New Guard newspaper criticized the paper for only 
suggesting that young conservatives should fight against McGovern, not for Nixon.  
Complaining about the President’s negative image in the September issue, a YAF 
member counted “a lead article attacking Nixon’s SALT agreements…three anti-Nixon 
editorials, three anti-Nixon cartoons and an advertisement for an anti-Nixon bumper 
sticker.” (“Vote Nixon:  Republicans for a Socialist US”).  This concerned reader feared 
the YAF would “fall from the ranks of the responsible right into the ridiculous right,” 
arguing, “It is time the YAF stopped waiting for the perfect candidate.”51 
Even though Nixon could not rely on the YAF, another traditional source of 
young supporters for Republicans, the Young Republicans (YR), seized the opportunity.  
In addition, the more opportunistic YAFers who supported Nixon moved into the GOP 
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through its youth organization. In 1971, the YR convention saw former YAF members 
sweep all but one of its eighteen national offices. The New York YR president worried 
that the national committee “was falling off the right hand side of the world and that they 
risked becoming “a party sitting on the razor’s edge of ideology.”  Denying his ultra-
conservative stigma, the new national chairman, Donald Sundquist, considered himself a 
“Bill Brock Republican”—moderate and image conscious.  The New Republican 
appealed to these young, more flexible conservatives.  By emulating Brock, Sundquist 
celebrated the Senator’s free enterprise principles, but also embraced his style, as the YR 
Chairman admitted, “We have to do a better job selling young people the idea that we are 
the party of youth.”52   Thus, YR leadership understood that they needed to package the 
conservative youth movement to new voters and expand the GOP’s appeal.   
Several factors, including Nixon’s image, motivated young people to vote for 
Nixon. Nixon’s efforts as president, whether ending the draft, passing environmental 
legislation or holding youth conferences, also helped his cause. This attempt to organize a 
youth campaign found surprising success, as young voters suddenly felt validated to 
voice their support for the President.  Most important to these young voters, Nixon 
appeared trustworthy.
53
   On the issues, Nixon could claim he stood with young people.  
And while Nixon’s personality earned him only fourth place, behind JFK, RFK and MLK 
Jr., in Newsweek’s poll of young American’s most admired men, Nixon’s staff found the 
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silver lining as the President remained “the most admired living person.” 54  One young 
Nixon supporter, a twenty-one year old YR and advertising salesman in Orange County, 
pledged, “I trust  Nixon as I’ve never trusted another politician,” while another claimed, 
“With McGovern, I just don’t know what to believe and what not to believe.”55 Nixon’s 
successful appeal to young Americans on the trust issue surprised his own people.  When 
one twenty-three year old Democrat defected, claiming “McGovern’s credibility was one 
key thing,” he laughed that when he walked into the Republican headquarters to switch 
his allegiance, “You should have seen these little old ladies’ mouths open.”56 While 
Nixon’s personal appeal became an asset in channeling “square power” to win over 
young voters, an economic appeal also worked. 
Rietz flaunted Nixon’s youthful personnel’s national influence on young 
Americans’ emerging roles in the workplace, claiming responsibility for “an atmosphere 
throughout the country where more industries are hiring more young people for important 
positions.”57  “There has been a new ‘youth atmosphere’ created in business” Rietz 
bragged, “and the administration has played a key role in its development.”58  Taking 
credit for a younger business climate exaggerated the administration’s influence, but 
Rietz could easily substantiate the claim with his YVP members. This appeal targeted the 
real “forgotten voter” that one Nixon aide defined as “a 20 year old breadwinner hard at 
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work providing for his young wife and new baby.” “His vote will not be determined by 
party, but by the hope for economic stability, job security and opportunity…His is the 
voice of common sense.”59Rietz argued that they “will vote their pocketbooks instead of 
the war,” as he claimed blue collar workers could support Nixon because “they are not as 
political party oriented as were their parents.”60 The young people who supported Nixon 
varied, though they all shared the President’s faith in the American dream, or Nixon’s 
“New Prosperity.” 
The 1972 Young Republican convention brought together 1,000 members to 
celebrate Nixon’s presidency and America’s affluence. Laying out a central theme for the 
four day conference, one morning’s workshop discussed “the administration’s plans for 
improved prosperity.” Lunch offered a suitably prosperous menu; beef shish kebab, filet 
of sole amandine, prime roast beef with baked Alaska for dessert.  That afternoon, Ken 
Rietz represented the afternoon panel’s “highlight” as he lead an open discussion about 
the YVP.  Mixing business with pleasure, the attendees adjourned to the Sheraton-Park 
Hotel for a “Cold Duck Dance” that featured “all the Cold Duck you can drink.”  On the 
last night, YVP celebrities including football star Bob Griese, actor Clint Eastwood and 
the former Miss America joined the convention for dinner before the “European style 
casino and auction with prizes ranging from $100 worth of Coors beer to a special all-
expense paid trip to Alaska.”61  Couched in this setting, the YVP promoted Nixon to non-
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college youth as an embodiment of political and economic opportunity. As the bland 
emphasis on prosperity smoothed-over potential divisions between conservatives and 
moderates during the 1972 YR convention, the YVP presence further resolved those 
tensions as the campaign’s opportunities trumped the ideological differences. 
Despite the high life the conference promoted, the event performed an important 
function in bringing local leaders of Young Republican clubs into the national program.  
As “the dean of the nation’s governors and a key figure in the national leadership of the 
GOP,” the convention invited Nelson Rockefeller from New York to deliver the 
moderate voice of the GOP’s Eastern establishment. In addition, Nixon’s campaign 
deployed a heavy presence to ensure the YR maintained its distance from conservative 
ideologues who challenged Nixon’s bona fides. For example, John Ashbrook (R-OH) 
offered the YAFers a conservative alternative, sporting the campaign phrase, “No Left 
Turns” and criticizing Nixon’s “liberal” moves.   In one memo, Malek suggested that 
Mitchell attend the YR Conference, claiming that they detected “significant Ashbrook 
sentiment” in the YR.62  While the White House passed on the YAF conference, they 
took control of the YR’s annual meeting as the White House could not risk losing this 
important source of young leaders.  
Cultivating this cadre of future GOP organizers, the conference training provided 
Young Republican leaders with the skills and knowledge to win campaigns. While 
Senator Bob Packwood gave a slide presentation on “How to Run a Local Campaign,” 
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other workshops offered strategies tailored to specific challenges ranging from winning 
urban areas to rural club building.  A slew of advertising executives and public relations 
experts taught new political strategies.  Murray Chotiner, Nixon’s former campaign 
manager in California whose tactics stigmatized Nixon as “tricky Dick,” held a “special, 
off the record session.” Next, former YAF member Richard A. Viguerie spoke about new 
innovations in direct mail fundraising that would eventually earn him the moniker, “the 
funding father” of modern conservatism.63 This effort may have been too successful. YR 
voters soon became the dominant source of YVP volunteers to such an extreme that Rietz 
wrote to his California YVP director, “We are too heavily YR oriented.”64 While YR 
support helped, YVP organizers would have to look to independents and students for 
young voters, intensifying Nixon’s campaign for voters outside the party. 
While many factors divided this generation, young Americans during this era 
overwhelmingly rejected the two major parties and identified as independents.  For 
example, one stewardess declared her party affiliation as “Gemini,” claiming that “an 
independent is more willing to say what he feels, than what the party thinks is right.”65 
One student called party line voters “indifferent,” suggesting that it “deemphasizes the 
value of the person running for a public office and places him in a mediocre pile labeled 
“Republican” or “Democrat.”66 
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These independent youth comprised an unwieldy segment that one journalist 
described as the “invisible youth…battered by the forces of tradition and change, more 
pragmatic than ideological, cynical about politicians, and not very confident in their 
ability to influence them.”   By 1972, polls showed that forty nine percent of the 1968-
generation described their politics as “middle of the road.”67 Young people had 
increasingly identified themselves as politically independent since 1949, but the process 
accelerated after 1964. Though Republican’s claim to twenty-three percent of the youth 
vote remained constant, Democrats amongst voters in their twenties dropped from fifty-
one percent in 1949 to thirty-nine percent in 1970.  Independents over this same time 
increased from twenty-six percent of young voters to forty percent of young voters.
68
 
Thus, the process of declaring themselves as independent allowed young people the 
transition traditionally Democratic areas into Republican hands.  After registration closed 
in Jacksonville, Florida, eight-six percent of the electorate there signed as Democrats 
while only fifty-three percent of young voters did so.  Thirty percent of these young 
voters declared themselves as independents, well above three percent of Jacksonville’s 
total voters who did not commit to a political party.
69
  YVP leaders saw this as a clear 
opportunity in the South and in urban ethnic enclaves. 
Brock’s original YVP strategy proposal stated bluntly, “Party labels have become 
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increasingly meaningless” as a means of classifying young voters.70  Charles Colson 
issued a report to Haldeman on the causes, claiming that although the conventional 
wisdom that tied young people to their parents’ politics held true to a degree, this was 
“much less so than ever before.” “There is increasing independence and in many 
instances defiance and rebellion against parental behavior patterns.”71 YVP leaders 
struggled to develop young voters’ party loyalty.  The eighteen year-old director for 
Nixon’s youth campaign in Cincinnati complained about independents’ increasing role, 
reminding young people that “a vital force of our democracy is the two party system.”72 
As the YVP campaign reached outside the party, the pursuit of young independents 
magnified Nixon’s young supporters’ effort to present the GOP as a political alternative. 
Thus, Bill Brock, known as a “pragmatic Republican,” welcomed young voters’ 
desire for “some measure of independence."73  Nixon’s young supporters followed this 
welcoming approach. A twenty-three year old director of the RNC’s youth activities, 
Nancy Payne, proposed a “New Alignment of Youth” organization to tout Nixon’s 
policies on important youth issues such as Vietnam, the draft, volunteerism, the 
environment, and concerns about the federal government’s growth to capture increasingly 
independent young voters. Considering independents in the short and long term, Payne 
argued, “The non-affiliated young person is vital to the Republican party for the election 
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and the future growth of the GOP.”74  While GOP partisans among young voters 
including Young Republicans, College Republicans and Teenage Republicans played 
traditional “political roles” such as “office workers and warm bodies at rallies,” 
independents required a new thrust in Nixon’s campaign, “education.”  Teaching young 
people that Nixon “is listening, is responding, and is doing a good job” could be enough 
to win over this segment.
75
 
After all, political ignorance prevented many non-college young people from 
deciding, as one youth organizer observed, “Many do not even know the names of the 
political parties, and feel powerless to influence public events…Many nonstudents just 
feel lost and useless.”76 This sense of powerlessness inspired Brock’s politics, as he 
explained his appeal to youth: “They were fed up with the system…thought nobody was 
listening…My message was that if you don’t like what is going on, it’s your fault, if we 
don’t like what they look like then we should look in the mirror.”  This stress on new 
voters forced Republicans to reach out to working, “nonstudent” young people they could 
persuade.     
To win over these young voters, Rietz suggested that the national convention for 
the largest vocational groups in the country provided the perfect forum.  The Distributive 
Education Club of America (DECA) gathering would include 7,000 of the most 
organized, “as well as patriotic” vocational education students “and should provide the 
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most outstanding reception.”77  Nixon’s White house point man on youth, Jamie McLane, 
agreed.  “This group is important, explained McLane, “because these young people are 
the real working youth—mechanics, bricklayers, metal workers, etc.”78 In addition, they 
shared a conservative loyalty to the free market, as DECA’s collegiate wing focused on 
“bachelor’s degrees to enable them to teach marketing in high schools and junior 
colleges.”79 Not exactly branching out, this effort would lead to an increasingly 
aggressive effort to cull out the segment of young voters most likely to support Nixon.     
 Another opportunity to build Nixon’s youth following involved a partnership with 
DECA, Citizenship in Action, a program that promoted “understanding and appreciation 
for the responsibilities of citizenship in our free competitive enterprise system” This 
effort confronted the popular fears that young Americans had lost faith in the economic 
and political establishment.
80
 This project targeted high schools and community colleges, 
advocating political activism, “a kind of activism that is not radical—a kind of political 
involvement that is positive and healthy.”  Among the many activities in this program, 
local DECA chapters would work on the campaign of a political candidate “mutually 
satisfactory to the majority of chapter members.”81  Since Nixon scored well with this 
group, it proved a valuable way to reach his potential voters as Rietz followed 
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Malek’sdirective to “ensure that each chapter makes the right choice on its candidate.”82  
In June, 1972, Nixon met in the Oval Office with presidents of six major vocational 
education organizations to celebrate the one year anniversary of the 26
th
 amendment and 
reaffirming the President’s call for “career education.”  Among the groups represented at 
this meeting, leaders of Future Homemakers of America, Future Business Leaders of 
America , Future Farmers of America and Future Industrial Clubs of America joined 
Nixon for a fifteen minute talk and photo op. 
83
  These efforts paid off.  Representing 
over 1.5 million members, an unprecedented nine vocational organization presidents 
endorsed Nixon.  Rietz credited the success to “high Nixon visibility in this group,” a 
validation of his emphasis on “peer group pressure.”84 
Speaking to members of his Young Labor for Nixon at the White House, the 
President thanked them for understanding his policy in Vietnam “more clearly than some 
people in the media, some people in the universities.”85  As Nixon celebrated the war’s 
end slightly prematurely, the audience clearly appreciated his announcement that, for the 
first time since 1965, no Americans had died in Vietnam the previous week. Still, Nixon 
laid down the patriotism especially thick here, suggesting that this group should instead 
be called “Young Labor for America.”  Campaigning against McGovern, without 
mentioning his opponent, Nixon explained that his young voters “know that strength in 
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the hand of America is not bad thing.  It is a good thing.  It is a necessary thing.”86 
Nixon’s campaign managers deemed the exercise worthy, as young people not attending 
school claimed to be conservative six-percent more often than students did, while they 
claimed radical or liberal sentiment half as often as those attending college.
87
 
The harsh reality of economic responsibilities, said many onlookers, would even 
turn college graduates into potential Nixon supporters. While SDS philosopher Herbert 
Marcuse anointed students as the carriers of revolution because they existed “outside 
society,” one journalist observed that a student “two to three years out of college is no 
longer ‘outside society.’” Instead, “He is on his way to becoming a ‘square,’ just like 
President Richard Nixon.”88  Young families provided a logical target for Nixon’s reach 
to working youth.  As Nixon’s campaign manager in Hamilton County, Ohio, the young 
advertising man Peter Glaubitz claimed that youth who “have had to provide for young 
families tend to be for Mr. Nixon. They seem to be better able to deal with realities.”89 In 
addition, polling showed that young people felt “family life” represented the most 
neglected issue in American society.
90
 As nine out of ten young people below thirty lived 
with their families, many young voters also lived with-- and influenced-- older voters. 
Nixon’s campaign organizers could not agree on whether young voters would 
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either follow, or not follow their parents’ political loyalties.91 Young liberals clung to the 
idea that they would vote differently from their parents and convince their folks to give 
McGovern a shot. Meanwhile, Operation Kinfolk, a YVP program, provided Nixon’s 
young voters with postcards that requested a statement of support for the President.  After 
the program’s youth volunteers gave postcards to relatives, they collected them once 
completed and sent them to CRP for future contact by election workers.  As one report 
suggested, “This will negate any conclusions that all youth are against Republicans, or 
against this administration.”  In addition, the report observed, “Mothers and fathers can 
be influenced by what is happening among their offspring, as we all well know.”92  While 
many had considered kids’ politics dependent on their parents’ beliefs, Operation 
Kinfolk’s organizers considered another possibility-- parents could follow their kids too. 
Brock’s politics welcomed people outside the student milieu: “we were open, honest, 
welcoming, nobody ever said ‘he doesn’t belong to us.’”93 
Despite this attempt to recruit different groups of first-time voters, Nixon’s youth 
campaign effort only extended to whites.  Not that they did not want to have blacks 
involved. When one young African-American, Don Johnson, earned a spot as a YVP 
Fieldman, his superb resume that included high positions in the Office of Economic 
Opportunity and the Urban League earned unanimous approval.  Observing Johnson’s 
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positive attributes, Magruder first listed, “Black.”94 Thus, because the President, and the 
GOP, could not find a reliable constituency with African-Americans, Nixon’s campaign 
for black votes lacked support within the administration. 
 Even when CRP’s leadership did consider a plan to recruit 20,000 black youth 
volunteers called Young Black Friends for the Re-election of the President, the program 
only sought Nixon sympathizers on college campuses.  Rietz thought ambitiously, “we 
have had good luck this far with young blacks…and I feel this is worth the additional 
$20,000.”  Malek scoffed, claiming “I doubt the President has any substantial support 
among blacks on college campuses.”95  Both sides agreed, non-college black youth, such 
as the urban blacks who rejected McGovern’s reach out to American cities, were outside 
the realm.  While Rietz’ search for young black voters pushed YVP  leaders towards 
student politics, the realities of youth politics would make this transition inevitable. 
The YVP turned to student politics for several reasons. First, Democrats claimed 
that they owned the student vote. After one Newsweek  poll in 1971 named the 
Democratic frontrunner, Senator Ed Muskie (D-ME), as the most popular candidate 
amongst students, one Nixon aide needled Rietz, “we haven’t forgotten you and your 
promises of youth.”96 Second, campuses provided a rich resource of personnel. Voices in 
the administration suggested that any youth would do. As Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare and Nixon’s initial point man on the youth issue, Robert Finch, reported: “In 
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a controlled situation, long haired, mod-dressed youth in one precinct v. neatly-dressed 
youth in a like precinct, the candidate’s vote increased in both cases.”97  Nixon’s 
campaign organizers understood the need to match the Democrats ground game and that 
the YVP leadership would have to engage in student politics.  
New Hampshire and Student Politics 
By December 1971, Rietz had staked out new territory for Nixon’s youth 
campaign; Brigham Young University, free of radicals, offered Nixon a visit and a “most 
positive reception on a campus held in great respect by those in the Southwest (and much 
of Middle America).” While Rietz acknowledged that liberal college students would 
criticize Nixon for playing it safe, Rietz easily dismissed them, “Their views should not 
dictate our appealing to our kind of people.”  Besides, Rietz argued, “we will not get the 
others’ vote anyway.”98Rietz emphasized caution and selectivity when entering campus 
politics. RNC co-chairman Anne Armstrong admitted: “If the youth vote depends solely 
on party images, the Republican Party comes out second best.”99 
Nixon’s effort for student voters underlined the symbolic role his youth campaign 
played in building his constituency. Nixon conceded his weakness with young voters and 
Rietz even admitted that he did not anticipate how successful they would become while 
he planned and executed the YVP campaign.
100
 This did not deter the cause to show 
young students that they included a silent majority, further marginalizing the vocal 
minority that his ‘law and order’ politics opposed.  In addition, Nixon’s youth campaign 
                                                          
97
 Finch to President, 4/1971. Papers of James McLane,  Box, Folder: Youth -General, (3 of 19). 
98
Rietz to McLane, Papers of James McLane, December 2, 1971, Box 29, Folder: Alphabetical, Youth, 3 of 
4. 
99
 Paul Hope, “Nations Youth Being Courted for Votes,”Reading Eagle, July 6, 1971, p.22. 
100
Rietz interview 
268 
 
 
 
stood for the “counterintuitive” and undermined the stodgy, ideological and cold 
portrayal of Nixon that his critics projected.  As one Nixon aide admitted, “Nixon isn’t 
going to carry the college vote,” though “the margin by which he loses it is important.”101 
If Nixon could show he had student supporters, that the bomb throwers on campuses 
represented the fringe, he could more easily speak about holding demonstrators 
accountable without alienating the “sons and daughters of the silent majority” or their 
parents.  Stressing the need to start organizing a year in advance, Rietz hired an up and 
coming campus vote organizer, George Gorton, in January of 1971.   
Gorton, in his young twenties himself, had earned his reputation as a youth guru 
in 1968 after he ran James Buckley’s unsuccessful campaign to unseat the liberal 
Republican incumbent, Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY).  Though the papers misspelled 
Gorton’s name, he got the credit for Buckley’s strong showing among disaffected 
conservatives, and Peter Wilson quickly hired him to run his campaign for mayor of San 
Diego.
102
 After Wilson won in 1970, Magruder visited Gorton and offered him the job.  
Setting his sights on the New Hampshire primary, Gorton quickly showed why he 
deserved the position.  
As Nixon prepared for the New Politics that Democrats developed after 1968, he 
used mock elections against liberal Republicans to practice campus politics. Nixon’s 
primary opposition came from Congressman Pete McCloskey (R-CA). McCloskey 
wanted to replace Nixon’s “war, pollution and deceit” with “peace, conservation and 
honesty.”  His candidacy showed the potential problem Vietnam presented to Nixon’s re-
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election campaign, as one flyer hearkened back to 1968, claiming that, “If thousands of 
young people register to vote for McCloskey, the same kind of pressure the McCarthy 
campaign applied to Johnson can be applied to President Nixon.”103 Most troubling, a 
January poll at Iowa State University showed fifty-three percent of the students opposed 
Nixon’s election. Reporting on the “the need for increased efforts in the youth area,” one 
aide explained, “This is a school in which we should do much better,” claiming that these 
students “feel he is too ‘political’ and they don’t trust him” as “they feel he isn’t getting 
US out of Vietnam fast enough.”104 To counter this impression, the campaign needed a 
visible YVP presence to support the President’s claim to a silent majority on campuses.  
As the YVP scrambled for young people, Gorton looked to students for an immediate 
injection of young volunteers. 
The New Hampshire primary tested the YVP organization and its ability to 
generate a youth-oriented appearance for Nixon’s campaign. In one of his first campus 
visits, Gorton walked into a room of students at the University of New Hampshire and 
announced his role.  As Gorton recalled, “I asked, ‘who here supports the President,’ and 
a guy hit me in the face.”105  Thus, the campus political culture made it difficult for those 
who supported the president to admit it.  Gorton believed this could be reversed, as he 
and other YVP leaders showed Nixon supporters they were not alone and that they too 
belonged in the ‘silent majority.’ This required the YVP to make Nixon’s campaign 
“cool,” which Gorton characterized as “standing up with other people-- coming out with 
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the crowd.”106 
Hoping to build peer group pressure for Nixon supporters who had hesitated to 
actively participate in the campaign, Gorton focused on the student mock elections.  
Mock elections had been a college tradition, and Nixon’s campaign organization utilized 
this long-standing political exercise to show Nixon had young supporters in the most 
unlikely places. YVP members on campuses across the nation manipulated mock 
elections to exaggerate Nixon’s popularity with students. As Rietz put it, this strategy 
would build momentum, “to make it look like everyone is supporting the candidate.”107 
The YVP state action plan on mock elections encouraged local organizers to first 
develop a positive attitude, “Your campus contact will probably tell you that the 
President can’t win on his campus.” The key to success in mock elections, wrote Rietz, 
“is to be better organized. So much better organized that we can identify and deliver to 
the polls a high percentage of our supporters while the opposition is relatively 
inactive.”108  First, a local organizer contacted a “supporter” in student government to 
approach the school’s student body president, as a “non-partisan,” to sponsor an election. 
Ensuring YVP control, the “non-partisan” Nixon supporter would then “offer to do the 
work and set it up.”109 
YVP members quickly canvassed door to door in dorms and fraternities, and 
positioned a YVP table to ensure that “every Nixon voter passing the poll will vote.”  As 
Gorton explained, after the YVP convinced student leaders to hold mock elections, they 
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sent “a good looking girl and guy” to hand out Nixon literature and make sure all the pro-
Nixon kids voted.
110
 While the YVP directors suggested that polls should be easy to 
locate, the election “must not be connected to regular student elections, the selling of 
football tickets, or anything else that will cause an unusually large voter turnout.”111  
After Nixon’s anti-war Republican challenger, Congressman Pete McCloskey, ate in the 
Dartmouth student cafeteria three times leading up to the New Hampshire primary, 
CRP’s organizers feared that the “general student apathy that usually allows us to control 
a mock election does not now exist,” and cancelled it.112 For this reason, high school’s 
offered a special challenge, as Rietz reported, “There is, however, some difficulty in 
controlling these elections since voting is mandatory and we need exactly the right 
situation.”113 In fact, Gorton admitted, “There was no way we could have won if voting 
was mandatory” on campuses.  Because the ‘silent majority’ on campus made up a 
minority, Gorton gave credit to the organization, “we canvassed everyone…we got a 
large percentage of Nixon supporters on any given campus to do something.”114  Thus, 
these first time voters for the GOP exhibited Republicans’ powerful get out the vote 
strategy.  This ability fed into the “silent majority” mythos that has shaped modern 
politics since 1972.  As the campaign hit stride, Rietz reiterated: “Organization will have 
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a real impact and in the initial primary states it already has.”115 
 While lauding his success, Nixon’s campaign organizers downplayed this careful 
preparation on campuses. Despite the well-funded, planned and executed effort, Rietz 
warned, “Under no circumstances should we let it be known beforehand that we feel this 
mock election is important or that we’ve put any special effort into it.”  The public 
relations effort after the election called for a higher profile, as Rietz instructed, “A mock 
election does no good if nobody hears about it.”   In addition, “the general psychological 
effect of winning straw polls, especially on college campuses which are supposed to be 
the stronghold of our opposition, is beneficial to the entire campaign.”116  This plan came 
to fruition, as Nixon’s campus victories piled up from smaller, controllable and reliable 
campuses such as Florida’s St. John’s River Jr. College where Nixon even managed to 
win that campus’ Democratic primary through a write votes.117  Combined with this 
success in campus mock elections, the YVP needed to make Nixon’s young supporters 
more visible and active before the first primary in early March, 1972. 
 Gorton looked to his old haunts, the New York conservative youth crowd, to 
bring in more YVPers. Before Cathy Bertini took over as the YVP state director in New 
York, Gorton asked her to help him prepare for the primary in New Hampshire to counter 
McCloskey’s claim to the youth vote.  When Gorton called Bertini, he offered to pay for 
“any vehicle, planes or trains, that you can fill with organized kids,”  as Bertini sent two-
hundred and fifty young people to work in New Hampshire for Nixon. To 
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Bertini’ssurprise, when she asked the Republican State Chairman for permission to 
recruit for the Nixon campaign, Charles C. Lanegan encouraged it as a way to smooth 
over any tensions between Nixon and Rockefeller’s “establishment Republicans.” The 
youth organization had been mostly a “Rockefeller operation,” and sending “his kids” 
would show people that “he was really for Nixon.”118 Thus, young voters played an 
important role in smoothing over the differences within the party.   In addition, the young 
campaign workers cost very little. As YVP members rang over 10,000 doorbells one day, 
costing Nixon’s campaign “two kegs of beer and some Coke.”119 YVP members’ 
performance in the primary gained attention from within and outside the campaign. 
In one rally that attracted over four-hundred Nixon supporters, Rietz’ college 
director reported that “the crowd looked good.” While the media coordination did not 
come through as Rietz had hoped, the press learned about the rally only one day in 
advance, the YVP’s sudden and impressive arrival evoked criticisms of a contrived and 
cosmetic effort.
120
  Nixon’s youth cadre left many observers searching for explanations 
and skeptical speculation about YVP workers’ backgrounds began when one article 
reported that two busloads of young people arrived at the rally from New York.
121
 While 
the out-of-state youth enhanced popular perceptions of Nixons’ youth as manufactured, 
Magruder placed a trusted journalist with Rietz during his travels the week before the 
New Hampshire event to “show our effort as straightforward and honest in its attempt to 
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involve young people.”122 
The YVP’s results made the campaign worth it, including “great public relations 
with locals” while it “demoralized McCloskey headquarters,” “developed credibility for 
the idea that youth support the president” and “increased morale among local troops.”123  
In addition, CRP unveiled its new system for distributing sound clips to radio stations, as 
thirty-three stations in New Hampshire and the Boston stations played recordings from 
the rally.
124
 Promising to “rebuild the responsive, progressive element of the Republican 
Party,” McCloskey fared poorly in the primary, carrying only twenty percent of the vote 
to Nixon’s sixty-eight.125  This election, and the YVP contribution, effectively closed any 
opening for a youth-oriented challenger in the GOP. 
Mitchell rewarded Gorton’s ability to win campus mock elections, and the 
emphasis on students suddenly became central as Mitchell supplied the College Director 
with an “unlimited budget” and thirty-eight paid field people.126 After New Hampshire, 
the CRP leadership reversed its strategy to avoid student voters as Gorton expanded the 
Nixon campaign on American campuses and fueled a more ambitious youth effort. 
Gorton next focused on Florida, where Nixon needed to shore up the large youth 
vote, and utilize the YVP volunteers to develop the campaign in this crucial state that 
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held the earliest primary in the South.
127
  As Nixon’s popularity gained ground in the 
suburban Sunbelt as southern conservatives considered themselves part of the ‘silent 
majority,’ the independent minded youth bloc allowed the administration to expand its 
national approach to include the South. Across the South, as a Louisiana State University 
poll showed, though many students could not yet join the Republican Party, sixty-six 
percent preferred Nixon over any Democratic candidate.  Even better for the President, 
though only twenty-nine percent in the poll preferred the Republican Party, forty-three 
percent of the registered students favored the GOP. 
128
 Any states below the Mason-
Dixon would provide an enormous cushion to Nixon’s claim to a national mandate.  The 
effort first focused on the “major campuses,” leaving Nixon friendly rural schools for 
last. In one mock election that included thirty-six schools in the “Sunshine State,” Nixon 
ousted his closest Republican competitor with eighty-four percent of the vote. Gorton 
continued to sharpen his formula for success on campuses. 
Bill Brock relished the mock election campaign when Nixon won a symbolic 
victory in McGovern’s homes state. After Nixon won fifty-nine percent of the votes cast 
in South Dakota’s mock convention for high school and college students, Brock 
contended: “This latest election reflects once more that in the primaries in weeks and 
months to come, the young people will overwhelmingly help in providing the President 
with a substantial margin of victory.”129 Through April, forty-six of forty-seven “test 
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elections” on high school and college campuses supported Nixon, as Brock had the 
results printed in the Congressional Record which the YVP then turned into 10,000 flyers 
that they disseminated to state offices.
130
  Nixon’s YVP effort on campuses, with all its 
complications, suddenly became worth it as it gained wider recognition. While Nixon’s 
centralized mock election campaign deserves credit, the emerging political enthusiasm on 
campuses helped YVP leaders organize students for the President.   
College Republicans played a central role in reinvigorating the GOP with future 
leaders. Young leaders, such as the Republican National Committee’s twenty-three year 
old domestic affairs writer, Brian Smith, argued that the youth support for Nixon should 
assume a more central role in Nixon’s re-election campaign.  Denying that students could 
not be won and thus lacked significance to the YVP, Smith claimed, “They’re going to be 
the leaders of tomorrow, and if the Republican Party is going to a viable party…we’ve 
got to attract the leaders.”  Smith’s twenty-three year old peer agreed on the youth 
campaign’s larger significance, bristling at Nixon’s “pompom girls and the cheerleaders 
and the nostalgia,” warning that, “If that’s all we have to offer then this party is in 
trouble.”131 Though many CR members studied business as a major, an overwhelming 
majority majored in political science, and their participation in the campaign served as a 
career opportunity.
132
 
Cathy Bertini, the YVP State director in New York, stated, “Not a soul there that 
was just there to get Nixon elected.”  In New York, the YVP included mostly college 
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students and tapped into the influential youth network that Rockefeller had formed as that 
state’s governor. Calling it “a movement,” Bertini recollected “a huge hope that the 
administration would be full of young people, and the government would be more 
inclusive to young people.”133  George Gorton, the YVP college director, pointed out the 
advantage this gave the YVP, as they faced very little opposition from College 
Republicans when they set up shop.  While Nixon’s youth campaign set off local turf 
wars in 1968, no such tension existed in 1972, as Gorton explained, “we just blew them 
[CR] away…we had speakers, money and possible future jobs.”134 While naked 
opportunism played a role here, so did loyalty to the Republican Party. 
Nixon’s YVP depended on willing and able student leaders who understood the 
youth vote’s larger implications for the GOP. As the College Republican National 
Committee Chairman, Joe Abate’s letter welcoming activists back to campus in the fall 
argued that the 1972 election offered a unique chance to realign American politics for the 
future and encouraged members to “bring collegians into the Republican fold.” Claiming 
that “The 18 year old vote, the President’s initiatives and the reaction to the New Left 
have all moved most students into a more moderate, independent mold,” Abate called for 
a “well-informed, well-organized effort” to “bring strength and vitality for our Party for 
years to come.”135The title for the Maryland College Republicans Convention, 
“Youth!Tomorrow’s Responsible Republicans,” spoke to their moderate and mature 
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appeal.
136
 In contrast to the radical-student image that the media popularized, Bertini 
claimed, “We were almost a counter-culture on campus.”137   This period saw impressive 
CR gains, as the University of Maryland’s CR club’s membership jumped from 200 to 
800.
138
 As College Republican chapters grew, they maintained an important emphasis on 
professionalism and developed a more significant role in Republican politics.  
Their primary contribution, Fieldman Schools, organized workshops to train 
young people in modern politics.  Starting in 1971, CR leaders initiated thousands of 
Fieldmen Schools that offered training for “future ‘Youth for…’ Chairmen and full time 
salaried youth campaign fieldmen.”139  The schools averaged twenty three attendees per 
seminar, and  offered “an exhaustive curriculum…Voter registration, campus 
organization, press, literature, communication, the campus canvass—all the techniques 
needed for a well-run, successful collegiate election. During the weekend-long  program, 
participants received a two hundred page “massive notebook  of ‘how-to’ materials” and 
“the sacred texts of the CR organizers, such as Saul Alinsky’sRules for Radicals, David 
Ogilvy’s Confessions of an Advertising Man and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.”  
As the twenty-two year old CR Executive Director, Karl Rove oversaw the 
expansion of the controversial schools after 1971. Rove devised and taught workshops to 
teach young people the ins and outs of campaigning. As a college student, Rove proved  
his persuasive personality when he won the American Legion’s national oratorical 
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competition and the title of Utah’s 1969 State Champion Orator.140  As a college student, 
Rove joined the YR and quickly climbed within the ranks. After Rove convinced his 
peers and party elites he could lead the CR, he strengthened the .organizational ability to 
recruit voters.  
In July, the Maryland Federation of College Republicans conducted a workshop 
for “regional people for Youth for Nixon” at Towson State College.  Hoping to attract 
College Republicans, a memo claimed that “well-meaning amateurs can help a campaign, 
but trained leaders are the ones that really get things done.”141  And while the Maryland 
State Central Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman hardly added star power, the 
memo concluded, “Carl Rove will travel down from the National Fieldman School in 
Pennsylvania to speak to us and give us an idea of some of the interesting activities going 
on there.”142  Another flyer promoting the Towson State event mentioned that “CR 
leaders will be trained by professionals, (one of them is the infamous Karl Rove).”143  
The speakers at these events revealed their multifaceted purpose, and influence. A 
Georgetown University campaign workshop brought in young Republicans to hear the 
voices that shaped the New Majority: the YAF’s New Guard editor, a public relations 
expert, a former CR executive director and Jeb Magruder from the CRP.
144
 
While Rove and his fellow CR members saw the Fieldmen Schools as 
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organizational necessities, opponents saw him as a teacher of “dirty tricks.”  In a leaked 
tape of a Rove led workshop, he can be heard describing how he sabotaged a Democratic 
rally by handing out fake invitations.  Distributed to “vagrants, homeless and drifters,” 
the “faux invitation” read, “Free Beer, Free Food, Girls and A Good Time for Nothing.”  
Rove claimed this tape did not include the instructional context; this was not a “how-to” 
but a parable warning the audience “not to duplicate the stupid thing I did.”   Still, it 
seemed to substantiate Rove’s nefarious reputation. After the tape surfaced and RNC 
Chairman George Bush called him in for a few congenial questions, Rove was the subject 
of a Washington Post article titled, “GOP Probes Official as Teacher of ‘Tricks.’”145 This 
cynical label missed the point that these schools operated outside of the YVP. Connecting 
Rove’s underhanded tactics to Nixon’s, for many in the incredulous press, explained 
incorrectly that these future Republicans took their marching orders from the White 
House.   
These schools served as a gateway into the YVP, as the College Republican 
National Committee Chairman, Joe Abate, wrote to perspective Fieldmen school 
attendees, “If you want to play a meaningful role in the 1972 campaign…then the Student 
Fieldmen School is for you.”146  Building a sense of national unity, College Republicans 
developed a coherent vision of responsible Republicans in 1972 as way to legitimize their 
role in the 1968-generation.  The Now Generation’s sense of alienation that motivated 
young liberals to get involved also pushed conservative and moderate youth to demand a 
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more significant part in the process. 
The University of Maryland’s CR President Alan Virta bragged: “We no longer 
serve solely as auxiliaries to be used by the regular party and campaign organizations in 
the outside areas. We now are the regular party and campaign organization.”147  One 
College Republican paper editorialized, “the Nixon organization is concerned about 
getting the youth vote and has money and talent to back up these concerns.” Continuing, 
if students could increase their influence and usefulness, College Republicans could 
“move away from the kiddie politics that College Republicans often engage in.”148 In a 
letter to the county’s Republican Central Committee Chairman, one CR president 
requested “the full responsibility of running an entire precinct.”  The CR leader made it 
clear that “we are not afraid of hard work,” as he stressed that his club’s volunteers 
“would look forward to more person to person contact with voters and candidates…More 
than simply distributing literature.”149 
Republican leaders on campuses worked hard to grow their ranks. For example, 
Rove sent out a speakers directory and instructions on how to invite a Congressman or 
Senator who expressed interest in visiting campuses.  Divided by topics, the directory 
included prominent Republicans to speak on their expertise ranging from Appalachia to 
defense.
150
  One CR club advertised this exposure to recruit more members, underlining 
                                                          
147
 Alan Virta to UMCR Alumnae May 6, 1972. UMDCR Papers, Box 1 Folder 13, Presidential Papers, 
Alan Virta 1971-1972. University of Maryland, College park, MD. 
148The Elephant’s Memory, Spring, 1972 1(1). UMDCR Papers, Box 1 Folder 13, Presidential Papers, Alan 
Virta 1971-1972. University of Maryland, College park, MD 
149
 Alan Virta to John Pope, December, 1971. Papers of UMDCR.  Box 1 Folder 13, Presidential Papers, 
1971-1972. University of Maryland, College park, MD. 
150
 Karl Rove, Speakers Directory, UMDCR Papers, Box 2 Folder 5, College Republican National 
Committee, Correspondence 1971-1972. University of Maryland, College Park, MD. 
282 
 
 
 
that they do much more than grunt work. Along with the weekend long political training 
sessions and “great parties” they held with CR clubs from Kentucky, Virginia, West 
Virginia and other schools in Maryland, the UMDCR members met with Senators Beall, 
Mathias (R-MD) Goldwater (R-AZ), Javits (R-NY), Percy (R-IL), Brooke (R-MA) and 
Thurmond (R-SC).
151
 
Aiding this effort, College Republicans had help from the party leadership.  One 
“front” organization for the GOP, the Committee for Responsible Dialogue, offered a 
roster of “Challengers” they could supply “to convert campus lecture engagements by 
militant extremists into open forums of debate.”  So Abbie Hoffman is coming to your 
campus?  Maybe a debate with Phillip Luce, author of “The New Left Today-America’s 
Trojan Horse” would offer balance.  If a campus organization, such as the CR, could pay 
the “Challenger” a fee equal to the terms offered the “revolutionary spokesmen,” the 
Committee would provide for transportation.
152
 Claiming no partisan cause, the 
“Challengers” ranged from former YAF leaders to Republican Congressman Bill 
Stuckey, “Outstanding Young Man of Georgia,” or New York Representative and former 
Buffalo Bills quarterback Jack Kemp (R-NY).  This effort reached a wider audience, 
beyond the College Republicans, to enlist the independent majority on campus. As the 
campaign shifted to registering first-time voters, CR members also understood the 
average student’s priorities. One Young Republicans registration drive at the University 
of Tennessee offered the fraternity and sorority that registered the most voters a keg of 
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beer, prompting one student to write, “if you can’t interest them in politics, woo ‘em with 
music and booze.”153 
While the CR clubs offered personnel to the YVP, the CR’s Fieldmen Schools 
also influenced the Nixon campaign’s youth strategy. In late June, YVP organizers held a 
three day National YVP Conference in rural Tennessee. This event duplicated the 
Fieldman School formula, offering seminars on the YVP program for sixty 
representatives, or “fieldmen,” from each state’s YVP office.154Fieldmen extended the 
Republican Party’s laser-like focus on campaign discipline throughout the nation.  If 
Nixon’s campaign offices in Washington D.C. functioned as CRP’s brain, the YVP 
Fieldmen who trained aspiring Republicans served as the brawn.
155
 Nixon’s staffers still 
orchestrated the personnel and leadership training for YVP volunteers, but this approach 
encouraged local youth efforts that duplicated this approach.  This growth benefited 
Nixon, as he could boast by September that polls showed he had had tied McGovern for 
student votes at forty-eight percent.
156
 
Once the YVP gained momentum, Nixon’s most senior campaign directors 
limited the campaign’s reliance on YR members’ contributions to YVP’s beginnings.  
After a CRP official disallowed the YR from fundraising separately for their own budget, 
it also denied YR leaders’ request for direct campaign related expenses incurred while 
supporting the YVP.  As Brock argued that this would bankrupt the organization in the 
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last three weeks of the campaign, Malek disagreed that the YR deserved $17,000 for 
salaries and travel.
157
  Despite Nixon’s huge campaign coffers, CRP’s leaders maintained 
control of its funds and ensured money went to Nixon’s people, not Republicans.158 In the 
end, Mitchell allowed them to resume fundraising, but would not provide the financial 
support. While YR leadership begged CRP and the Republican Party for money, young 
people that worked directly for the YVP found a lucrative reward as the YVP state 
directors earned between $500 and $800 a month. 
Nixon’s campaign advisors wanted workers committed to the President, not the 
party.  The YVP Organization Manual instructs students, “Avoid relying solely on Young 
Republicans as they already have obligations to the party, and state and local office 
seekers that will prevent them from putting their maximum effort into the Nixon 
campaign.”159  While Rietz felt “YR’s are OK for a start,” he stressed that “a real effort 
has to be made to involve other young people as we build.”160 The YVP search for young 
voters looked beyond party loyalists as Nixon’s central command maintained its agenda 
to expand its youth constituency and reach independent voters. As the campaign turned 
into the summer of 1972, YVP volunteers targeted young independents through this 
organization to register first time voters.   
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Speakers 
Rietz maintained that young people could be persuaded to support the President 
with youth visibility in “mock elections, youth blitz days and youth crowd building for 
Presidential appearances.”161 Surrogate speakers and rallies offered another important 
way Nixon confronted the peer group pressure that worked against his popularity with 
young voters. The “Youth PR Program” would include many modern campaign and 
media techniques, but it also continued traditional practices such as a “comprehensive 
speakers program for the youth.”162  One main task guided this public relations campaign 
for young voters-- hit the issues.  As the RNC’s director of “issue development,” twenty 
three-year old Mark Harroff set off to debate young McGovern workers on campuses 
across the nation.  “My biggest job,” claimed Harroff, “is to get young people away from 
the Nixon image and concentrate instead on the Nixon record.”163 Nixon ended the draft, 
wound down the war, passed environmental protection, lowered the voting age and age of 
majority, went to China and more.  
As party loyalty waned disproportionately with young voters, political observers 
hoped they would become more knowledgeable about policy positions to make more 
individualistic choices at the voting booth.
164
 Nixon’s campaign managers combined 
these “issues” to provide a message to youth about Nixon’s presidency that built on 
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political realities to enhance his presidential reputation.  So if it came down to image, 
Nixon’s surrogates made sure young people got the right impression. Colson explained, 
“Credibility is an even more critical issue with the youth than with the public at 
large…the answer here relies more on what we say and how we say it rather than what 
we do.”165  The messenger mattered as much as the substance.  When YVP organizers 
asked a group of young Nixon supporters who they would like to see speaking on the 
President’s behalf, they answered in the negative: “Don’t send Agnew.”166  Thus, 
Nixon’s speakers offered young voters the perspective they found most credible, sporting 
the moniker, “the youth truth team.”167 These carefully tailored messages and messengers 
provide an insightful lens into the different groups Nixon’s youth campaigners targeted.   
In the South, a young Baptist journalist and White House aide, Wallace Henley, 
spoke to the Mississippi State Youth Congress on Nixon’s behalf.  Speaking to this 
conservative audience, Henley joked that real change could not come from “by one 
glorious week’s rampage through the streets.”  Ridiculing campus culture, Henley 
followed Nixon’s focus on non-college working young people, mocking students, “you 
come out of the ivory tower of drugs and protest and into the very real world.”168  Citing 
a recent Gallup poll that found thirty percent of young Americans did not care “if 
America was the best,” Henley claimed that the youth feared real work and could not 
“perceive greatness.”   While “The screaming generation wanted the luxury of dropping 
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out, of evading reality by means of drugs,” religion offered an alternative, more 
participatory path as the young Baptist, and future minister quoted the bible, “where there 
is no vision, the people perish.”169 
Melding religion, economics and patriotism, Henley hit just the right tone for this 
crowd that felt it offered an authentic renewal to the American spirit after the 1960s 
turmoil. One notable name absent from this speaker list, Billy Graham, revealed the 
awkward relationship between Nixon and the religious conservatives he courted.  Even 
though the celebrity evangelist ranked as young Americans’ most highly regarded person, 
garnering forty-four percent youth people’s admiration in a Gallup poll, Graham did not 
stump for Nixon.
170
 While Nixon moved to create a moral presidency, he could not yet 
merge his campaign with religious celebrity. Still, Graham put the campaign in touch 
with fifty major Christian youth groups and their vast mailing lists.
171
  In addition, 
Graham coordinated a partnership between Nixon’s campaign and evangelical Oral 
Roberts University’s successful basketball team that Nixon’s aide Harry Dent described 
as “clean-cut youth.”172 
Speakers also attended major youth group events to court the non-college youth.  
More conservative forums such as the Boys State Conventions proved accommodating as 
over ten speakers ranging from Strom Thurmond to Wallace Henley addressed the young 
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audience about Nixon’s accomplishments.173 In addition, youth speakers did not always 
represent the higher echelon of American politics and society.  Many local youth 
volunteers participated in the speakers program, as YVP classes held sessions for up to 
fifty people to train them on “the best approach during a speech to a youth audience.”174  
One session trained one hundred and twenty five young people who “covered” forty-nine 
high schools in only fourteen days. As the speakers program became more popular, 
maintaining this square image of Nixon’s young supporters became difficult. 
YVP speakers had limited room to maneuver and still had to answer for any 
deviation from the company line. These young Nixon representatives toed the party line. 
When Rietz vetted a speech that J. Brian Smith wrote on “Nixon and Youth,”  he 
appreciated the argument’s thrust but could not allow even the slight admission that “It is 
not easy- or natural- for American young people to support” Nixon.175 Smith countered 
that admitting Nixon’s shortcomings in charisma earned credibility with young 
audiences, a sacred value among the 1968-generation.  Rietz went further, arguing, “the 
mistake a lot of people made….is that young people wanted a personality.” Rietz felt that 
Nixon’s leadership presence mattered more, “claiming, His attention to the job of the 
presidency is a plus.”176 Nixon’s youth effort meant to blunt his critics, not concede to 
their impression that Nixon stood on the wrong side of the generation gap. 
The problem of rhetoric, and how Nixon’s campaign speakers related to the 
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generation gap, exposed the contradictions that challenged the White House on the youth 
problem. One campaign worker, claiming to be “co-director of Nixon’s youth issues,” 
raised Rietz’ ire. After this rogue spokesman admitted Nixon’s daughters lacked 
credibility and understood that young voters questioned the significance of what a 
“daughter or grandfather of a candidate says,” the YVP director called for Malek to stem 
this potential embarrassment.  Rietz asked, “I believe in candor as much as anyone else. 
Don’t you think, however, that this going a little too far?”177 In addition, Nixon’s reach to 
young voters attempted to reverse his previous admission during the dark days after Kent 
State that a clear division separated the generations.  In a rare speech to young voters, 
Nixon addressed the annual 4-H conference, an audience squarely set in Nixon’s young 
silent majority, and denied any generation gap existed, claiming that “we should start 
treating young people like everyone else.”  Rietz agreed and criticized a youth speech 
disseminated to Nixon’s speakers, as he argued its theme “young people are concerned, 
etc.” contradicted Nixon’s position and “seems patronizing.”178 
By the final months, the speakers’ campaign demanded even tighter control as the 
YVP stepped up its efforts on campuses. For this task, Rietz utilized youth friendly 
cabinet members such as the first EPA director William Ruckelshaus, HEW secretary 
Elliot Richardson, or the YVP Chairman, Pamela Powell.  While one could predict visits 
at the University of San Fernando’s College of Law Enforcement, community colleges, 
and religious campuses, surrogates also went to larger Northern universities such as 
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Princeton and the University of Michigan to offer students a version of Nixon they would 
find more appealing than the man himself.
179
  Though Nixon’s campaign carefully 
structured the YVP to ensure direction but preserve autonomy during the campaign’s 
early stages, CRP’s leadership would take a more hands on approach to ensure a return 
on its youth effort during the campaign’s final months.  
Registration  
After the 26
th
 Amendment’s ratification, the need to register young voters 
concerned the Nixon administration.  When YVP field-man Tom Bell attended one of 
many voter registration workshops that included mostly left-leaning groups such the 
National Student Association, Young Socialists and the NAACP, he advised that YVP 
leadership should utilize “their supposedly non-partisan registration efforts for our own 
partisan ideals.” Acknowledging that registration of “blacks, poor whites and 18-20 year-
olds is going to be very harmful to us,” Bell noted that “it will be necessary to exert as 
much control as possible on their activities.”180 This thinking inspired the White House to 
pursue its own registration effort to counter the optics of McGovern and new voters.  
After all, registration played a central role in youth politics as first-time voters totaled 
over twenty million in 1972.   
Throughout June and July, 1972, Haldeman peppered different cabinet members, 
asking Secretary Finch, “what are our plans, specifically in regard to youth?” and 
criticizing Magruder that “no effort is currently being conducted to register people in the 
                                                          
179
Rietz to Malek, September 18, 1972.  PFVM Box 43, Folder: Citizens Youth 2 of 2. Nixon Library, 
Yorba Linda, CA. 
180
 Bell to Magruder, “The Youth Vote: Workshop in Voter Registration,” PJM Box 29, Folder: 
Alphabetical, [JSM] Youth 3 of 3. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA. 
291 
 
 
 
18 to 21 year old age bracket.”181 In response, CRP leadership increased its control over 
its youth branch as the registration effort took shape. The daunting task of locating 
Nixon’s young voters sharpened CRP’s advanced capabilities to segment voters. Many 
aspects of youth demographics distinguished between the generations, as six percent 
lived in metropolitan areas and thirty-six percent changed addresses in one year.  Still, 
only seven percent moved out of the state and sixty-three percent of male voters had 
joined the labor force while forty-seven percent of women between eighteen and twenty-
four years old had jobs.
182
Hardly the college provocateurs or the commune dwelling 
drop-outs seen on American film and television. 
  On August 12, over 20,000 YVP volunteers in twenty three different states led a 
registration drive that targeted hundreds of thousands of young voters.  While Rietz 
admitted that the number of new voters registered fell short of expectations, “primary 
emphasis was placed on media attention, not registration.”  Rietz’ report on the coverage 
claimed that over forty newspaper articles and television or radio programs featured the 
YVP volunteers canvassing. Nixon’s daughter and her husband, Tricia and Ed Cox, 
received special attention as they reached out to new voters in suburbia’s center of 
leisure, the shopping mall.  Thus, Rietz argued, “the registration drive can be considered 
successful in terms of publicity,” and Malek agreed “the media attention was well worth 
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the effort.”183Rietz saw the organization’s visibility as a way to both soften Nixon’s 
image for voters of all ages and make supporting Nixon the “in” thing, acceptable to 
young people.  Still, the registration effort required a more grassroots effort that could 
produce better results. 
Under these circumstances, selectivity became the guiding principle behind this 
effort; the project’s name, Target ’72, revealed the focus on registering Nixon voters.  
The volunteers conducting the registration drive came from existing conservative youth 
groups such as the Young Republicans, College Republicans, Teenage Republicans 
(TAR), Jaycees and from local high schools.  With clear instructions for going door to 
door, these volunteers interviewed each person in their assigned area to determine if they 
supported the President.  If not, “the interview is terminated,” as the campaign opted for 
an efficient gathering approach over any lengthy dialogue or persuasive effort.
184
  This 
registration approach looked to find young supporters where they lived.  Rather than rely 
on students, Nixon’s campaign carefully sought out the less concentrated majority of 
young people who did not attend college. Earliest estimates acknowledged Nixon’s 
national approval ratings amongst students dipped to twenty-nine percent, while it 
remained at fifty percent for “18-20 year old non-students.”185 The YVP registration 
guide reminded its members that the “average income of an 18-24 year is $8,000 per 
year, so don’t go into high cost housing areas.” Nixon even saw this as a way to bolster 
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his conservative populism, as he suggested his staff spin the YVP’s selective focus on 
non-college young voters to emphasize that “McGovern people are limiting themselves to 
the elite youth.”186 
The YVP registration guide followed this logic and suggested that door to door 
canvassing proved the most effective strategy, and concentrations of young people could 
be found in metropolitan centers with new housing construction.  In addition, field 
workers looking for young Nixon voters compiled lists of new parents, newlyweds and 
new home owners to get to non-college voters.  For example, his researchers discovered 
that almost all of California’s 2.5 million youth lived in ten of that state’s fifty-eight 
counties, concentrated in the rapidly expanding residential areas of the Southland.
187
  
Nixon’s home state, flush with young voters, looked endangered.  He had barely won 
California in 1968, and Rietz admitted that in that state “we are in very bad shape with 
18-24 year olds.”  With millions of potential first time voters in California, his campaign 
knew exactly where to go.
188
 Even though McGovern’s campaign could brag about a 
fifty-seven percent to forty-one percent edge over Nixon among registered voters that 
August, the growing YVP organization aimed to catch up. Confident in their ability to 
shrink the difference, YVP leaders pointed to the polls that showed forty-six percent of 
those who had not yet registered supported Nixon while only forty-three supported 
McGovern.
189
 Fifty-nine percent of young people between eighteen and twenty four who 
                                                          
186
 Nixon to Haldeman, July 23 1972, Camp David. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA. 
187
 “Politics: GOP Reach to Youth,”Time Magazine, Monday, January 31, 1972. 
188
 Ted Garish to Fred Malek, “State Priorities for Young Voter Division,” September 26, 1972. PFVM Box 
43 Folder Citizens Youth 1 of 2. 
189Terry Ryan, “Nixon Forces Confident They’ll Win Half Youth Vote,” Sarasota Herald Tribune, 
Wednesday, August 16, 1972, p. 5-A. 
294 
 
 
 
did not attend college had not registered as late as August.
190
  Clearly, Nixon’s approach 
required more work than McGovern’s campus focused youth campaign.  
Despite the targeted approach, CRP leaders still had doubts about the youth 
campaign. Malek had little faith in actually winning the youth vote, but saw young 
volunteers as a persuasive force in winning over “the highest priority areas.”191 While 
Malek appreciated the YVP’s effort, he argued that “there will be higher pay-offs for 
registration drives in non-youth areas” and that any attempt to register young people 
“would have to be done on quite a selective basis.”192  Consistent with this pessimism 
about the youth vote itself, Magruder suggested to Malek that Rietz’s “corps” seemed to 
more suited for the “Bumper Blitz” in parking lots, shopping centers, schools, business 
locations and public parking areas to distribute bumper stickers.
193
  While Malek and 
Magruder trusted the YVP leaders on the ground with creating the right affect, Nixon’s 
advisers paid careful attention to maintaining the CRP leadership’s hand in the operation.  
Any preliminary contact that YVP canvassers made had to be recorder in quadruplicate, 
“one will go to the campaign representative who will use it for contacting supporters, one 
for the “Membership Chairman,” and the other two went to the College Director who 
“will send one to Washington for the national mailing list.”194  While inclusiveness met 
the youth’s call for more influence, the campaign still needed its young volunteers for the 
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traditional grunt work that had defined youth politics during the past elections.  
By July, 1972, polls showed that unregistered young voters favored Nixon over 
McGovern by a forty-six to forty-three-percent margin.  With its structure and 
momentum, the one-hundred and fifty paid YVP organizers began to capitalize on their 
work and recruited volunteers on campuses.  In one week, 20,000 students joined the 
YVP ranks, 1,500 in one day volunteered at the University of South Carolina.
195
  
Eventually, over 400,000 young voters joined the YVP and supplied over half of the 
entire campaign work.
196
 Nixon’s incipient youth following may have flown below the 
radar, but it stood ready and able to help Nixon’s re-election.197 
Conclusion 
 Richard Nixon’s youth campaign, despite popular predictions, had become a 
powerful weapon in his campaign for re-election in 1972.  As Nixon’s campaign peeled 
young, non-college voters away from the Democratic Party, party loyalty appeared to 
weaken.  However, it actually became stronger as YVP members injected a new 
independent sensibility that the GOP channeled. The 1968-generation infused the 1972 
election with a new appreciation for a targeted campaign that this shifting electorate 
required.  In addition, young voters provided the ground troops and the wedge to loosen 
traditional regional political loyalties and build new ones among urban ethnics and in the 
Sunbelt. 
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Nixon and his young supporters both deserve credit for this unexpected result. As 
locating and mobilizing young Nixon supporters posed a logistical problem, the YVP 
leaders required discipline and the administration assured that it controlled the 
organization’s structure and hierarchy.  Combining its vast resources and ground-
breaking campaign tactics in polling, registration and organization, the YVP sharpened 
Nixon’s “science-fiction preview of future politics.”198  YVP story shows that this 
“campaign within a campaign” set a model organization for future youth efforts.     
In doing so, the YVP opened the political process to a segment of this generation 
that considered itself a movement.  These “sons and daughters of the silent majority” 
utilized the YVP as a vehicle to announce their presence, and rejuvenated the GOP with a 
leadership cadre that would exert lasting influence.  As YVP leaders agreed Nixon had 
little to do with the energy behind the YVP members’ enthusiastic effort, his presidency 
still became a signature moment in the mobilization of the conservative movement.  As 
Hunter S. Thompson bemoaned the fact that youth politics failed in 1972, scholarship on 
the history of youth politics has continued the argument that McGovern’s effort fell short. 
Remembered as a lost opportunity, or moment, scholars still allude to McGovern’s 
candidacy as the first and last youth campaign. However, Nixon’s young voters proved 
more influential.   
Nixon’s loyal young voters here helped the transition of Democrats to 
Republicans. Even though many voters making this transition registered as independent 
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during this election, young people saw it as the right political position.  This cannot be 
defined as a pure realignment as the party politics did not drive the political environment.  
Cathy Bertini claimed, “Young voters didn’t want to be the party, and CR didn’t want to 
be consumed by the campaign.” Still, this Nixon friendly version of independents varied 
greatly from the liberal leaning, anti-party independent youth who McGovern courted 
(and encouraged). While independent voters assumed a fluid reputation, their political 
direction charted a larger shift in party politics to the politics of image.  As the next 
chapter shows, young independents required an image-conscious campaign that Nixon 
could not provide up to this point.  Now that he could claim a portion of the Now 
Generation, Nixon’s advisors found a way he could transition from the law and order 
image that defined his original relationship with young Americans. Nixon had finally 
gotten past the youth problem. 
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Chapter Seven 
“Right On, Mr. President” 
 
 The night before Richard Nixon accepted the Republican Party’s re-nomination 
for the 1972 presidential election in the Miami Convention Center, his clean-cut, well-
mannered but exuberant Young Voters for the President (YVP) volunteers attended a 
concert in nearby Marine Stadium.  In the audience, over 6,000 young people combined 
to celebrate the President and their own emergence on the political scene.  Performing on 
the floating stage, Sammy Davis Jr. kept the crowd going until the Chairwoman of the 
YVP, Pam Powell, led Nixon to the center of the stage where he addressed the crowd.   In 
his memoirs, Nixon recalled the event’s electric environment, as he wrote, “Hands above 
their heads, four fingers outstretched, the thousands of young people took up a chant that 
I was hearing for the first time: “Four more years! Four more years! It was deafening.” 
Observing the moments’ significance, Nixon glowed, “It was music. This was a new kind 
of Republican youth: they weren’t square, but they weren’t ashamed of being positive 
and proud.”1 This moment provided the culmination of YVP organizers efforts, as a 
strong YVP presence at the RNC fueled Rietz’ original plan to disprove the popular 
perception that young people disliked the President. 
 Speaking to the audience, Nixon emphasized his young supporters’ 
independence, telling them “nobody has the youth vote in their pocket.”  Then, after 
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praising Sammy Davis Jr., the rat packer snuck up behind the leader of the free world and 
squeezed him with both arms.  Startled, Nixon awkwardly allowed Davis to cling onto his 
side until he let go and sheepishly receded to the backstage.  While “the hug” lasted only 
seconds, it brought the crowd to a frenzy and earned popular press as Time dedicated a 
two page spread to a photograph of the brief embrace in Miami. To Nixon’s detractors, 
this awkward moment with Sammy Davis Jr. exposed the President’s inability to be hip.  
To Nixon’s advisers, the event hit just the right tone, as they agreed that young 
Americans “just wanted to be taken seriously and heard.”2  Furthermore, simply 
appearing with young supporters showed voters, young and old, that Richard Nixon could 
be “in.” As Bill Brock recalled the hug, he explained: “Man that is powerful television, to 
have that going on in the middle of four thousand young people hootin' and hollerin'.”3 
While liberal critics such as Hunter S. Thompson dismissed the YVP members as 
“waterheads” and one prominent anchor compared them to “sewer workers,” this robust 
cadre of loyal supporters substantiated Nixon’s image as the president for all Americans. 
Nixon’s staff identified the special significance the youth vote carried for all voters; 
pointing out that visible and potent youth support for a candidate would “allay fears that 
the young people, and indeed many adults, would not accept him.”4 Without a compliant 
press, CRP leaders combined their own resources to make Nixon’s campaign image; the 
YVP and the high powered executives who volunteered for Nixon’s personal ad agency, 
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the November Group, worked together to counter the anti-Nixon youth narrative.    
When the twenty-sixth amendment lowered the voting age to eighteen in 1971, 
this youth image became central as the liberal youth revolt in the 1960s and President 
Richard Nixon’s cultural personification of the generation gap inspired pundits, political 
scientists and even Nixon’s personal pollster, Robert Teeter, to predict potent youth 
support for the Democratic challenger, Senator George McGovern.
5
   As the Nixon youth 
campaign gained steam, the national media overlooked its success and the movement that 
fueled it.
6
 With the YVP, Nixon’s administration now wanted to contradict McGovern’s 
widely accepted claim to a liberal youth vote.   
Nixon’s YVP image offered an effective way to mobilize voters, young and old, 
on the cultural issues that Wattenberg and Scammon had underlined: “crime, violence, 
drugs, disruption, riot, out-of-wedlock birth, promiscuity, that whole panoply of issues."
7
 
These issues effected how voters felt about a candidate.  This personal politics mattered 
even more now that party loyalty could not be entrusted to political machines. Nixon’s 
square young supporters inflated McGovern’s extremist character, as personality traits 
became increasingly significant in this image-focused environment. As Nixon’s Chief of 
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Staff wrote in his diary, “we need savage attack lines against the McGovern positions. 
Get McGovern tied as an extremist.”  Exaggerating the differences between the two 
candidates’ images, their respective young voters became a proxy for their political 
culture. Haldeman continued: “get the maximum number of pictures of rowdy people 
around McGovern, while we go for the all-out-square America.”8 
 As CRP director, Jeb Magruder, recalled, Nixon felt the youth vote mattered “not 
so much for its substance-voters registered, volunteers enlisted-as for its PR benefits.”9 
Reflecting on the 1968 Youth for Nixon campaign, Nixon’s advisor Mort Allin pointed 
out the potential for this effort to provoke more creative spectacle through different 
media forms in 1972.  “Youth, with its flair for the unique and far out,” prodded Allin, 
“can be the division that flies in the face of traditionalism.”10  While Allin focused on 
posters, this creative space in Nixon’s otherwise stodgy campaign allowed for Nixon’s 
YVP to spice things up.  It would be this area where the “creative revolution,” a new 
advertising era that sold with youth but also sold to youth, would exercise its fullest 
potential in merging Madison Avenue with the White House.  As YVP’s College Director 
George Gorton pointed out, “In addition to Ken [Rietz] getting them, it was a matter of 
showcasing them.”11 This way, the president could win the all-important image war 
without the eastern media establishment he detested. 
Nixon’s effort to reach independent young voters and their vulnerability to image 
politics further motivated a carefully constructed media effort to display the YVP.  One 
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November Group executive, Bill Novelli, pointed out the line Nixon had to straddle, 
warning in a March, 1972 memo: “to present the president as a mod candidate of youthful 
orientation would perhaps: invite disbelief, invite ridicule, damage the Nixon image held 
by the 35+ voter.”12  In pursuit of this welcoming image, Nixon’s re-election efforts 
focused disproportionate attention to building a visible youth campaign. Nixon’s 
campaign used young voters to highlight the President’s credibility as they often carried 
signs reading, “Nixon’s the One,” and produced songs with the chorus, “more than ever, 
we need Nixon now.”  Predictably, opponents challenged the YVP’s legitimacy, as one 
student quipped that while McGovern’s “long hair” youth aimed to “end lies and deceit,” 
the YVP’s well-manicured members “traded their David Cassidy buttons for Nixon 
banners.”13  As liberal students dismissed the YVP’s authenticity, Nixon’s young voters 
challenged the notion that the president still had a youth problem.  
To make his youth image authentic, Nixon’s television ads packaged his record to 
mobilize the president’s young supporters. This focused effort forced the long, traditional 
“man on the street” ads into obsolescence as the commercials began to sell candidates in 
short spots that just tried to reach the right people. More economical, the thirty second ad 
also made its point more efficiently and effectively. “How long does it take to say to 
young people, 'Richard Nixon gave you the vote, stopped the draft, and is winding down 
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the war?'" asked November group’s creative editor, Bill Taylor.14 These issues- the 
challenging terrain Nixon negotiated during his first term- set the terms for the 
President’s image. Melding of this new advertising style and politics emphasized the 
ways in which television moved American politics into the living room, and away from 
the bread and butter issues that dominated the kitchen table.   
This chapter argues that young Americans transition into the political system 
compelled politicians to adopt the politics of image.  For Nixon, the YVP allowed his 
administration to make full use of the modern image politics that he had found so 
problematic as a candidate and as president. Since Joe McGinnis’ biting criticism of 
Nixon’s 1968 packaged candidacy, The Selling of the President, scholars have followed 
the notion that the New Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of the “image-is-everything 
president.”15 Judging by the youth vote, Nixon’s image politics in 1972 provides a more 
complete picture of a modern campaign. In his campaign for re-election, Nixon’s image 
relied on the combination of organization, policy and slick advertisements and television 
appearances. Many observers continued to criticize the new superficial, image-based 
political style, as one study came to the conclusion that “1972 could scarcely be labeled 
an issue election.”16 As one political insider quipped, with television, “you could run a 
candidate who is maybe in a mental hospital” as “the techniques of political image 
makers often work in the service of distortion…life-and death issues disposed of in ten 
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seconds.”17Popular in 1968, this cynical interpretation missed the mark as issues did 
matter in 1972. Rather than separate issues from image, the November Group’s 
advertising gurus built on their relationship and created a youthful campaign by collaging 
Nixon’s record on the Vietnam War, the draft, the environment and the voting age. This 
powerful connection between the YVP and his personal media wing showed that the 
image-making process in politics developed as a telling window into the period’s larger 
and structural concerns.  In this case, Nixon’s politics of image shows that youth had 
emerged as a political force. 
The YVP and Nixon’s Image Strategy 
In planning the organizational outline in September, 1971, Rietz asserted that 
young people would not simply change tune and buy Nixon. Thus, the task required more 
than a straight sales job. Were it that easy, wrote Rietz to CREEP’s director, Jeb 
Magruder, “It would have been a simple matter to propose an expenditure of millions of 
dollars on mass media.”  Rather, Rietz argued that “organization will have a real 
impact.”18  Still, Rietz’ background as a public relations expert colored his overall view 
of the youth’s significance, as he revealed the project’s ultimate goal to get youth actively 
involved “so the overall campaign takes on a young flavor.”19Rietz’ effort also meant to 
undermine Nixon’s opponents, boasting that, “We will beat them in the area that 
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McGovern has made a key element of his campaign."
20
  While the College Republicans 
increasingly felt they had become part of the campaign, not just window dressing, they 
also understood their symbolic role.  In one CR newsletter, Karl Rove asked if some 
volunteers could come to the headquarters early for a photo shoot of “young people 
stuffing envelopes alongside little old ladies.”21 
 In many ways, Nixon had to flaunt his youth campaign. As Finch clarified in a 
memo to the President, “Parents expect public officials to work with youth. Adults want 
their youth to participate legitimately, even though unproductively, within the system.” 
While even “long haired and mod dressed” young campaign workers could increase a 
candidates votes, Finch argued that “if youth turns off a candidate it can mean adult 
rejections.”22 Thus, the November Group’s ads harkened back to the 1960s youth Nixon 
would rather remember.
23
 While one J.C. Penny executive claimed: “the appeal to the 
young is heard by many who are in their 30s and 40s,” A BBDO study went even further, 
arguing that “Since the need of a “younger” image appears quite suddenly (at about 25), 
it should probably be kept in mind that in selling to people under 25, the ‘youthful’ 
appeal may not be effective.”24 While YVP organizers felt older voters would appreciate 
the YVP’s image, the youth campaign focused on winning over young voters. 
Young Republican leaders learned the centrality of image in campaigning, and 
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though pictures with “little old ladies” did not exactly make Nixon hip, Rove tried to help 
make the President “in.”  Selling buttons that read “I Give a Damn,” Rove wrote, “This is 
just the thing for the socially-concerned, right on Republican.”25  Referring to another, 
“VotePower” button, a CR official wrote Rove, “The button really did wonders for me, it 
boosted my ego.”26 With this growth in morale, the President’s young supporters could 
stand up and be counted. 
When asked how the November Group’s executives in the campaign taught the 
YVP about selling a candidate, Rietz responded, “they learned from us.”27  November 
Group observers found Rietz’ focus groups with young people surprisingly successful.  
For example, after a room full of young people almost unanimously opposed the 
President, these same first-time voters proved much more “sympathetic” to Nixon’s 
presidency when YVP leaders separated them into smaller groups and discussed his 
policies on major youth issues.
28
 When young people felt involved, many of the subjects 
dropped their concern to be hip in their peers’ eyes and admitted they supported the 
president.  Thus, as the YVP image helped Nixon contrast his square campaign with 
McGovern’s’ “extremists,” it also gave Nixon’s campaign the motivation to hone its 
argument to a particular voting bloc.   
Rietz carefully targeted the youth vote, underlining the President’s ability to 
segment particular voter groups (Polish for Nixon!). While Jeb Magruder set up plans to 
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attack enemies with a rifle, rather than shotgun technique, he issued a lesser known “rifle 
memo” to his boss, John Mitchell.  “There has been evidence that certain techniques of 
direct, targeted, ‘rifle-shot’ communications to voters can substantially augment a 
candidate's mass media image,” argued Magruder. “These techniques use past voting 
data, socia-economic data and public opinion.”29 
This new advertising style relied heavily on targeted research, data and polling to 
reach the youth segment with the most effective image. In the campaign’s earliest days 
during the summer of 1971, Rietz obtained the services of the Playboy Enterprises’ 
subsidiary, College Marketing Corporation, “a successful firm having a revenue of 
$1,300,000 in the 14 months they have been in business.”   With its experience in 
surveying students for corporations concerning “brand preference studies, brand name 
testing and brand package testing,” Rietz quickly found this developing field in 
marketing especially useful in “finding out what the youth vote is thinking about.” This 
research also gathered information on campus leaders, publications and radio or TV 
stations with influence. The firm’s director and New York Stock Exchange member W. 
Peter Hass pledged the support free of charge, as Rietz reported that “they are all 
Republicans.”30  While Nixon protested the liberal media establishment, his allies on 
Madison Avenue brought him a strong advantage.  The youth campaign offered an 
important vehicle to combine political appeals for votes with business’ appeals for 
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customers.  With the giant resources this alliance provided to Nixon’s campaign, the 
November group worked closely with YVP research to find common ground amongst 
this emerging youth constituency. 
Young American’s first concern, the environment and the Vietnam War, stood out 
as priorities in the early polling data of eighteen to twenty four- year-old new voters.
31
  
The CRP even had non-valid postage stamps made that read Generation of Peace (GOP) 
with Nixon’s picture.  Though, this hardly mapped out a clear route for the youth 
campaign. CRP Citizens Division director Fred Malek pointed out this changing dynamic 
in March 1972, “I do not think we can lock on our posture regarding Vietnam for several 
months.”32 Nixon as the peace candidate could not yet work, but Bill Novelli’s research 
showed the November Group could start with the candidate’s reputation. The President 
ranked poorly in the categories of “relaxed,” “warm,” “extroverted,” sense-of-humor” 
and “up-to-date.”  While Nixon’s campaign to recruit young voters rested on his 
accomplishments and hoped to soften his image, his campaign aimed to be “believable” 
by emphasizing Nixon’s strengths as he received high rankings in categories such as 
“experienced,” “trained” and “informed.”33 
Talking to young voters also gave Nixon’s advisors a way to address his larger 
image agenda.  Bill Gavin, Assistant Director of the United States Information Agency 
claimed that the “Nixon machine was animated by an unspoken but fierce love on the 
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part of all of us for the Boss. That same love can be communicated by the President to all 
young Americans (and of course to the media)…”34 Undeniably, a mod Nixon in an 
unusual double breasted jacket, loud patterns, long hair, a wide belt and tight low-rise 
pants would have been hilarious. Thus, Nixon in control, but not out of step became the 
desired balance.  This meant the YVP needed more attention.  
One poster depicted the President from behind his hunched shoulders, as he stood 
hands in pockets, leaning against a wall in the oval office and peering out his window.  
The slogan claimed that America needed “coolness,” “intelligence,” and “a sense of 
history” more than it needed “clarion calls,” “charisma,” and histrionics.”35  Nixon’s 
advisers disagreed over this image’s effectiveness, as it turned Nixon’s back to the 
viewer, and could reinforce his distant reputation.  After extensive polling, young voters 
rated this highest among Nixon’s posters, receiving a more favorable response than both 
the “Peace in Vietnam” and “Environment” posters.  This picture made Nixon 
presidential and thoughtful, something they welcomed amid this period’s vitriol and 
exhaustion with the 1960s turbulent legacy.  The November Group attempted to soften 
Nixon’s image, as another poster of the President walking with his wife especially 
resonated with Nixon’s young voters.  One of his twenty-three year old campaign 
workers approved, “You know that one picture of him walking along the beach in sports 
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clothes? I think that’s the most effective shot we have of him.”36  While Nixon famously 
walked the beach in a suit for a previous photo-shoot, fulfilling his square reputation, the 
YVP posters presented a slightly more casual Nixon. 
 Under this assumption, CRP dissected and courted the youth segment like any 
other.  Behind this ambitious plan, Rietz laid out the strength of “peer group pressure” 
which he defined as maximum involvement and exposure of youth as a means of 
convincing more youth to join in Nixon’s re-election effort.  While Rietz focused on 
building the YVP membership, Nixon’s young supporters also developed the symbolic 
significance CRP leaders needed to improve Nixon’s image for all voters. 
In the summer of 1972, CRP leader Fred Malek expressed concern about “how 
little we have done in a broad PR sense.”  When one YVP organizer contacted Malek 
about obtaining a New York Times film clip on the new voting rights to be shown in high 
school classrooms, Malek responded, “Quit worrying about this peripheral shit and let’s 
get going on mass media plan.”37 This new impetus came as the campaign shifted its 
sights toward the convention and looked to expand its reach beyond the GOP base. 
Nixon’s advisers anxiously pushed the YVP leaders to utilize their symbolic value and 
improve the president’s standing in image politics.  
Rietz acted cautiously concerning public relations. For example, the YVP 
Chairman consulted a State Young Voters Committee; consisting of young celebrities 
and athletes who actively supported the President. The Young Voters Committee offered 
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good public relations through speaking engagements, television appearances and 
attending YVP events.  Rietz had always emphasized that organization made the media 
and not vice versa, and he made sure to separate the two. As the YVP offices began to 
spread in the spring of 1972, Rietz recommended that “the Young Voters Committee 
have as much of a separate identification as possible.”38 While Rietz valued the role these 
big names played, to confuse them with the organization would risk stigmatizing the 
YVP as commercial.   
Young celebrities played an important role in publicizing Nixon’s youth 
campaign and attracting new voters. While Nixon developed a wide and varied group of 
television stars, athletes and entertainers, critics in the media continued to demean 
Nixon’s youth effort and handed the youth vote to the “in” candidate, McGovern. In 
response, as the Celebrities for the President’s director, Raymond Caldiero, fired off a 
letter to Newsweek about one article that indicated Nixon could suffer with the youth 
vote. The article seemed especially dangerous as it ignored Nixon’s celebrities and rallies 
that targeted young voters.  Caldiero listed the new members of the “Performers for the 
President,” including The Carpenters and Allen Osmond among others who would 
provide “entertainment suitable for rallies for young people.”  Caldiero fumed that 
Newsweek instead ignored this effort, and focused on “a so-called division…a division in 
which the young always support Senator McGovern.”39  In May of 1972, this Celebrity 
Division proved effective in defending Nixon as “in,” and Magruder suggested to 
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Rietzthat “it would be useful for us to have many more young celebrities who are 
appealing to young people.”40 Young voters for Nixon also became useful in drawing 
celebrities to speak on the president’s behalf.  Buchanan wrote Magruder about one such 
celebrity, Elvis Presley, who promised to “pop for some loot” if granted a position on 
“some antidrug commission.”  Buchanan added, Presley would only contribute if 
approached “by the right young guy” as he was “turned off by older folks.”41 Of course, 
the King never joined the Nixon campaign as his presence would have been a departure 
from the YVP’s square political culture. 
While John Lennon staged concerts to register young McGovern supporters that 
doubled as protests against Nixon’s war on drugs, Nixon used celebrities to communicate 
his anti-drug message to young people.  As one memo advised, “drugs seem to be the 
best issues to involve celebrities with the President. Witness the success with Sammy 
Davis Jr.”42 Nixon’s campaign managers used surrogates counter McGovern’s 
Woodstock  image, meaning they could not resist athletes’ growing celebrity.  Besides, 
OJ Simpson projected a more wholesome personality than the “limousine liberals” from 
Hollywood.  When Shirley McClain and Warren Beatty rounded off McGovern’s so-
called “sparkles,” Nixon sent Miami Dolphins linebacker Nick Buonicotti or Miss USA, 
Debbie Shelton.  In addition to the celebrities, Nixon’s rally organizers displayed young 
women in matching outfits, the Nixonettes, to differentiate his young supporters from 
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hippies.  
In fact, CRP developed two campaign divisions under the YVP for young women; 
the Nixonettes, young women in matching Nixon campaign regalia, and the Nixonaires, 
airplane stewardesses who attended rallies in their flight uniforms.  Most visible, the 
Nixonettes added vitality to Nixon’s appearances, as they always popped up adorned in 
their red wrap around skirt with blue borders, cotton flop hat in white or blue, a silk YVP 
scarf and a button that read, “Get to Know a Nixonette.”43 The manual for “rally men” 
instructed them to recruit “good-looking college girls…Get as many as 
possible…hundreds, thousands.”  Their presence played a central role in Nixon’s image, 
as the manual suggested, “Always attempt to have these girls at the front of the crowd so 
they will be picked up by the TV and wire photos cameras.”44 Led by Angela Miller and 
Pam Powell from the YVP national office, this effort crystallized New Republicans’’ 
effort to modernize the GOP’s image.   
Powell, the twenty-four year-old daughter of actor and singer Dick Powell, 
became the National Chairwoman of the YVP. After she had been a Nixonette in 1968, 
Powell emerged as the prominent leader in Nixon’s youth effort.  As one journalist put it, 
the “fresh faced, petite blond” became the “youth symbol of the Nixon campaign.”45 
Speaking on the President’s behalf, Powell praised his efforts to hire more women, 
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claiming “I’ve never had a problem being a woman. It has, in many cases, helped me.”46 
Personally, Nixon’s view of his young women volunteers betrayed his outdated views, as 
he thanked a group of campaign staffers, “I know what you men do…I know it’s difficult 
for your wife to think about you out there with all those cute little ‘Nixonaires’ and 
‘Nixonettes’ and everything.”47 Still, even as Nixon himself denigrated the Nixonettes’ 
significance, they too found their position in politics elevated due to youth politics. When 
fixated on, they emphasized older women’s emerging role in modern politics.  Nixon’s 
use of young women meant to spice things up, but also targeted the forty-nine year old 
woman in Ohio who Scammon and Wattenberg defined as the average American voter.
48
 
Campaigning with younger women also glued Madison Avenue’s segmented 
public relations techniques to modern politics. Researchers in Nixon’s Women Voters for 
the President relied on polls that Virginia Slims conducted in preparation for an ad 
campaign launching a new cigarette “geared essentially to the ‘liberated’ woman.”  For 
younger women, “Not enough jobs, equal opportunity, salaries” topped the issues that 
revealed resentment about their role in society.  The Nixonaires (or Stewardesses for 
Nixon) accomplished a slightly different image, as their occupation had become 
synonymous with the new, exciting opportunities for young women in the 1960s.  A 
group of Pan-Am ladies up front greeting Nixon at the airport produced exactly the 
desired affect to communicate Nixon’s support for what Virginia Slims called, “the 
liberated woman.” To reach this constituency, Nixon’s campaign decided to integrate 
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women into every level of the campaign, and not to develop a separate Women’s 
Division.  Under this plan, “Women will be seen everywhere and on all levels of the 
Nixon 1972 campaign.”49  Women did hold important positions in the YVP, as Bertini, 
Miller and Powell showed. The YVP campaign appealed to both younger women and 
their mothers.   
As for the women at home, the campaign’s “Program for Women” stressed the 
“sensitivity to the new self-awareness of women,” pointing out that “women watch twice 
as many television hours as men, and hear three times as many radio hours.”  In addition, 
the research showed that with the advent of the birth control pill, more women worked 
and had more money and influence over family expenditures. As a result, media savvy 
women often “know far more than her husband about public events.”50 Nixon’s clean 
version of America’s youth offered an appealing vision to American women with 
children, as a Harris Poll in 1970 showed the “difficulty to raise children, drugs, 
generation gap” as the greatest problem in being a woman.51 
  In Nixon’s campaign, the participatory politics mattered, but making it look 
good became the focus. Still, Nixon’s campaign combined issues, organization and image 
to create a single objective-- counter peer group pressure that worked against the 
President. One way to do this, mass media, gave the YVP direct access to young voters 
and the opportunity to take Rietz’  work with small groups and test it on a larger scale.  If 
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YVP leaders could persuade young people to support Nixon in a small room, a similar 
argument on the issues through posters, television and radio could do the same.   
Media, Advertising and Image 
 Young voters, more than any other segment, looked at the candidate and not the 
party.  As Robert Finch wrote to the President, “Since youth are not locked into party 
they will join with and adhere to individual candidates.”52 While Mort Allin admitted, 
“The hippies, yippies and malcontents will never be ours,” he held faith that there existed 
“a majority of latent moderate student supporters who will work for a man whom they 
respect and who shows an interest in their support.”53 
As the youth vote pushed Nixon’s campaign to develop its image making 
capabilities, the CRP absorbed the corporate advertising world’s fascination with youth 
and segmenting groups. Business simultaneously decided to “welcome the questioning of 
the young,” as Nixon’s former ad agency that created the Pepsi Generation, Batten 
BarstonDurstine and Osborn (BBDO), invited eight student leaders into their new “‘ad 
lab’ for a rap session.”  While the students agreed that “Capitalism is, in reality, socialism 
for the few,” they learned about “the genuinely good things businessmen are doing in the 
area of ecology,” citing the paper industry for “going all out to make their products bio-
degradable.”  In radio coverage of the meeting, the announcer commented, “They [young 
people] are not always right, but it would be healthy for the country if the business 
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community started listening to them.”54  This could easily pass for political advice as 
well, and Nixon’s youth campaign quickly obtained BBDO’s video tape of the session for 
research. Selling with youth had become an art form. Of course, as Allin pointed out, 
“Richard Nixon is not Bill Brock.” “Image-wise,” Allin conceded, Brock’s “concern and 
understanding of youth—we aren’t going to realistically develop.”55 Making Nixon’s 
campaign image more hip and believable required a media effort to highlight the 
president’s young supporters.   
 Entrusted with this mission, Nixon’s campaign managers brought together the 
best and the brightest of American advertising.  Many of Nixon’s CRP directors shared a 
background in public relations and advertising. The November Group, comprised entirely 
of advertising executives, fulfilled this pattern.  A publication on the election published in 
1973, Financing the1972 Elections, described the November Group as CRP’s 
“advertising arm” which produced television programs, documentaries and specialized 
campaign materials such as posters and campaign brochures targeted towards specific 
voting groups. Peter Dailey, the in-house PR firm’s director, exemplified the high caliber 
pedigree they all shared.  While Peter Dailey ran his own high priced LA firm, other 
members such as Phil Joanou came from the prestigious Doyle Dane and Bernbach.  
According to Dailey, the campaign set out to build on the incumbency and highlight 
Nixon’s accomplishments to emphasize Nixon’s presidential, non-campaign. “There was 
only one candidate,” explained Dailey, “and then there was the President.” Dailey’s first 
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priority was to build Nixon’s campaign on a “peace generation.”56 The political ads now 
targeted a particular segment, they based their position on extensive scientific polling and 
they geared the advertisements towards creating differences between the candidates.  
Thus, Nixon young voters became the perfect actors to focus this effort. 
After Nixon’s first term, Magruder pointed out that people had already developed 
a static idea of Nixon’s television image.57  Supporting this mission, the November 
Group hit the airwaves to publicize Nixon’s interactions with young people.  Thus, 
Nixon’s campaign managers recorded songs, sung by YVP, for distribution to YVP 
supporters, along with other folksy tunes that always incorporated the lyrics “Nixon 
Now.”  This combination balanced the slogan’s urgent call for a strong, disciplined leader 
with the soft, harmonies of 1970s pop music. Nixon’s image makers saw the YVP as a 
way to dull Nixon’s stigma and the public’s sharpest criticism that he lacked a human 
side and charisma. For example, the November Group’s George Karalekas complained to 
radio and television station managers that he would “rather be up against a nice Coke, or 
Pepsi, or Canada Dry than a banging Excedrin spot.”  The soft drink branding set the tone 
they desired, as Karalekas made clear, “We’d prefer non-abrasive commercials around 
us.”58 
Soft drink advertisements offered a model style for the November group. Pepsi’s 
youth-centered television commercials began with an ominous beginning; a car driven 
down a hill toward a lake, young people whizzing around on strange contraptions or a 
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camera zooming closer and closer into a road on a hillside.  In each case, the dangerous 
image and music become lighthearted as the commercials show thrill-seeking young 
people before the soothing, Pepsi jingle calms viewers and urge them to “Come Alive!!!”  
All in thirty seconds, the ads project the frenetic energy of a generation and a comforting 
resolution.  Pepsi-Cola president Roger Enrico summed up the youth’s appeal to 
consumers, explaining, “We can appeal to the broader audience through the eyes of 
youth.” Youth culture had achieved new significance in America, as Pepsi exhibited the 
blueprint for putting “a youthful mindset on the product emphasizing vitality, excitement, 
being on the cutting edge.”59 Nixon’s in-house advertising team that included BBDO’s 
high powered executives duplicated this effort to sell the President.    
When Nixon did use television, the YVP played an important role in undermining 
his static,” “abrasive” image. One commercial, titled “Youth,” speaks directly to the 
November Group's efforts to build his youth image on his record and their own notion of 
selling to youth.  Beginning with a menacing, dark, dangerous and fast paced rift, a deep 
voice in an accusatory tone lists the youths demands over images of young people 
protesting, “You ask for an end to the war, you wanted peace , you said the draft was 
unfair, you asked for a say in our government, you wanted a voice in your future, you 
said why isn’t something being done to save our environment.”  The music and 
announcer rose to a crescendo, “you spoke out for change, you asked for reform, you 
wanted a better America,” when they both cut out giving way to Nixon’s inauguration 
speech as he calmly suggested, “we cannot learn from one another, until we stop shouting 
                                                          
59
 Lawrence Graham, Youthtrends: Capturing the $200 Billion Youth Market (New York: St. Martin’s Press 
1987), p.6. 
320 
 
 
 
at one another.”  The ad then lists Nixon’s achievements in winding down the war, 
ending the draft, supporting the twenty- sixth amendment to lower the voting age and his 
environmental reform.  As a candidate of change, this approach to young voters 
communicated that the job remained unfinished, and that “we need President Nixon, now 
more than ever.”60 
One similar Nixon ad begins with an upbeat tune as Young Voters for the 
President members sing in chorus, “making dreams reality, more than ever Nixon Now 
for you and me.”  The montage of still shots shifts from a butterfly on a flower, to other 
pastoral landscapes and then begins to show young people filled with extreme joy as 
couples embrace in a sun splashed open field or frolic in the ocean.   Thirty seconds into 
the two minute commercial, Nixon can finally be found wading into crowds of jubilant 
young supporters when the image shifts to a YVP office and its window adorned with 
signs reading, “We Luv the Pres” and “Happiness is Nixon.”  As the song continues, 
“reaching out across the sea, making friends where, foes used to be,” the montage 
continues with close ups of Nixon’s notable visits to China and the Soviet Union.  
Cognizant of his silent majority, the ad continues with footage of Nixon’s visit to a 
construction site teaming with loyal hardhats.  Then, the commercial flashed a still shot 
of a young smiling couple, holding hands as they ran barefoot through puddles. As one 
critique observed about these ads, “They are various and inclusive. They appear, in 
catchy tunes and in specific directed issues, to reach out to all Americans, not simply the 
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‘average’ ones in the factory.”61  With its youth image, Nixon’s campaign deflected his 
youth syndrome and tried making Nixon likeable to everyone.   
Nixon’s ad campaign for youth maintained its socially conservative sensibility. 
This Pepsi-like version of youth culture that dominated ads of the early and mid-1960s 
focused on the squares within this segment. As one Pepsi executive admitted in 1969, 
“overnight, those tanned, frolicsome happy go-lucky people began to become advertising 
anachronisms.”  Now, Pepsi’s youthful fantasy “became square to the very people we 
were aiming at.”62 Despite this conservative approach, this outreach to young people had 
limits as one ad quickly yielded a conservative critique that Nixon had “aligned with the 
hippie vote.”63  Congressman Ben Blackburn from Georgia, annoyed after watching the 
ad that showed “the President has done many of the things the kooks wanted,” called 
Nixon’s campaign aides to complain that “straight citizens resent catering to that 
element.”64  In turn, CRP leaders pulled the ad.  While Magruder explained that 
television commercials were not as effective in reaching young people as “activities on 
college campuses and elsewhere,”65Magruder’s decision showed that the silent majority’s 
persistent anxieties about adolescents and law and order politics pushed Nixon’s 
campaign to tread carefully with the youth image. While television and media played an 
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important role in Nixon’s effort to highlight his YVP, the campaign had to show that it 
included young voters as well.   
Convention and Rallies 
 After years of planning made the YVP successful, the Republican National 
Convention thrust Nixon’s cadre of young supporters into the limelight.  In the months 
leading up to the RNC, Nixon made it clear that more had to be made of the YVP’s 
members on the PR front.  Nixon built an “Open Door” theme for the convention to 
balance his critique of McGovern’s quota system.66 The YVP convention plan aimed to 
“take advantage of the coverage of the national news media to identify the President with 
young people.”67Rietz had predicted this necessity, and built the youth campaign, from its 
beginnings, around a strong YVP presence at the RNC.  On this stage, the plan suggested, 
“We can show him constantly surrounded by young people-our kind of young people; 
young people who will not turn off the electorate viewing the convention.”68 In an article 
on the convention, Variety Magazine described it as "the biggest commercial freebee 
since television began," and the administration would not miss this opportunity to 
showcase the YVP in action.
69
 Once they arrived, “the boys beardless, the girls firmly 
bra-ed,” over 3,000 members broke up into three sections.70  Leadership for the sections 
came from the national youth campaign headquarters’ salaried staff, while each section 
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then divided into ten, one hundred person “units,” consisting of  ten “teams” of ten young 
people.
71
 
Once congregated in a nearby school that one cynic dubbed “the pen,” the YVP’s 
steering committee assigned each group to a job, ranging from transportation to sign 
painters. Maintaining the priority on discipline, they all stood on call for rallies, 
unplanned events and Presidential appearances.
72
  As the YVP  staff director explained, 
“If the President calls and says, ‘I need 500 kids at a press conference,’ we can get them 
there in 20 minutes.”73 YVP members who studied journalism interviewed their 
colleagues and sent tapes or stories back to their hometown newspapers. Operated out of 
a room at the Fontainebleau, the College Republican executive director, Karl Rove, 
directed the youth desk that informed reporters about youth activities while he recruited 
potential CR club organizers. The CRP leaders still took precautions as the YVP made 
Nixon’s advisers nervous about controlling the square Nixon brand. While the YVP 
volunteers selected to attend the convention represented the cream of the crop, Nixon’s 
campaign managers saw controlling thousands of young people as a potential problem.
74
 
YVP’s leadership developed a legal assistance program with forty volunteer attorney’s to 
make sure young volunteers did not get arrested, and if they did, get them out of jail as 
fast as possible.
75
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In contrast, representing Nixon’s enemies, a “carnival of protesters” built a tent 
city in nearby Flamingo Park.  Here, Yippies, Zippies, Vietnam Veterans Against the 
War, Jesus Freaks and others welcomed visitors to the “people’s liberated zone of 
revolutionary living, organizing and non-violent direct action.”76  These groups varied in 
concerns, as the Yippies’ leaders Abbie Hoffman attempted to organize young working 
class Americans around a class based critique of America while the Jesus Freaks urged 
their drug-consuming counterparts to find an authentic life through religion.  This park 
symbolized the fractured state of the New Left’s factions, their differences caused 
constant chaos and confrontation between them.  Furthermore, some groups that focused 
on more political issues, such as the VVAW, moved to another part of the park to avoid 
the counter-culture’s stigma.  Nixon’s staff had discussed several plans to head off any 
disruptions including pushing local universities to hold finals for summer classes during 
the convention, shutting down the schools altogether, or holding an alternative 
conference for young people that would “draw the crowd from the inevitable march on 
the convention center.”77 
Still, the networks mostly ignored the presence of the protestors and the 
tumultuous activity outside the convention that resulted in small scale rioting and 
thousands of arrests.  Abbie Hoffman complained, “We got a fucking elephant dragging a 
fucking coffin down the street and we can’t even get on the 11 o’clock news.”78  The 
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network’s reporters had reason to comply due to the Nixon administration’s barrage of 
attacks unleashed against network executives, reporters, journalists and newspaper 
editors for their perceived liberal bias.  Nixon's poster boy for the Republican Party, 
California Governor Ronald Reagan, claimed that broadcasters "pander to the drug 
culture, allow obscenity on the air, and turn over their facilities to those who shout 
revolution."
79
  More concretely, Nixon pushed Federal Communication Commission 
officials to demand information on documentaries such as CBS' "The Selling of the 
Pentagon" due to accusations of "news staging."  Morley Safer, the co-host of the 
documentary based program "60 Minutes," confirmed the defensive posture networks 
consequently assumed, accusing Nixon's administration of carefully planting "doubt in 
this country about what we print or show or say."  Continuing his criticism of this 
"planned program of misinformation" and its chilling effect on the press, Safer 
complained that Nixon's administration had "done for the truth what the Boston Strangler 
has done for the door-to-door salesman."
80
 
While the network’s reporters ignored Flamingo Park, some print journalists 
acknowledged the protestors.  These articles usually enhanced the protestors’ 
disorganized image in contrast to Nixon’s orderly convention.  For example, David 
Lamb, a Los Angeles Times reporter, interviewed a VVAW protestor, a twenty-five year 
old Miami policeman and an eighteen year old YVPer for an article titled, “3 Young Men 
in Same City Different Orbit.”  After quoting the VVAW protestor, Rusty Bronaugh, who 
claimed “The war in Vietnam is just one of the issues...,” Lamb immediately pointed out 
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that Bronaugh first smoked marijuana at age eleven.  Meanwhile, a Harvard student 
wrote, “By comparison, the YVPs were mindless hordes.”81   Thus, youth politics at the 
RNC hardened the perceived differences between the candidates.   
Hoping to get a more authentic perspective, a group of self-described “video 
freaks” formed a production crew, Top Value Television (TVTV), armed with portable 
Sony porta-pak cameras and filmed a documentary on the RNC, Four More Years.  In 
making Four More Years’, TVTV’s members used cinema verité and distorted fishbowl 
lenses to stage their own version of the convention.   Four More Years introduces the 
Nixon Youth in a compromising situation. In the first scene, a young man, floppy topped 
with side burns, and a young woman with long straight hair, rehearse in a studio for a 
convention appearance. Repeating the chorus, “Nixon now, all we need is Nixon now,” 
and a softer verse, “Reaching out to make dreams reality.”  The footage then shifts to 
shots of YVPers shouting and clapping, “Hey hey, what do you say, Nixon-Agnew all the 
way,” while lined up to greet the President at the Doral Hotel.  TVTV’s editors 
interspersed this image with the  own chant, “Hey-hey, ho-ho, Tricky Dick has got to 
go!”82 Thus, TVTV’s editors immediately framed the contest over America’s youth that 
appeared throughout the documentary.  
After this opening, a segment labeled “Right On Mr. President” begins with a 
tight shot showing a young man on the convention floor screeching, “Yee haw, Right 
On!” Continuing with its focus on the YVPers, TVTV’s crew filmed a formal gathering 
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that Nixon’s daughters, Trish and Julie, hosted with the Nixonettes.  Before the party that 
included dignitaries such Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, one Nixonette organizer 
commends the YVPers working the room, “just the decorations alone will give us the fun 
we need.”  Despite this obvious critique of Nixon’s attempt to appear hip, TVTV’s 
reporters offered the YVPers an opportunity to refute allegations that they only served as 
a “propaganda mill.”  In this candid moment, five YVPers excitedly emphasized their 
voluntary commitment and autonomy to chant whatever they wanted; though, they 
admitted to a rather strict transportation and work schedule.  Contradicting their defense, 
the YVPers answered in unison with a perfectly synchronized “NO!” when TVTV’s 
reporter asked whether the Republican Party forced them to work. 
Other journalists, such as Hunter S. Thompson, joined TVTV reporters’ in 
ridiculing the Nixon Youth.  In his book, Fear and Loathing: On the Campaign Trail, 
1972, Thompson recalls with glee the shocked reactions of a young Nixon supporter (“a 
poor, ignorant young waterhead”) after he told her NBC anchor John Chancellor dropped 
LSD in his drink.  Firing back, one YVP volunteer who attended the convention argued, 
“We were there because we love and respect Mr. Nixon, and our demonstrations were 
spontaneous and sincere.”83  Not all YVPers agreed, as one of Nixon’s young supporters 
acknowledged the YVP volunteers at the convention mattered more for image, 
complaining that “Nothing has anything to do with politics, It’s all cheerleading.”  
Another protested, “I just got fed up with it. I just couldn’t stand every five minutes and 
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cheer, cheer, cheer.”84 
Thus, the YVP members’ authenticity became contested territory for Democrats 
and Republicans.   Democrats claimed the GOP paid YVPers to come and that they did 
not represent American youth politics.  In fact, this select group of YVP’s “hardest 
workers” who made the six-day trip received a special rate for transportation and a room, 
paying half the cost had they attended on their own.
85
  Though Congressmen usually 
contacted them directly with an invitation to attend the convention, they came of their 
own will, paid their own way, and made their own political commitment.  In return for 
their work and their cosmetic ability to liven up the convention, the YVP organizers 
provided the volunteers with “a swimming pool, tennis court, rock bands and games.”86  
The GOP also offered youth events in venues throughout Miami such as a youth speakers 
program and a Youth Appreciation Luau that would bolster the YVP volunteers’ morale 
as well as create photo opportunities.  Still, YVP members who attended the convention 
received nothing in return. This explains the YVP volunteers’ thin skinned reaction to 
reporters who compared them with Mayor Daley’s controlled and paid “sewer workers” 
from the 1968 DNC.  Reacting with “Sewer Workers for Nixon” signs, the YVP got the 
last laugh.  
During the RNC, Nixon finally perfected the “square chic” version of celebrity. 
The convention served as center stage for Nixon's performance in 1972.  From the three 
enormous screens behind the podium, a collage of Nixon’s achievements splashed across 
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the convention, and consequently across the nation; whether shown sipping Champaign 
with Brezhnev or sauntering down the Great Wall of China, Nixon appeared 
presidential.
87
 Although YVPers represented only three percent of the delegation, the 
convention featured them prominently.  Projected on the convention’s screens, hundreds 
YVPers welcomed the Nixon family upon their arrival at the Hotel Fontainebleau 
chanting thunderously, “Four More Years!”88  Furthermore, compensating for the low 
percentage of delegates under thirty, the seating arrangements for the convention 
assigned YVPers to the perimeter of the floor to shape a youthful appearance that the 
New York Times described as “efficiency in Bermuda shorts.”89 
CRP organizers developed a schedule laced with young speakers, but also 
included the 1,500 YVP volunteers inside the convention as “props.”  For example, on 
the night of Nixon’s nomination, the press center erroneously received the Republican 
Party’s choreographed script for the evening’s events.  Though the proceedings did not 
match up exactly with this script, the Nixon Youth’s "spontaneous" cheer, “Nixon 
Now!”- slated to last from 10:33-10:45- only missed by a half hour.90 They waved signs 
that helped bridge generations, such as one that read “Ron Baby, We Love You” which 
they waved enthusiastically for the sixty-one year old Ronald Reagan’s speech.  The 
convention’s proceedings included Nixon’s young supporters and displayed the emerging 
                                                          
87
 David L Paletz; Martha Elson, “Television Coverage of Presidential Conventions:  Now You See It, Now 
You Don’t” (Political Science Quarterly, 91(1), (Spring, 1976)), p.129. 
88
Four More Years, 1972. 
89Robert  Semple Jr., “Youths for Nixon Contrast with Protestors in Park,” New York Times, 22 Aug. 1972, 
A16, p.1. 
90
 James T. Wooten, “Unexpected ‘Preview’ Provides a Jolt To a Hitherto Predictable Convention,” New 
York Times, 23 Aug., 1972, p.26. 
330 
 
 
 
role youth played in politics that year.  Donald Sundquist, president of the Young 
Republicans, addressed the convention’s opening session, arguing: “Never sell our young 
Americans short.”  Rather than some monolithic liberal bloc, Sundquist pushed for the 
more independent minded generation, “We are not going to be taken for granted.  We 
speak for ourselves.”91 Through young voters, Nixon also appealed to the precious blue 
collar vote he planned to peel away from the Democrats.  Utilizing the intense media 
coverage, Nixon’s campaign managers carefully selected delegates to target the working 
class independents who became more common with the youth vote.  The final session of 
the convention began with a “salute to working youth.” In addition, the White House 
invited a twenty-year old boilermaker from Pittsburgh, Ross Scumaci, to second the 
President’s nomination.  Scumaci fit the bill perfectly after the Democrat’s rules excluded 
him from the delegation and pushed him to support Nixon.  In addition, one aide drooled, 
“He is husky, and wears a moustache…[and] will be heading up Working Youth for 
Nixon in the fall.”  While Scumaci’s seconding speech criticized McGovern’s quotas that 
blocked his own role in the Democratic Party, he celebrated Nixon as a friend of the 
working man and, in the eyes of one union leader, “galvanized ethnic and labor 
Democrats around RN.”92  Three “working youth” also offered floor resolutions on the 
RNC’s first night.   
Still the nomination rally, the night before the President’s official coronation as 
the Republican presidential candidate, stood out as the convention’s highlight.  While the 
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rally in Marine Stadium did not begin until 8:30, YVPers arrived two hours early for a 
rally “warm-up” to hear speeches and organize for the ensuing concert.93 Denying the 
damning criticism of the YVP as square, tightly choreographed cheerleaders--fighting 
words for the 1968 generation--one YVP volunteer boasted, “we have great parties and 
some of us even smoke the other stuff.”94 
To enhance his image as “hip,” the President applauded the Nixon Youth during 
his speech at the Marina Bay concert, starring Sammy Davis Jr., only one hour after his 
official nomination.  The president argued against the premise that the youth vote “is in 
anybody’s pocket.” After his speech, and an awkward hug from Davis Jr., Nixon’s youth 
followed the president to the airport where they were granted special access to his 
farewell. Here, Nixon proclaimed, “Those who have predicted that the other side is going 
to win the young voters are simply wrong.”95  Highlighting the YVPers, Nixon’s 
campaign communicated to voters that the President still had control over a threatening 
element of American society—its youth.  This awkward political moment signifies two 
essential points in this dissertation.  First, how much Nixon had learned about the role of 
image and spectacle following the televised debate with John F Kennedy.  Not only did 
Nixon shave for this event, his campaign managers skillfully surrounded the President 
with cheering young faces while he embraced the role of showman-in-chief.  Second, his 
youthful audience forces historians to confront the strange reality that young people liked 
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Nixon.  
 The formula proved a winner and the YVP became central to Nixon’s PR 
campaign. When Nixon announced September 26 as Student Government Day, Rietz lit 
up at the vision of the President inviting hundreds of high school and vocational student 
leaders for a press conference.  This meeting offered Nixon a youthful forum sans the 
unruly campus leaders to discuss his policies over his first term that related to young 
issues. It also would “show the President’s extra effort to give the nation’s newest voters 
some special consideration.”96  Speaking with friendly crowds, Nixon sought out 
sympathetic organizations such as the ultra-patriotic youth branch of the Kiwanis Club, 
the Key Club International.  With its working class appeal and affinity for tradition, this 
group promised Nixon an especially receptive audience as the invitation for the President 
to speak at its twenty ninth annual convention promised “you will not need to be 
concerned with egg throwing or rude behavior.”97 
 Following the successful Marina Bay rally, Rietz also planned a series of eight 
similar events.  After the convention, polls showed Nixon’s lead as high as twelve points 
among voters between eighteen and thirty years old.  By September 28, a Harris poll 
showed the lead down to two.  The differences could have been technical, and the 
students’ return to campuses accounted for the surge in McGovern supporters. Still, as 
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one memo made clear, the change was significant.
98
 
 Rietz defended his efforts, contending that many undecided young voters could 
swing to Nixon. Finding students came easy, but the concerts helped bring together the 
working youth. As Brock explained, the concerts “let us connect with them where they 
were.” These shows presented a different picture of Republicans and Nixon, as they “put 
up some pretty people who could play a pretty good sound” and “make it fun.”99  Special 
youth events scheduled in cities across the nation included a “traveling rock and roll 
revival show-one of the most popular forms of entertainment with young people,” 
modeled after the Marine Stadium event.
100
 These events targeted suburban communities 
that fit the YVP organizers’ demographics, as the “Legend of Rock n’ Roll” tour traveled 
to eight locations in the campaign’s last month.  The tour’s finale at Fairfax High School 
outside of Washington D.C., performed under a large Young Voters for the President 
banner and flanked by large cutout silhouettes of Nixon, featured late 1950s and early 
1960s performers such as The Coasters, The Five Satins and Gary U.S. Bonds.  This 
show called on the traditional brand of rock that existed before 1960s musicians 
revolutionized it.
101
 
For speakers, Nixon’s daughter, Tricia, clad in a “short white knit dress and white 
vinyl boots” stirred up crowds that numbered more than one thousand Nixon supporters.  
Taken aback by the audience’s wild cheering, Tricia joked, “Your E.Q.- enthusiasm 
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quotient-must be at least in the genius category.”  These rallies earned Nixon’s youngest 
praise as “really great,” “dynamite,”  “lovely” and “delightful.”102  Aimed at maximum 
press coverage, the publicity created “peer group pressure” to support Nixon.  While 
YVP activity created the contrast with McGovern’s less disciplined young supporters, it 
also played in important role in the CRP’s covert efforts aimed at finding, exposing and 
exaggerating McGovern’s connections to radical voters.  The rise of image in politics in 
1972 indicated that the candidate focused environment also promoted public and 
clandestine political attacks.  Young voters, eager to contribute, played their own role in 
this bi-product of the image politics.  
Ratfucking and Going Negative 
As youth politics independent majority demanded a larger role for media in 
elections, these voters’ emphasis on the candidate also pushed campaigns to demean each 
other. In Nixon’s attack, the YVP gave the CRP a surreptitious political weapon. Nixon 
could not openly call McGovern’s campaign radical. Nixon’s aide Charles Colson 
argued: “Young people tend to identify with individuals much more than with political 
parties,” and that “all kids tend to identify with each other…it is almost impossible to 
attack one without attacking them all.”103 Complicating the effort, Nixon could not 
develop a one sided critique of young people and their culture, as one advisor pointed 
out, “the hippies can be roundly criticized…but we can’t allow people to think the 
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Administration is against their children.”104 After all, “many of their kids have long 
hair.”105 Thus, Nixon would need to build McGovern’s extremist image without 
contributing to the president’s anti-youth reputation that the YVP meant to counter.   
Restraint became a challenge after McGovern’s liberal and young constituency 
wandered into Nixon’s crosshairs. White House aide Patrick Buchanan took great 
pleasure in McGovern’s primary victories, as he claimed, “Not in our memory has there 
been such a wealth of material with which to tag a national candidate as an extremist.” 
(Buchanan claimed “‘radical’ was overused in 1970…“the term ‘extremist’ is a far more 
difficult one to defend against.”)106  The “three A’s” attack on McGovern’s campaign 
during the primaries pleased Nixon’s advisor, as he planned to let Democrats “do the 
preliminary hatchet work.” Belittling McGovern’s youth movement and the internecine 
battles within the Democratic Party, Buchanan sneered, “McGovern’s ambitious children 
seem to be busy ‘stealing’ [George] Wallace delegates” after a paralyzing gun-shot 
wound forced the former Alabama governor out of the presidential race.
107
 
Buchanan appreciated the political punches when the Democratic candidate 
Scoop Jackson complained that McGovern’s passé approach to marijuana “is a great 
relief to those who, like the Rubin-Hoffman types, like to mix their politics with pot.” 
This critique mirrored the Nixon campaign’s “Assault Book” which argued that “Senator 
McGovern’s catering to young people by suggesting we treat marijuana in the same 
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fashion we treat alcohol is the essence of political irresponsibility.”108  Nixon aides 
begged for McGovern’s nomination, arguing “we must do as little as possible, at this 
time, to impede McGovern’s rise.”  While tempting to attack the Senator on “the 
extremist radical labels; the pro-amnesty and pro-abortion positions; the radical chic 
attitude,” they thought better, arguing, “Let’s not do Hubert’s work for him.”109 
Explaining why Humphrey’s “three A’s” approach failed, Buchanan claimed “his tone of 
attack was negative, and bitchy and strident.”110 Only a calm, confident and credible 
candidate could paint another as an extremist. Framing Nixon’s attack on these terms, the 
YVP members offered an alternative to “McGovern’s kids” with the President’s own 
square version of the Now Generation.  Still, Nixon’s campaign operatives had set in 
motion a clandestine effort to attack his enemies that relied on young loyal supporters. 
 While Nixon’s administration developed its own dirty tricks, many of these 
underhanded strategies filtered down from, and some cases back to, the White House.  
This effort did not target McGovern himself until he had secured the nomination in late 
June.  In fact, Nixon’s young shock troops’ covert political efforts, dubbed “ratfucking,” 
had aimed more at young liberals themselves.   
On December 3, 1971, the American Student Government Association held an 
Emergency Conference on Youth in Chicago at Loyola University. As one hundred or so 
student leaders claimed the meeting meant to secure representation at the national 
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conventions in 1972, it soon evolved into a “Dump Nixon” event.  Journalists compared 
this meeting to a similar conference held by Allard Lowenstein in 1968 which set the 
youth rebellion on a crash course with the Democratic Party and Chicago’s finest.111  
While Nixon representatives tentatively scheduled to attend, Rietz called them off as 
distance became the best strategy.  Instead, Rietz had the event “wired” and placed 
observers which confirmed his suspicions.  The closing statement summed up the one 
point on which conference attendees agreed; they meant to replace Nixon with “someone 
who speaks for the young, the poor, and the hopes of America.”112  For most there, that 
meant George McGovern.  Perhaps most telling, pot toking Mexican comedians “Cheech 
and Chong” provided Saturday night’s entertainment. The liberal Americans for 
Democratic Action secretly funded the $400,000 meeting, and the event itself ended in 
“disarray” as Blacks and Chicanos demanded a more significant role after a weekend of 
“fiery anti-Nixon speeches and political workshops.”  Not even the “fellow from Ripon 
[Society],” normally known for its Republican lean, offered a sympathetic voice for the 
administration.
113
 
Contributing to the chaos, Rietz’ contact, John Venners, wrote after the fact that 
“under instructions [from Rietz] to create more turmoil among the already tense and 
disturbed delegates,” he attended workshops to inquire about the event’s secretive 
funding and met with Chicano leaders to discuss the convention’s inequality and 
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encourage a walk out with the black caucus.
114
   While Rietz’ mole claimed that the 
conference showed radicals’ “effectiveness in practical politics will be nil,” the 
conference did plan for a future youth caucus, but Venners claimed the media 
exaggerated the potential for a threatening organization of young liberals who could form 
a potent voting bloc. 
Capitalizing on the moment, an indignant Republican Congressman took up the 
cause. Speaking on the floor, Representative Louis Frey Jr. of Florida ripped the 
Emergency Conference as “an assault on the President and the Republican Party.”  
Claiming that the conference denied Nixon supporters’ requests to speak, Frey cried foul, 
as the “non-partisan tax exempt" Association of Student Governments that held the 
conference “attempted to manipulate the young people for their own political ends.”115  
As Nixon’s aides attempted to wield the IRS’s power, the intimidation did work.  As 
these “non-partisan” registration events revealed themselves as “dump Nixon” rallies, 
they lost credibility making it difficult for groups such as the Youth Citizenship Fund 
(YCF) to set up programs. The YCF, an organization formed to register non-college 
youth, attracted suspicion that it cared only to recruit Democratic voters and soon became 
fearful that the IRS would investigate its non-partisan status.  In reaction, YCF organizers 
replaced the executive director “because he was becoming too political.”  In addition, a 
Nixon insider became the organization’s’ director of field operations, allowing the White 
                                                          
114
Magruder to Mitchell, December 7, 1971. Papers of JSM, CRP Collection, Nixon Library, Box 29, 
Folder: Alphabetical, Youth, 3 of 4 
115
Congressional record, Representative Louis Frey Jr. (R-Florida), December 9, 1971. PJM Box 29, 
Folder: Subject Files, Alphabetical, (JSM) Youth No.3 [1 of 4]. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA. 
339 
 
 
 
House to “pretty well decide when YCF should be active.”116  The President’s re-election 
campaign relied on its young supporters as weapons in the clandestine, attack politics that 
made Nixon infamous.
117
 
While their positions on Vietnam clearly separated the President from McGovern 
since 1968, Nixon’s men could not resist attacking McGovern’s youthful supporters to 
make other differences more obvious.  A primary vehicle for mudslinging, the “letters 
operation” utilized stockpiled dirt on McGovern and tailored opinion pieces in 
newspapers “to target in on sections of the country.”  One attack line manufactured 
especially for Chicago’s papers quoted McGovern’s comments about Chicago’s finest 
following the 1968 DNC, “those sons of bitches…those bastards,” and condemned him 
for “a knee jerk tendency to exonerate hell raisers.”118 But, while calling out McGovern’s 
soft approach to crime maintained Nixon’s law and order image, Buchanan scoffed that 
the “three A’s” attack as “so ‘cute’ as to make it appear we are simply political.”119 For 
Buchanan, “three A’s” did not associate McGovern with the extremist label clearly 
enough.  This line of attack would take more work than a simple catch phrase.  In 
addition, CRP’s organizers increased its young volunteers’ visibility to expose McGovern 
as the “fraud and super politician that he is” by also offering an alternative to radical 
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youth politics that stigmatized the left. 
120
 
 Youth speakers soon got hold of the Nixon Assault Book, as the YVP’s speakers 
director asked Buchanan to share “some grape shot for the close range work.” The self-
described “field artillery,” or speakers, focused their speeches based on the audience.  For 
non-college crowds, or “wage-earners,” YVP speakers emphasized McGovern’s stance 
on the issues that fixed him to his radical stigma, “abortion, pot, the war.”121  Nixon’s 
campaign for young voters pulled no punches, and the YVP both encouraged and 
absorbed that approach. 
During October, Nixon’s campaign ethics came under further scrutiny when 
several students contended that a Nixon operative, Donald Segretti, offered cash for 
clandestine campaign activity.  Fresh out of the Army, Segretti relished the chance to 
rehash his college days at USC with Nixon chief of staff H.R. Haldeman.  Steeped in the 
fraternity politics of espionage and subterfuge, or “ratfucking,” Segretti pulled out his old 
tricks in the campus campaign and worked through the YVP College Director, George 
Gorton, to locate cooperative young voters who could infiltrate, sabotage or gather 
information for Nixon’s campaign. The College Republicans president at George 
Washington claimed that he received $150 a month from CRP to infiltrate radical groups 
and report information on individuals that would go to Rietz.  While this would not 
hinder Nixon’s juggernaut campaign, it would fall under the larger Watergate umbrella as 
one of CRP’s leaders’ many sinister moves which brought down the President. As the 
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Nixon presidency quickly unraveled, a 1973 General Accounting Office audit determined 
that CRP had maintained a clandestine “Kiddie Corps” that Nixon busting journalists Bob 
Woodward and Carl Bernstein claimed to have served as “young spies around the 
country.”122 In addition to the YVP’s reputation as manipulated and contrived, this 
“tricky” legacy ignores this political moment’s larger significance.  Nixon’s campaign 
organizers turned McGovern’s strength, young voters, into his biggest problem while the 
YVP turned Nixon’s weakness into a political force.  
Lessons Learned: Youth and Image 
 In the end, Nixon’s youth campaign succeeded.  On voting day, only eleven 
million of the twenty-five million voters under twenty-five showed up at the polls.  While 
McGovern won this segment by a fifty-two to forty- six percent margin, Nixon fared 
better when including all the voters under thirty who Nixon’s youth campaign managers 
targeted.
123
  Over twenty-eight percent under thirty registered as independent, and Nixon 
won an overwhelming majority of this segment as only twenty-six percent identified 
themselves as Republicans.
124
 It did not win the majority, but it played an important role 
in Nixon’s landslide victory by a sixty-one to thirty-eight point difference. Nixon’s YVP 
also helped draw a clear distinction between his campaign and his opponents, a necessity 
in the candidate focused environment that these the increasingly independent youth 
fostered. As pundits remarked that this election marked “the year the independent voter 
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‘arrived,’” they feared its influence on the political system—charisma would overcome 
competence.  One Wall Street Journal article downplayed this change, claiming that “few 
candidates have been less charismatic than President Nixon.”125  Charisma did matter in 
1972—though in this case the young voters offered this necessary political ingredient.  
Youth politics opened up this election to new and creative strategies that changed 
campaigns in modern American politics. Correspondingly, YVP’s members attracted 
attention as a model of distortion in America’s image-based politics by his opponents, but 
a model of authenticity to his silent majority.   
Convinced that the mass media worked against Nixon, especially on the youth 
problem, Nixon turned to his own resources in the November Group and the YVP to win 
the image war.  As youth politics emerged in 1972, young Americans brought their 
image-conscious outlook into both campaigns’ strategies. While one leadership group in 
the YVP focused on public relations and rallies, the larger leadership cohort focused on 
registration and “The get-out-the vote program.”126  These two thrusts encapsulate the 
competing visions of young people’s role in politics after 1972—youth as symbol vs. 
youth as voter.  In Nixon’s campaign, youth politics merged the participatory politics and 
a PR effort.  This new political approach may have offended traditionalists and idealists, 
but also opened up politics to new groups and required tremendous organizational 
discipline.  Thus, the politics of image changed the American political system, but did not 
replace it.
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Conclusion 
 
After Nixon won the election, he assigned Jeb Magruder as the inauguration’s 
Executive Director. Nixon’s Inaugural Committee planned an event that one journalist 
described as “colossal,” while Magruder vowed to bring the “best inauguration ever.”952 
Lacking any public funding to pay for this elaborate fete, Magruder brought YVP director 
Ken Rietz onboard as the director for fundraising events.  Fundraisers included traditional 
dinners but also offered concerts starring the Mike Curb Congregation, James Brown, 
Hank Williams Jr., and the Pat Boone Family that brought in $100 a ticket. Rietz utilized 
his trustworthy cadre of YVP leaders to organize five balls, including one for youth. 
Assuring that Nixon’s second term began with a youthful, polished and welcoming image 
for the Republican Party, Rietz also made sure the ceremony’s budget finished in the 
black.   
Some in Nixon’s administration believed Rietz belonged on a short list to become 
the RNC Chairman. After young Nixon supporters achieved “movement” status in 1972, 
YVP leaders such as Rietz and Gorton would have to participate in Congressional 
hearings on Watergate—damaging their careers’ trajectory. This project looks beyond 
Nixon’s “dirty tricks” and focuses on his presidency’s larger, structural significance in 
modern politics.  Still, Watergate does explain the YVP’s limits. Even YVP leadership on 
the ground level felt Watergate’s stigma. As Cathy Bertini recalled, “everyone lost 
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everything,” when she described watching Nixon’s resignation speech while sitting in a 
room of crying co-workers.   
Rebuilding the GOP, however, required young leaders to continue the Republican 
Party’s search for a new majority. Angela Miller, the YVP’s Chairperson, served as the 
first White House Youth Affairs Office director revealing two important ways that 
Nixon’s youth campaign’s influenced the Republican Party.  First, leadership and training 
personnel who helped build the YVP became important leaders in Nixon’s second term 
administration and beyond.  Cathy Bertini became the White House’s second Youth 
Affairs director in 1975 during Gerald Ford’s presidency.  In addition, the need to 
establish a White House Youth Affairs Office shows that youth politics became 
entrenched in the politics of youth. Nixon’s campaign charted a new approach to youth 
issues and young people’s attitudes as the YVP mobilized young voters and included 
young people in the process as the White House built young Americans’ trust in the 
president through policies.   
YVP leaders’ campaign for young voters marked the New Republican reach to 
expand the GOP’s constituency. Bill Brock, considering the YVP legacy, remembered 
that the organization relied on “a belief that we need to get more people involved and 
believing that they can make a difference.”  Brock would test this strategy when he 
became the RNC Chairman in 1977. Attempting to rebuild the GOP in the Watergate 
aftermath, Brock’s strategy borrowed from the YVP playbook. In meetings that the RNC 
named Concord Conferences, teams of RNC staffers recruited “young people who look 
like the people from their community…Polish people need Polish leaders…” These 
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conferences trained young people on activism and recruited them into local offices.  As a 
result, Brock claimed, voters would think, “hey, Republicans look like us.” “That was 
where I think it [YVP] made lasting differences.  Give that community a voice.” Thus, as 
youth politics showed conservatives that they could find new constituencies the tactics 
and organization this effort required became an important element of the successes 
conservative politics enjoyed after 1972.  This approach continued the politics of image 
that the GOP molded during Nixon’s 1972 youth campaign. The youth organization 
showed Republicans how a youthful image could help shed previous notions of the GOP 
as the “tired and dreary” party of bankers.  While scholarship on the rise of conservatism 
argues that the GOP moderated the party after the 1964 Goldwaterites took it too far to 
the right, this focus on youth politics shows that the youth vote provided a way for 
Republicans to finally convince the nation that New Republicans could offer a more 
convincing alternative to New Deal liberals. 
After Watergate, young Republicans at the 1976 RNC, including stewardesses, 
wore pins to drive home their purpose that read, “Republicans are people too.”953 
Reflecting on the role of image, even Bill Brock came to join the concerned chorus 
protesting its negative influence on democracy.  Speaking years later, Brock testified that 
30-second ads had “tended to create the impression that solutions are simple” and that “it 
also leads to polarization in politics.”954 “We would never have considered ourselves the 
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kind of right we see today,” Brock argued, “We were open, honest, welcoming.”955 Brock 
understood that the GOP built its majority on an expanded constituency, and that the 
unraveling of that constituency would make the Republican Party harder to unite behind 
any one candidate and conservative platform.  
While pundits often hail political independents in America, the role these voters 
play in the elections. And while Nixon’s campaign appealed to this segment, both parties 
found it increasingly difficult to get independent voters to turn out at the polls.  Thus, this 
increasingly independent element of the young voters, central to Nixon’s strategy, slowly 
lost their connection to the political process.  The voting rate among non-college, white 
voters under thirty-five decreased from fifty-nine percent in 1964 to thirty-one percent 
1988.  While voting rates dropped for college educated young whites as well, their rates 
only fell from seventy-one to sixty-three percent.
956
  In addition, the independents of this 
generation contributed to the rise of image politics as parties mattered less. 
Young Democrats also learned lessons about image and politics from 1972. For 
young, shrewd, and more optimistic political newcomers such as Bill Clinton and Hillary 
Rodham, McGovern simply went too far left.  In January, 1972, Rodham’s memo to Bill 
Clinton painted a rather bleak picture of McGovern’s fortunes in Texas.  Rodham 
claimed that the slight increase in voter registration for the Democrats “is black, brown 
and youth,” suggesting that the campaign had become too reliant on minorities and young 
voters. Clinton witnessed the liberal grasp for youth gone awry, and learned to reconcile 
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the Democrat’s version of New Politics with the socially conservative direction after the 
1960s.  While Clinton’s presidential campaign used McGovern’s youthful strategy to 
build a grassroots and broad constituency with a celebrity persona, he paid careful 
attention to the issues that ruled political discourse after the 1960s. As the Republicans 
dragged him through his anti-war, draft dodging, pot-smoking days, Clinton’s use of 
MTV to appear youthful, hip but also authoritative succeeded where McGovern could 
not. Yet, his image as a product of the 1960s’ left, as it did to McGovern, fueled a 
vehement opposition.  The 1972 election and, to some extent, every national election 
since, has fought over the 1960s’ legacy and influence on American politics.  Looking at 
1972 and McGovern’s attempt to embrace the previous decade’s influence on the 
Democratic Party through his New Politics, the rise of social and cultural issues in 
politics instead seared the radical liberal label into Americans’ historical memory of the 
1960s’ “youth revolt.”  
During the late 1960s and early 1970s politicians catered to youth politics that 
carried Americans’ greatest hopes for the future. Even before the 1972 election, that 
optimism had already regressed, allowing for elements of pre-1960s youth-phobia as 
journalist Marya Mannes’ Boston Globe op-ed answered the question, “Would you be 18 
now?” Mannes admitted she would embrace the opportunity to “feel the high surge of 
vitality that belongs uniquely to the flaming span of youth” and “to play a part in making 
a much better life on earth than we now have.” But, in conclusion, Mannes answered no. 
“No-to the unstructured life…to the erosion of ritual and tradition both now under fire 
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from the young who deny the value of either…to dependence on drugs.”957 The allure of 
youth had lost its luster.  
While the youth-craze ran its course after 1972, the struggle to define this 
generations’ politics had just begun. Even in recent politics, both conservative and liberal 
politicians, pundits and activists hold up this era’s protest politics or memories of radicals 
to rekindle our hopes or fears that we trace to the sixties experience.  Understanding the 
political environment they entered, and changed, this story shows that baby boomers 
brought politics into a new era that placed culture above bread and butter issues, elevated 
image above party loyalty and merged grassroots politics with modern communication 
methods. And while youth politics shaped Nixon’s “silent majority,” young voters also 
learned from Nixon. 
After Richard Nixon resigned, many young Americans found it quite believable 
that Tricky Dick broke the law.  But for many of the of young voters in America who cast 
their ballot for the President, their image of Richard Nixon from the 1972 election could 
not be reconciled with the long list of dirty tricks connected to the White House.  He ran 
as the statesman, the trustworthy and steadfast leader, and the moral voice to calm the 
decade of permissiveness and protest.  To those who chose the moral Nixon, they were 
let down. To other, more libertarian minded conservatives amongst the youth, Nixon did 
not represent the solution, but a vehicle with which conservative youth could gain entry 
into the powerful and influential positions.  Nixon’s policies fell short for many young 
ideologues on the right, but his tactics, methods (both overt and covert) could not be beat.  
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While shifting to the right took much longer than conservatives would have liked, 
Nixon’s presidency played a signature role in ending the New Deal coalition and 
beginning a Republican one.  Even as they railed against the youth revolt, youth politics 
made the conservatives’ effort to build a new political majority possible. While 
Watergate dragged down the CRP’s reputation, the YVP story shows that this “campaign 
within a campaign” introduced a political generation to modern politics and vice versa.   
Through the 1980s, the Republican Party owned the youth vote.  Ronald Reagan 
and then George Bush won this voting bloc by large majorities as they offered a 
successful record on the economy to contrast with the Carter legacy and popular positions 
on conservative social values.  The twenty-somethings from the 1980s remain the most 
reliably Republican cohort.  However, the youth vote dynamics have shifted as the Bush 
years economic woes and socially conservative position on issues such as gay rights and 
abortion have undermined the GOP image as the moderate party that attracted so many 
independent young voters in 1972.
958
 Democrats have also contributed to this shift, as 
they have learned to incorporate youth politics into the politics of youth with a focus on 
organization, policy and image that resonate with new voters.  While pundits have 
recently explained the youth vote’s emergence as a predictably Democratic constituency, 
this dissertation shows that this political loyalty can make a lasting influence, but also 
that either party could gain young people’s votes with the right formula.  Today, while 
some older Americans decry the increasingly influential role young people play in the 
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major facets of American society--economic, cultural and political—these aging critics 
have only themselves to blame.  While the baby boomer generation continues the age old 
refrain, “kids these days,” it was the 1968 generation that demanded a larger role for 
themselves and pushed the nation to include young Americans in politics.  
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